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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (21545)3/17/2002 3:36:54 AM
From: Nadine Carroll  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 281500
 
The Three Faces Of Sharon, a Man Alone
By Martin Indyk
Sunday, March 17, 2002; Page B01

What is Ariel Sharon up to? Last week, ahead of U.S. presidential envoy Anthony Zinni's third attempt at an Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire, Sharon undertook a series of dramatic steps that seemed to contradict everything he had done immediately before.

He declared that Yasser Arafat was free to leave his virtual prison in Ramallah. He dropped his long-standing demand for seven days of complete quiet before implementing a cease-fire plan. And he let it be known that he was willing to accept American monitoring ofa cease-fire. Sharon also endorsed a meeting between Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Palestinian negotiators, instructed his son to reestablish contact with Arafat and held his own meeting with the Palestinian leader's economic adviser.

Is this the same Sharon who had earlier deemed Arafat irrelevant and expressed regret that he had not killedhim when he had him under siege in Beirut 20 years ago? How should we interpret the intentions of this Israeli leader who, while signaling flexibility toward U.S. cease-fire proposals, dispatches the Israeli army to occupy Palestinian cities and refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza, killingmore than 100 Palestinians and culminating in a full-scale armored invasion of the interim Palestinian capital of Ramallah?

To understand Sharon, we need to recognize that at any particular moment there are, in fact, three different Sharons competing for the mind of the Israeli prime minister: the general, the politician and the statesman.

Sharon the general is a familiar figure. He's the Israeli who has fought terror all his adult life and who believes in the efficacy of force and in the importance ofterrain. He's the defense minister who, in 1982, sent the Israeli army into Lebanon, confronted the United States, and was implicated in the Lebanese Phalangists' slaughter of hundreds of Palestinian refugees. He laid siege to Beirut, destroyed the Palestinian state-within-a-state, and evicted Arafat. And he's the leader who surely sees the advantage of doingthat to Arafat again -- this time in the West Bank. General Sharon was also the first to advocate that Jordan become the Palestinian state, and he was responsible for building many of the strategically located, outlying settlements in the West Bank, designed to render impossible the establishment of a contiguous Palestinian state there. In these days of unremitting Palestinian violence and terror, General Sharon is surely telling Prime Minister Sharon to go and finish the job.

Then there's Sharon the politician. He's much less sure of the right course. He was elected with a mandate to stop the violence, and promised Israelis peace as well as security. He has delivered neither. Instead, the Israeli economy has tanked, and people throughout the country are living in fear of the next terror attack and in despair for the future of their children. As a result, Sharon the politician is losing popularity fast; more than 60 percent of Israelis now disapprove of the job he is doing.

Sharon the politician is being torn by opposing political forces. He is being pulled to the right by a formidable challenge from Binyamin "Bibi" Netanyahu, who now commands majority support in the Likud, Sharon's own party. Netanyahu, a former prime minister, is gaining strength because he unabashedly advocates the destruction of the Palestinian Authority and the eviction of Arafat. And unless Sharon steals his thunder by acting resolutely against Arafat, Netanyahu could outflank Sharon and threaten his chances for reelection.

On the other hand, Sharon the politician is being pulled to the left. He knows that if he goes too far with force and reoccupies the West Bank and Gaza, he will lose the Labor Party from his coalition. Now that Avignor (Yvette) Lieberman's ultra-right wing Russian party Yisrael Beiteinu has left the government, the departure of the Labor Party could cause the collapse of the coalition, precipitating early elections and a leadership contest in the Likud that Sharon would likely lose to his nemesis, Netanyahu. Thus, politician Sharon is caught in a no-win situation, accused by the left of going too far, by the right of not going far enough, and by the center of destroying their hope.

Finally, there's Sharon the statesman, surprised to find himself inhabiting the prime minister's residence at the very end of his controversial political career. He feels the full weight of responsibility for the well-being of the Jewish nation. He has been given one last chance to remove the stigma of the ill-fated war in Lebanon from his historical legacy. This Sharon does not intend to repeat the mistakes of Sharon the general. He will not be the one to send the Israeli army into the West Bank and Gaza to reprise the Lebanese quagmire. This is not just a matter of personal pride. Sharon the aspiring statesman is fully aware of the corrosive effect of reoccupation on a reserve army and knows that Israel cannot afford the signal of weakness that would be sent by another unilateral withdrawal in the face of Arab violence.

Statesman Sharon, unlike General Sharon, proposes an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, empathizes with Palestinian suffering, is ready to freeze all settlement activity (if the violence and terror stop), and even hints at dismantling some of them. He knows the limits of force and understands that Arafat can benefit more than Israel from an escalation that precipitates international intervention.

