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To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (48780)3/18/2002 12:50:26 PM
From: elpolvo  Respond to of 65232
 
jw-

any word on when that nasty NASDAQ might
might lift the trading halt on NoWAY?

biz.yahoo.com

-polvie



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (48780)3/18/2002 1:14:54 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Tracking the Trouble Caused by WorldCom's Bernie Ebbers

By Jerry Knight
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, March 18, 2002; Page E01

Seems like every day lately, Washington investors find a new reason to wish they'd never heard of Bernie Ebbers.

Bernard J. Ebbers, chairman of WorldCom Inc., has managed to turn two of the most innovative technology companies in Washington history into two of the worst investments in the region.

Shares of Digex Inc., a pioneer in the business of hosting Web sites, once were worth more than $30 a share. Since WorldCom acquired Intermedia Communications Inc., which controls Digex, the stock has skidded to $1.42 a share from about $10.

MCI Communications was the star of Washington's telecommunications industry before being acquired by WorldCom. Since Ebbers came up with the idea of creating a separate tracking stock for WorldCom's Washington-based MCI Group last summer, the shares have plunged to $8.02 a share from $22.50.

The twin tracking stock of WorldCom Group has done almost as badly, falling from $17.85 to $7.40.

The two WorldCom stocks dropped sharply last week after it was revealed that the Securities and Exchange Commission is conducting a sweeping investigation of accounting practices at WorldCom, whose auditor just happens to be Arthur Andersen.

Based on the list of documents the SEC is demanding from the company, the probe sounds all too familiar. Service swaps with other companies that may have inflated the revenues of both firms. Potential hanky-panky in accounting for acquisitions. Possible double counting of revenue. Questionable write-offs of bad debts.

In all, the SEC is asking about 24 different topics. Some are targeted down to the 14th subparagraph, leading to speculation that insiders have tipped off the SEC on what to look for. Some are stunningly sweeping, including "all documents created or reviewed by WorldCom's COOs, CEOs, CFOs, Controller or Board of Directors and all committees thereof concerning."

You get the message. Turn on the Xerox machines. Unleash the paralegals. Then rent a couple trucks and haul it all over to the SEC.

In statements, the company has said it has done nothing wrong, has nothing to hide and doesn't know why the SEC started its investigation.

One thing that probably unleashed the watchdog is in item No. 21 on the SEC's shopping list, which takes dead aim at Ebbers himself. The SEC is demanding "all documents concerning loans made by WorldCom to any of its officers." That would include the $341 million loan the company gave the chairman last month to bail him out of his bad investments.

While part of the reason that WorldCom and MCI stocks are down is that the telecommunications industry is in the tank, at least as much of the blame belongs to Ebbers.

The plan he came up with last year to create separate stocks for the MCI long-distance part of the company and WorldCom's Internet services was a loser from the beginning. The company did not actually split in two. Instead, Ebbers created what are called tracking stocks for the MCI Group and the WorldCom Group.

The price of the MCI Group tracking stock is supposed to reflect how that part of the operation is doing. Ditto for the WorldCom side of the operation. The trackers trade on the Nasdaq Stock Market, under the symbols WCOM and MCIT.

The tracking stock concept has been around for years and is based on the premise that the sum of the parts is worth more than the whole company. The financial engineers who came up with tracking stocks contend the markets simply don't understand complicated companies. Create separate tracking stocks and Wall Street will reward you with a higher value, they promised.

It has almost never worked. Circuit City Stores Inc. tried it in 1997, creating a tracking stock for its CarMax auto dealerships. Predictably, the performance of the CarMax tracking stock and Circuit City's shares has been disappointing. They trade as KMX and CC on the New York Stock Exchange. A few weeks ago, Circuit City announced it will abandon the tracking stock experiment and will spin off CarMax into a separate company, with actual shares.

The flaw in the tracking stock theory is that investors seem to have even more trouble understanding tracking stocks than they do understanding companies with diversified businesses.

I predicted last summer that WorldCom's tracking stock scheme would fail to "enhance shareholder value," just as almost all others had. Ebbers responded in a letter to the editor that the criticism was "based on the performance of dissimilar tracking stocks and a narrow view of business prospects."

