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To: T L Comiskey who wrote (49387)4/3/2002 7:10:14 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Deferral Talk Reported in Andersen Case

By KURT EICHENWALD
The New York Times
April 2, 2002

Justice Department officials
were willing to consider
deferring the prosecution of Arthur
Andersen, letting it avoid
indictment, if the firm publicly
acknowledged that it had illegally
destroyed documents in the Enron
investigation and if it
agreed to restrictions similar to
probation, people involved in the
case said yesterday.

But discussions of such an idea,
raised in talks between the
government and Andersen several
weeks ago, never got off the ground
because Andersen officials thought
that the firm had not broken any
laws and that such an admission
would have been just as
devastating to its fortunes as an
indictment or guilty plea.

The indictment last month has led
to dozens of defections by clients
and members of the global network
of Andersen partnerships, putting
the firm's survival at risk. Though
it is impossible to say whether
Andersen would have fared better
with a deferral of prosecution, such
an arrangement would have given
the firm a measure of finality in a
case that now threatens to drag on
for months.

An admission would have been part of what is known as a
deferred- prosecution agreement. When a judge approves
such a deal, the defendant must acknowledge criminal
wrongdoing, and then prosecution is deferred for a number of
years. After that time, the indictment is dismissed. But if
the defendant is found to have committed any other
misdeeds during the deferral period, the case can go to trial
and the admission can be used against the defendant as
evidence.

Though such deals are most frequently used in low-level
narcotics cases, the Andersen prosecution would not have
been the first to use a deferred-prosecution agreement in a
prominent white-collar case.

In 1994, Prudential Securities was allowed to enter into
such an agreement to resolve criminal charges that the firm
had defrauded investors in the sale of energy limited
partnerships. The brokerage firm emerged from its
probationary period three years later, and the charges were
never revived against it. The proposal in the Prudential case
was drafted by the government and lawyers for Davis, Polk &
Wardwell, which now represents Andersen.

But terms of such a deal in Andersen's case were never
discussed because the concept collapsed over the issue of an
admission. As a result, no financial penalties or other
aspects were discussed, so there is no way to know whether
the two sides could have reached a deal even if Andersen
had been willing to acknowledge wrongdoing.

A deferral without such an admission was said to have
appealed to Andersen, but the government would not
consider a proposal like that.

Legal experts said a deferred- prosecution agreement could
be an appealing compromise for the two sides, given that
Andersen has already suffered the consequences that it
feared an admission would bring.

"In the marketplace, people have already assumed that they
had" engaged in improper document destruction, said
Stephen M. Ryan, a former federal prosecutor who now
works at Manatt, Phelps & Phillips in Washington, meaning
that an admission would probably harm the firm no more
than the indictment has. "But with their current position,
they are balancing the future of the company on a knife edge
and handing it to a jury. That is a pretty good roll of the
dice."

Although there is no certainty the government remains
willing to consider such an arrangement, a deferred
prosecution would also have advantages for prosecutors -
allowing them to lock up a victory on their first case in the
Enron investigation without running the risk that a jury
might side with Andersen.

Such a defeat, given the devastating effect of the indictment
on Andersen, would open the prosecution's decision to
criticism from Capitol Hill. Several members of Congress
have already expressed skepticism about the decision to
indict.

In recent statements, the two sides have seemed to circle
around the concept of some sort of deferral. The offer of Paul
A. Volcker, the former Federal Reserve chairman, to take
charge of Andersen if prosecutors withdrew their indictment
contained several elements that were similar to a deferred
prosecution. Mr. Volcker said, for example, that under his
proposed arrangement - in which the indictment would be
withdrawn under a legal concept known as "without
prejudice" - the government would be free to refile the
charge if it was unsatisfied with reform efforts undertaken
by Andersen's new management.

The government has responded to that, both publicly and in
communications with Andersen, by saying that reforms must
be coupled with some sort of admission of wrongdoing, along
with an agreement to cooperate in the investigation. All
those components would be met by a deferred-prosecution
agreement with a provision requiring a public declaration by
Andersen that it was culpable for misdeeds.

The possibility for such an admission has seemed remote
recently as Andersen has begun an aggressive public
campaign criticizing the government's decision to prosecute
and declaring its innocence.

But some people involved in the case say that a small
window of opportunity exists in the coming days as Andersen
names a new management team to run both the
international firm and aspects of the national operations.