Sharon the statesman also knows the advantages of coordination with Washington. Indeed, he will do whatever he can to avoid letting any daylight show between the United States and Israel, knowing that Arafat, if given the chance, would do his best to drive a wedge between the Jewish state and its superpower patron. He is sensitive to President Bush's interest in regional stability and has assured him that while he will fight terror, he will not do so in a way that causes broader instability. Sharon the statesman therefore prefers the option of American-led international pressure on Arafat to stop the intifada, backed by the threat rather than the use of massive Israeli force.

At any particular moment in this crisis, one or other of these Sharons is dominant. Last week, Sharon the General sent the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) into the West Bank and Gaza in a move that was reminiscent of his 1982 war for Lebanon. But Sharon the Politician quickly found himself in an argument with the Labor Party leader and defense minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, over the extent of the operation, and accepted its curtailment. Meanwhile, Sharon the Statesman found himself for the first time harshly criticized by President Bush, prompting his embrace of Zinni's mission in order to close the gap with the United States and focus American pressure on Arafat.

Sharon is recognized in Israel for his tactical prowess. But the problem he now faces -- and all three Sharons surely know it -- is that he is fast running out of maneuvering room. The general is one step away from destroying the Palestinian Authority and reoccupying the West Bank and Gaza. The politician finds his position growing increasingly tenuous as his popularity sinks and the prospect of early elections looms. And the statesman has discovered that Phase II of the U.S. war on terror requires him to calm, rather than escalate, the crisis if he wants to stay on the right side of an American president who does not welcome the distraction of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict while he is preparing to topple Saddam Hussein.

So Sharon moves right in preparation for moving left. He sends the army into Palestinian cities and refugee camps in a draconian operation to prove his toughness and reassure an Israeli public shaken by the carnage of innocents in their streets. And then he readies himself for a U.S.-monitored cease-fire, an army pullback, a suspension of targeted assassinations, a political negotiation and even a settlements freeze.

He probably calculates that he can rely on Arafat not to fulfill commitments required by a cease-fire plan proposed last year by CIA Director George Tenet or the recommendations of a commission headed by former senator George Mitchell. Then, Sharon probably figures, he will not be blamed for continuing violence. But that will not resolve his dilemma. It may buy him a little more time but it will not be sufficient to extract him from the increasingly tight corner he is now in.

Sharon,who owns a ranch, once told me that he is haunted by the image of one of his cows bellowing as it finds itself being pushed through the ever-narrowing "corrales" to the slaughterhouse. And that's how he sees himself, struggling to avoid the mounting domestic and international pressures that could force him into his own corral. But what Sharon may not understand is that this evasive maneuvering is leading him closer to the fate he fears.

As he begins to recognize what lies in front of him, we should expect the prime minister to become receptive to a U.S. initiative that not only aims to stop the terror and violence but also launches a political process. That is the only way that Statesman Sharon can assert himself over General Sharon. And it's the only way that Politician Sharon can show his people that he can indeed deliver a process that holds out some hope of producing not just the security but also the peace he promised them.

Martin Indyk is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. From 1995-97 and from 2000 to 2001, he served as U.S. ambassador to Israel, including during the first six months of Ariel Sharon's tenure as prime minister.

washingtonpost.com



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (21545)3/17/2002 7:54:09 AM
From: skinowski  Respond to of 281500
 
Interesting recent summary from Debka.

debka.com

Will Zinni’s Mission Succeed?
DEBKAfile Political and Military Analysts Add More Questions