"The employees of the MCI Group welcome the opportunity to exceed the predictions that fall so severely short of our potential and, more important satisfy the expectations of the many investors who share our belief in a prosperous future," he wrote.

The shares of the MCI and WorldCom tracking stocks began to fall on the first day of trading and have never added up to what WorldCom stock was worth before it was bifurcated.

The false promise of the financial engineers is not the only reason for that. Since last summer the financial performances of both parts of the company have deteriorated. Sales of the WorldCom Group fell 9.6 percent to $5.3 billion in the fourth quarter, and profit was down 42 percent to $347 million. The MCI Group's sales slid 16 percent to $3.18 billion, and the group, which had a fourth-quarter profit of $125 million the previous year, posted a loss of $89 million.

The company's weakening profits started the stocks' slide last year, and the decline accelerated in the past few days after it was disclosed that the SEC launched its investigation of WorldCom's accounting practices. MCI Group's stock fell 18 percent last week; WorldCom Group's fell 19 percent.

The SEC probe also has driven down the value of the billions of dollars of bonds issued by WorldCom, which the Bloomberg financial news service ranks as the sixth-largest borrower in the U.S. bond market.

In a single day last week the price of a WordCom bond with a $1,000 face value plunged from $912 to $868. At that price, the WorldCom bonds, which were issued carrying a 7.5 percent interest rate, are yielding 9.71 percent. That's high. The yield is only 7.41 percent on some General Motors Corp.'s bonds that mature at about the same time.

Those numbers suggest the bond market calculates that the chances of not getting paid when you buy WorldCom bonds is roughly 30 percent greater than the chances of not getting paid by GM.

Call it the Bernie Ebbers discount.

Is it fair to blame it all on Ebbers? Absolutely. It's his company, as much of a one-man show as a $35 billion a year business can be.

Ebbers built WorldCom into what it is: one of the nation's biggest telecommunications companies, the outfit whose fiber-optic cables connect the 19 million customers of America Online, link together all the Federal Aviation Administration's air controllers and provides similar communications services to thousands of other customers.

Ebbers built the company with acquisitions, starting with a few little phone companies that hoped to profit from deregulation and ending with the acquisitions of UUNet and MCI, two of the most successful and important telecoms in Washington – except for AOL Time Warner.

If there was ever any doubt that WorldCom is Ebbers's baby, it was dispelled by the loan the company gave him last year when he got a margin call from the brokers who lent him more than $250 billion using his WorldCom stock as collateral.

Other founders have lost control of their companies after making the mistake of mortgaging their personal stock. It happened to William Schrader, who created PSINet Inc. It happened to Robert Kopstein, founder of Optical Cable Corp. of Roanoke. It didn't happen to Ebbers because he used WorldCom as his personal piggy bank.

The company generously agreed to lend Ebbers all the money he needed to cover his debts and to lend it to him at a bargain rate – about 2.15 percent. That is less than half the prime rate charged by banks, which is 4.75 percent, and well below what he could borrow the money for from any brokerage house.

That's what it costs WorldCom to borrow, company officials say, so it's only fair to charge the chairman the same rate. It's not fair to stockholders, however. Charging Ebbers the going rate would take $15 million to $20 million out of his pocket and put it into stockholders' pockets, giving the company a badly needed revenue boost.

The company also argues that bailing out Ebbers is good for shareholders. That, unfortunately, may be true. When Kopstein was forced to sell his controlling interest in Optical Cable to meet margin calls last year, the stock plummeted from $8 to around $1 and has never come back.

Kopstein, however, controlled about 90 percent of Optical Cable's stock and liquidation of his holdings flooded the market. Ebbers's holdings are closer to 1 percent of WorldCom's outstanding stock. Selling Ebbers's shares would dampen the market, but not drown it.

Giving loans to corporate executives always is an affront to ordinary shareholders and Ebbers's loan is one of the biggest ever, according to the William M. Mercer Inc. The firm scoured through company reports for the Wall Street Journal and found no other executive loans of more than $15 million.

Don't blame me, Ebbers told Maria Bartiromo of CNBC last week. "I was asked not to sell my stock by the company, and I did that," he said.

