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To: Dan B. who wrote (1161)	3/21/2002 12:42:57 PM
From: craig crawford	Respond to of 1643

>> Craig, don't be blind to the fact that your own posted sources tell us that prior to the removal of tariffs, the British people often suffered greatly to afford food << i don't recall posting any sources that make that claim. my sources indicate that britain was almost entirely self-sufficient when it came to feeding itself. in the ensuing decades after the corn laws were repealed britain became heavily dependant on imports of grain. >> whereas after the lifting of the tariffs- with a 50% greater population to feed in place by 1871 to boot and farmers(as expected) moving to the cities for lack of farming profit- approximately noone suffered for food as often happened in the past. << In 1800, agriculture still seemed to dominate the British economy, employing about a third of the workforce and accounting for the same proportion of the national income. It had been able to respond to a doubling of the population, largely through the application of better methods of cultivation (crop rotation, changes in patterns of animal husbandry to allow more to be kept over the winter etc). In 1830 90% of the food consumed was still produced in Britain. This had been achieved by a complete transformation of agriculture. internationalism.org >> You'll clearly have to back off of responding to my contentions with indications that repeal of tariffs almost starved Britian to death << my contention is that the repeal of the tariffs and the move to free trade made britain reliant on foreign imports-- not that it made them starve. >> I repeat, farm output declined while population rose by 50%, yet Britian, I can fairly say, fed its people better, by all your accounts, than it had with tariffs. << like i said, my contention was not that britain starved, my contention was that they were at the mercy of imports. >> Look honestly too, at the job loss resulting FROM tariffs << i don't believe that the steel tariffs will result in net job losses. >> Steel will now cost more, and will thus be used less than otherwise desired << i've been through this argument several times. tariffs have been around for centuries, and so have the arguments that barriers to imports often cause rising prices. people that are in favor of protective tariffs do not dispute this. >> Steel using industries aren't just whistling dixie when they decry the job loss the Bush tariffs will bring Who will suffer? Who will get the steel they need at any price, yet have less funds left to spend elsewhere in an otherwise more diverse job-creating fashion. There, I've outlined loss of jobs on two fronts, resulting FROM tariffs. Factor it in. << i have already answered all these arguments. when you raise tariffs (taxes), you lower other taxes, on corporations and individuals. therefore they can afford to pay the slightly higher costs on steel because they have a lower tax burden and more money in their pocket to spend. >> It's also good, I might point out, that the world allows us some titanium. We don't have any. May you come to understand the fire you play with, when you play with tariffs << 1) that is not true 2) i don't see how it is relevant to the discussion

To: Dan B. who wrote (1161)	4/28/2002 6:23:32 AM
From: craig crawford	Read Replies (3) \| Respond to of 1643

Back to the Trade Future: A Dead End tradealert.org William R. Hawkins Friday, April 19, 2002 First, this has never really been American policy. Shlaes cites Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who talked much about free trade. Yet his negotiations under the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements amendment (the forerunner of today’s “fast track” negotiating authority) were mainly bilateral exercises in U.S. market power. Narrow concessions on raw material imports from major suppliers were granted in exchange for new market openings for American manufacturers. John Conybeare, an expert on the history of trade warfare at the University of Iowa, has called these negotiations “hegemonic predation.” He concludes that when combined with high Smoot-Hawley tariffs, the United States was able to use trade policy to raise its national income. He also notes that when England abandoned free trade in 1932, it also improved its position. Second, let’s look at the Shlaes alleged “ideal” itself. Under it, enemies are not to be distinguished from allies, all are to be treated equally. Just because the British send their Royal Marines to fight alongside American troops in Afghanistan should not get them any better treatment than the Chinese, who periodically threaten to sink the U.S. Pacific fleet. On this point she quotes Richard Cobden, the leader of the British free trade movement in the early 19th century, who thought there should be “as little intercourse as possible between governments” in regard to trade. Unfortunately, Shlaes writes as if it were still 1846 and that her audience is completely ignorant of the 156 years of history since -- years which have made just as much hash of Cobden’s ideas as had all the centuries before. It was Cobden who thought that international commerce was “the grand panacea” that would eliminate “the motive for large and mighty empires, for gigantic armies and great fleets.” Cobden’s comrade across the channel was French economist Frederic Bastiat (still also a favorite of today’s free traders), who argued in 1849 that France should be a model for the world by adopting unilaterally both free trade and disarmament. “I shall not hesitate to vote for disarmament,” he proclaimed, “because I do not believe in invasions”—an interesting notion considering where he lived. Cobden’s desire to see the elimination of “great fleets” almost proved disastrous to England under “free trade.” Cobden’s main achievement was the repeal of the Corn Laws that subsidized British agriculture. The island nation then became dependent on food imports – which meant that a naval blockade could starve England into submission. German U-boats almost accomplished this feat in World War I. At least on this point, more responsible British leaders understood that interdependence required increased military power to protect the flow of trade. Doctrinaire free traders have always tended to reject the foreign policy and national security implications of their advice. Historian Heinz Gollwitzer noted this movement “put up a strong fight against armaments and power politics, the acquisition of non-European territories, the establishment of naval bases, and, above all, the retreat from its economic principles.” Bernard Semmel, who dedicated his career to studying this movement in England, found that its adherents felt “strategy, any plan for exerting or projecting military or naval power, was ipso facto wrong.” Unfortunately, free trade adherents are as deluded in the 21st century as they were in the 19th. There have been a number of interesting books that dispute the wisdom of free trade for a major power like the United States. Princeton political economist Joanne S. Gowa, in her book Allies, Adversaries and International Trade, argues that we should not abandon the traditional practice of having “trade follow the flag” because interdependence is too risky with any government that cannot be trusted on political grounds. Gowa contends “power politics is an inexorable element of any agreement to open international markets, because of the security externalities that trade produces....trade enhances the potential military power of any country that engages in it.” Trade with an ally makes both parties stronger, whereas trade with an enemy creates what Gowa calls “a security diseconomy.” Such a “security diseconomy” can be seen in China where a growing trade surplus with the United States has provided the Communist regime with hard currency to buy weapons, with foreign investment to expand strategic infrastructure, and with technology transfers from Western corporations to improve Beijing’s military. The private gains to business firms and consumers have been trivial compared to the momentous, transformational gains to Chinese military capabilities. Such considerations are beyond Shlaes’ caring. She prefers to harken back to Bastiat’s approach, concluding her column by claiming, “A new commitment to free trade unilateralism would help to make today's great powers appear less hypocritical in the eyes of allies and potential allies.” How so? Potential allies are to be shown that they cannot expect any advantage from becoming an actual ally? That makes no sense at all, in either diplomacy or simple logic. It does make, in its own strange way, a fitting conclusion for her ill-informed screed.