15 March: First, it depends on the nature of US envoy Anthony Zinni’s brief. If it is, as officially and publicly defined, to convince Palestinians and Israelis to suspend the grim cycle of violence and bloodshed and accept a truce – then the answer is: Not likely.
He might bring Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to the point of saying the right words – or even signing a paper. Any such pledge will survive only long enough to be trumpeted by the media - before it is blown away.
The reason? The Palestinians are satisfied they have terrorized Israel to a draw, and are determined to press their advantage by redoubling their onslaught.
DEBKAfile analyses this perception:
Israel’s main feats:
1. The seizure of the Karine-A arms smuggling ship, before the cargo reached Palestinian hands;
2. The capture of all Palestinian towns;
3. Deep incursions into hardline Palestinian terror strongholds sheltering in the refugee camps, to begin the task of rooting out the hardline al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades command centers run by Arafat’s Fatah. Thousands of Palestinian activists were detained and bomb and rocket manufacturing facilities destroyed.
4. Effective intelligence penetration of the most dangerous Tanzim and al Aqsa Brigades terrorist organizations, and the targeted liquidations of 70 percent of the hit and suicide teams poised ready to go.
5. The temporary removal of the Qasam rocket threat hanging over Israel’s Sharon and Shomron areas north of Tel Aviv - and possibly Jerusalem;
6. The shattering of much of the extremist Hamas and Jihad Islami’s operational capability;
7. The Gaza Strip and most of its terror machinery have been sealed off from adjoining Israeli territory;
8. These operations were achieved for a relatively small number of Israeli troop casualties and low collateral damage to civilian life.
Palestinian achievements:
1. A high degree of operational mobility against superior Israeli military strength;
2. Offensives that level both sides of the military playing field, in the face of Israel’s military preponderance. Examples: The two surprise assaults on Israeli military roadblocks at Ein Arik and Ofra; the blowing up of two Israeli Merkava tanks in the Gaza Strip;
3. The ability to constantly restart waves of mass-casualty terror:
4. The preservation of the various Palestinian security forces’ operational frameworks although IDF forces were present in Palestinian towns;
5. The almost uninterrupted flow from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon to Palestinian areas of trained guerrilla fighters, arms, explosives and funds;
6. The ongoing Palestinian operational interrelations with outside terrorist groups – Hamas, Jihad Islami, Hizballah, Imad Mughniyeh, al Qaeda and Iraqi military intelligence.
This deadlock ties in significantly with the broader Middle East scene, chiefly the advancing US military preparations for its offensive against Iraq and the al Qaeda bases going up in Lebanon.
According to the latest intelligence reports, the Iran-backed arch-terrorist, Imad Mughniyeh, turned up in Lebanon last week. One of the joint Iranian-al Qaeda-Hizballah operational chiefs, he is closely connected both with Arafat and Osama bin Laden. In Lebanon, he joins Abu Zubaideh, another top al Qaeda operative, who has settled in the south. Their presence there signals a further upsurge of Middle East violence.
Arab League rulers meanwhile get set for their Beirut summit opening next Wednesday, March 27, which coincided with the onset of the Israeli Arab community’s Land Day - that most years ends in riots, and the Jewish Seder ceremony ushering in the Passover festival. In the current atmosphere, each of these events are potential tinderboxes.
Moreover, DEBKAfile reports from Baghdad the Iraqi leadership’s conviction that the Americans will strike in the first days of April – at latest – with a spearhead operation in the central sector of the front, ie the Jordanian-Iraqi border - in order to break through to Baghdad. US raids from the north and south – from Turkey and Kuwait – will be no more than diversionary actions, in the view of Saddam’s advisers.
All these circumstances combine to harden Arafat’s posture. Anthony Zinni can look forward, at best, to an ad hoc Palestinian consent on limited issues, such as new red lines for combatants should the violence continue to escalate.
If Zinni’s mission is purely diplomatic – to sit the parties down and lead them into the Tenet ceasefire framework and the Mitchell peace blueprint – he might as well give up now. The criticism coming from the US state department of Israeli military actions may make good news copy but has little effect on the ground, except for raising Israeli leaders’ blood pressure.
However, the retired Marine general’s mission makes sense, if he is the man on the spot to watch over America’s military and political interests in a very troubled and terror-ridden period, across a region that takes in Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians, the eastern Mediterranean and even Turkey.
Zinni officiated as OC of the US Central Command until the end of 1998, when he handed over to the incumbent General Tommy Franks, who now manages the Afghanistan War. During his stint, the retired general dealt with the upsurge of al Qaeda terror against US targets in Saudi Arabia. He is amply qualified for a military-diplomatic role in the coming Iraq conflict, possibly as a sort of unofficial super-commander of the western flank, under his successor, General Franks. That is why his assignment is open-ended.
When US vice president Richard Cheney arrives for talks with Israeli leaders next week, the ground will have been prepared for him by Zinni, who sat down with Israel’s armed forces chiefs the day he arrived, Thursday, March 14, as well as with political leaders. DEBKAfile’s military sources expect Cheney’s most important interview in Israel to be his encounter with Zinni, where concrete decisions are likely to be taken in the light of the envoy’s updated briefing.



To: Nadine Carroll who wrote (21545)3/17/2002 10:50:15 AM
From: Zeev Hed  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Nadine, it would also help if the Saudi start and speak less with a forked tongue, look at what they publish in their official journals:

A Look at Israel’s Latest Potential Peace
Partner
(IsraelNN.com) Accompanying calls from Saudi
Arabian officials for the “normalization of ties”
between the Arab world and Israel is the
publication of libelous anti-Semitic propaganda in a
state-run paper.

The Saudis speak of the baking of Aznei Haman
cookies for the Purim holiday as well as
preparation of matza for the upcoming Passover
holiday by using the blood of Christian or Muslim
children.

The article appearing in the daily ‘Riad’ speaks of
how the Jews take the blood from of a Christian or
Muslim child and dry it into granules which are
then mixed into the dough preparation by a Jewish
religious figure.

Zeev