It'll be interesting to see whether that answer satisfies the SEC. So far in the flap over the Bernie bailout, no one has asserted that it is illegal, only that it is wrong.

The loan, alas is not the only thing WorldCom has done lately to protect its chairman. Earlier this month, the company adopted a "poison pill" takeover defense that makes it all but impossible for anyone to buy WorldCom unless Ebbers and his hand-picked board of directors go for the deal.

That too was done, not for his benefit but for the shareholders, Ebbers insisted on CNBC. "We didn't do it to make it harder for other people to come at us," he said. "Since 1983, when we started the company, we've been for sale."

The poison pill, he said, was fed to WorldCom by its investment bankers, whose research of the subject "clearly showed that people that have poison pills . . . get a better result for their shareholders. That's the reason we did it."

Ebbers's defense of the poison pill may be hard for shareholders to swallow. But it can't be much worse than swallowing the 47 percent drop in WorldCom stock since the first of the year.

© 2002 The Washington Post Company



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (48780)3/18/2002 2:41:09 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Tech VCs toughen up on funding terms

By John Borland & Troy Wolverton
CNET News.com
Mon Mar 18,12:50 PM ET

With venture capital mired in the doldrums and scant demand for initial public offerings, technology entrepreneurs are jumping through increasingly onerous hoops to get funding.

Some struggling start-ups are forcing company founders to accept stock options that vest over longer terms, such as five or 10 years instead of two or four, to ensure that they don't jump ship shortly after an IPO and destroy the management team.

Some executives have gone so far as to agree to "automatic conversion," which guarantees the venture capitalist a high return on the investment after an IPO--regardless of how the stock fares on the open market. And many entrepreneurs must meet stringent benchmarks in order to get successive rounds of funding--a sharp contrast to the late 1990s, when VCs doled out as much as $100 million in a single financing round.

"During the bubble, no venture capitalist would bring (terms like this) up because nobody would put up with it," said Mike Homer, chief executive of peer-to-peer content distribution start-up Kontiki, a Mountain View, Calif.-based company that received an initial funding of $18 million in August. "Now, that's all you discuss."

The harsh measures come as the venture capital niche--one of the hottest sectors during the 1990s stock market bubble--hits a 10-year low. According to a report from VentureOne, U.S. VCs invested $6.3 billion into U.S. companies in the fourth quarter of 2001, a 4 percent drop from the same quarter in 2000. The amount of money that VCs invested dropped 65 percent between 2000 and 2001, according to VentureOne, shrinking the pool of funded companies from 5,779 to 2,780.

Given the sharp downturn in the number of companies they are choosing to fund, it is no surprise that VCs are scrutinizing their investments with a more critical eye. VCs say they are increasingly asking entrepreneurs to meet a series of fixed "milestones"--market or financial goals that must be met as often as every three weeks or every month. Though this type of requirement isn't new, the timetables have been dramatically compressed in recent months.

For example, a company that announced completed financing of $30 million might actually get an initial lump of $10 million, and would get $10 million more a month later when it ships its first product. It would receive a third round of $10 million a month after that when it hires an acclaimed chief financial officer or sells a certain number of products or signs up a certain number of new clients. By contrast, three years ago, the same company would have received an initial grant of $30 million or more, with no conditions for further financing.

Steve Spurlock, a partner with Menlo Park, Calif.-based Benchmark Capital, said the milestone approach is most common among capital-intensive companies such as communications-equipment companies.

"People are less likely to commit freely. They want to hedge," Spurlock said. "Investors have more leverage and they can get more rights. They can make a case for not putting any more into companies."

New rules stir controversy
One of the most controversial new funding rules hinges on "antidilution protections," executives and VCs agree. These terms can let VCs usurp or wipe out outstanding shares held by previous investors, founders and employees in order to protect or boost their stake in the company.

Antidilution protections are bitter pills for proud founders, but they are particularly tough to swallow for a company formed from numerous smaller companies that might have dozens of founders. VCs agree that it is difficult to get companies to agree to financing if it erases the stakes of a large percentage of founders--and in some cases antidilution protections sap morale and cause management defections and more turmoil for the company.

"The really tough terms are coming in recapitalization and in squeezing out old money," said Roland Van der Meer, a partner at ComVentures, a Palo Alto, Calif.-based venture firm specializing in telecommunications companies. "The choice is to let them go bankrupt or sell the assets."

Because the previous investors, who often have a seat on a company's board, have to approve antidilution protections, negotiations often become bitter, drawn-out affairs. As executives and VCs bargain over terms, companies often watch their cash dwindle to nothing.

"It's almost guaranteed that you won't be able to raise money until you're almost out of money," said one entrepreneur who recently closed a round of financing worth more than $50 million. "It's a contentious and not very gentlemanly process."

Antidilution protections aren't necessarily the strictest terms that VC-backed companies must swallow. Others include:

• Liquidation preferences: VCs boost the amount of money they receive if a company is sold--in some cases requiring a return of double or triple their original investment. In the old days, they could have been guaranteed their original investment plus a cut of the proceeds.

• Founder vesting: VCs require founders' stock options to vest over longer periods to ensure that key managers don't quit if the stock performs well immediately after the IPO.

• Automatic conversion: VCs get a guaranteed return--sometimes double or triple their original investment--as soon as the company goes public, regardless of what happens to the company's stock price.

Tougher rules, better management?
VCs insist that the tougher rules are not meant to penalize entrepreneurs but to help them achieve sustainable growth over the long term. The milestone approach, they say, has been particularly effective in galvanizing the management team around specific goals.

"It makes the board meetings a lot more focused," said Richard Couch, chief executive of Diablo Management Group, a San Ramon, Calif.-based crisis-management firm that often works with troubled start-ups.

Still, entrepreneurs question the motives of VCs. Some say the pay-for-performance strategy is a clever way of disguising the fact that VCs' coffers are dwindling to dangerously low levels and they can no longer afford generous, lump-sum payments.

"The downturn has affected them as much as anyone," said one CEO, who asked to remain anonymous.

Venture capitalists agree that their funds have shriveled, but some say they are eager to provide hitch-free financing--if solid management teams create blockbuster business proposals with a clear opportunity for a return on investment in the near term. Some VCs say that if they have gut-level faith in a company's initial pitch, they don't necessarily require the entrepreneur to sign harsh contracts.

"You either have faith in a company or you don't," said Warren Packard, a managing partner at Redwood City, Calif.-based Draper Fisher Jurvetson, which generally avoids the strictest rules when funding start-ups. "We're going to back those companies we think are really good and we're going to pull the plug on those we don't think are going to work out."

Others wonder whether entrepreneurs' bristling reflects less on the harshness of the new rules than on the laissez-faire funding attitude of the late 1990s.

"It's the same rules we used to play by," Van der Meer said. "But everyone forgot about them for a while."



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (48780)3/18/2002 9:30:54 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
America, Israel and the Palestinians: Too bloody to ignore

From The Economist print edition
Mar 14th 2002

The United States has to step in, for its own sake and for that of the Middle East too

NOT knowing how to make peace between Arabs and Jews, the Americans hoped that there might at least be relative calm in Palestine while they prepared Arab opinion for their next attack on Saddam Hussein. But if they thought they could rely on Ariel Sharon to impose the calm, they know better now. Faced with an unstoppable wave of Palestinian attacks, Israel's prime minister has followed the habit of his soldier's lifetime and escalated. The upshot has been a public-relations disaster for Dick Cheney. America's vice-president landed in the Middle East looking for allies just when Mr Sharon's tanks swarmed into Ramallah and the refugee camps of the West Bank and Gaza. If Mr Cheney is to salvage his mission, the United States must now take urgent remedial action.

The remedy has two halves, one deceptively simple and the other simply baffling. The simple half is to spell out loud and clear America's support for an independent Palestine. The Americans made a start this week by proposing a UN Security Council resolution “affirming a vision” of a separate Israel and Palestine “living side by side within secure and recognised borders” (see article). This is significant. President Bush had mumbled as much before; and Bill Clinton's attempt to make peace between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat at Camp David two years ago was predicated on the idea of dividing Palestine into two states. But by saying this out loud in a Security Council resolution, Mr Bush has signalled that a president who wanted to avoid another enervating bout of Arab-Israeli peacemaking has at last accepted the need to try.

Details, please
This change of heart ought to buy Mr Bush a more sympathetic hearing among Arabs. But the simplicity of the two-state solution is deceptive. For although both sides say they accept it—Israel welcomed the Security Council resolution as “balanced” and the Palestinians called it “a step forward”—the devil is in the details: the drawing of borders, the status of Jerusalem, the future of the Jewish settlements and the fate of the Palestinian refugees. If Mr Bush wants his peace vision to be taken seriously, he will have to provide further particulars.

After the 1991 Gulf war, Mr Bush's father summoned the Arabs and Israelis to a summit in Madrid and asked them to work out the details themselves. After a decade of failure, that is no longer an option: America's mediation is essential. But Mr Bush need not start from scratch. He has a ready-made peace plan in the proposals Mr Clinton devised to bridge the gap at Camp David. These called for Israel to withdraw from up to 96% of the West Bank and Gaza, and to hand over a bit of Israel “proper” in exchange for the bit of the West Bank it annexes. In Jerusalem, Israel would have sovereignty over Jewish areas and Palestine over Arab areas. Palestine would have sovereignty over the Temple Mount and Israel over the Western Wall. The refugees would not return to Israel itself but would have a right of “return” to the new Palestine.

The fact that this was Mr Clinton's plan does not make it perfect—least of all in Mr Bush's eyes. But by offering some such framework, Mr Bush could at least persuade the Arabs that America envisages a Palestine worthy of being called a state, rather than the bantustan which they are sure Mr Sharon has in mind. He could revive the peace camp in Israel, which supported just such a deal. And he would make it hard for either side to feign outrage at a proposal that their own negotiators—albeit, in Israel, those from a different government—came tantalisingly close to accepting less than two years ago.

The barrier of blood
Describing the final peace is the simpler part of America's job. The baffling part is the task facing Anthony Zinni, the marine general Mr Bush sent back to Israel this week with orders to end the violence so that negotiations can resume.

It is not impossible that General Zinni will impose a lull. Mr Sharon may see this week's offensive as the last punch of the present round. He has already made one concession—dropping his demand for seven quiet days before starting to talk—controversial enough to drive an extreme right-wing party out of his governing coalition. As for Mr Arafat, he has much to gain by proving that, far from being the “irrelevancy” Mr Sharon tried to make him, he alone can restrain the Palestinians' gunmen and suicide bombers. In return for a ceasefire, he would probably demand to be allowed to travel in triumph to the Arab summit in Beirut later this month.

To make serious progress on peace, however, something longer than a lull is required. What cut short General Zinni's previous mission was America's conviction that the campaign of atrocities into which the intifada had degenerated was taking place with the acquiescence if not the active connivance of Mr Arafat himself. At that point, the Americans decided to give Mr Sharon the freeish hand he said he needed to stop the terror with military force. Now that he has failed, it is not only Israel and America that will have to think again. Palestinians have drawn their conclusions as well.

In the intifada of the late 1980s, Israelis lived normally while the Palestinians suffered. This time the intifada is armed, and in spite of all the security promises in the Oslo agreement the Palestinians have destroyed normal life in Israel. In this sort of asymmetrical war, Israel's army cannot catch every young Palestinian who is willing to blow himself up in a pizza parlour or spray machinegun fire at a wedding party. The violence deals peace a double blow. Their unaccustomed vulnerability tips more Israelis to the right and destroys the little faith they had in Mr Arafat. Their unaccustomed power to damage Israel makes a lot of Palestinians—not least those who have never subscribed to the two-state solution—believe that they can, after all, one day liberate Palestine by force.

That belief is almost certainly an illusion. But illusions have sent the people of the Middle East down bitter paths before. If America is to avert disaster it must give Palestinians hope in a peace worth having. It will also have to impress on Mr Arafat that peace is not compatible with the prosecution of a terrorist war, no matter how deep the anger that feeds it.

Copyright © 2002 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.

economist.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (48780)3/19/2002 8:56:37 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Input on The Fed...

investavenue.com

investavenue.com