The board of Andersen Worldwide is expected to meet this
morning in London and name a new chief executive.
According to people close to the situation, few Andersen
officials have expressed much interest in the job, at a time
when some international offices are selling themselves
piecemeal even as the rest of the division is in negotiations
for a merger with KPMG. So far, only a few partners -
mostly from Europe - have expressed any willingness to
take on the job, which will be largely legal and
administrative rather than involving any setting of grand
strategy for the future of the firm.

But even with new management in place, there are
numerous financial hurdles to any sort of deal. For example,
Andersen's insurer, Professional Services Insurance of
Hamilton, Bermuda, notified the firm last week that it would
be unable to pay $217 million to settle a civil fraud case in
Arizona. The insurance company was rendered technically
insolvent by the failure of the accounting firm to make a
$100 million payment, a person involved in the situation
said, confirming a report yesterday in The Wall Street
Journal.

The insurer is owned by the member firms of Andersen
Worldwide, the Swiss cooperative that serves as the central
hub for Andersen's global network of accounting firms in
various countries. But Andersen's United States division
owns less than 5 percent of the insurer, meaning that the
foreign companies would largely be paying for the
transgressions of their United States partner.

People close to Andersen portrayed the breakdown of the
insurance situation as the most obvious sign of troubles
between the firm's United States and international offices.
"This is a function of the spat between the U.S. and
international" offices, a person close to Andersen said.

A person who has reviewed Andersen's finances said that
Professional Services was the American firm's only source of
insurance for professional liability and that it could pay a
maximum of $250 million for each claim. Before Andersen
was indicted, its financial projections included the
assumption of $300 million a year to pay the cost of the
premium.

Patrick Dorton, an Andersen spokesman, said yesterday that
the firm had fully intended to pay its settlement in the
Arizona case but that its plans had been derailed by the
criminal indictment.

Andersen negotiated the Arizona settlement in good faith
and "at that time we believed the settlement would be
approved by the insurance company," Mr. Dorton said.

"The unalterable fact is that the decision by the Department
of Justice to indict the entire firm has changed the
landscape for all parties involved."

The path to the document destruction at Andersen appears
to have begun in September. The New York Times reported
last month that a controversy over a series of memos erupted
then between an elite group of accountants in the firm's
professional service group, which reviews the accounting
methods used by the audit partners, and Andersen's Houston
office. The memos appeared to indicate that the Chicago
accountants had approved a tactic used by Enron, when, in
fact, they had not given their approval.

The Times report last month said that the Chicago and
Houston accountants debated in conference calls for several
days about how to revise the memos, at times in consultation
with a lawyer for the firm. Those revisions were entered into
the memos, with written indications of the dates that they
had been revised. During one of those calls, an Andersen
lawyer reminded the accountants about the firm's rules for
destroying unnecessary documentation; after that reminder,
the Chicago accountants began deleting e-mail messages
concerning their conversations. Discussions about the firm's
document retention policy continued for several weeks, until
finally, according to the indictment, the shredding picked up
for the purpose of impeding a Securities and Exchange
Commission inquiry.

The primary witnesses for the government will be Andersen
employees themselves. For the last several weeks, many of
them have been cooperating with government investigators,
answering questions about the document destruction.

One of the partners who answered questions from the
government is a member of the professional service group,
Carl Bass, whose role was first identified in Business Week
magazine. As part of his work, Mr. Bass reviewed some of
Enron's accounting practices and was particularly skeptical
of them. Documents obtained by the House Energy and
Commerce Committee indicate that Mr. Bass was the target
of sharp criticism from Enron officials who thought he was
too hesitant to endorse their accounting. Indeed,
Congressional investigators said, Andersen removed Mr.
Bass from consulting on the account at the request of Enron
officials.

The anger of Enron left Mr. Bass perplexed, since he had
never spoken to anyone at the company about accounting
issues that led to certain criticism of him. In a March 4,
2001, e-mail message to a colleague, Mr. Bass noted his
concern, saying that he was "perplexed as to how the client
even knows I was consulted."

An Andersen spokesman referred questions to a lawyer for
the firm in Houston, Rusty Hardin, who did not return a
telephone call.

nytimes.com



To: T L Comiskey who wrote (49387)4/3/2002 8:24:31 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Creative accounting and the destructive risk

By Henry C K Liu

atimes.com

Alan Greenspan, chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board, frequently credits US growth in the 1990s to a rise in productivity made possible by advances in technology. Yet studies have shown that computerization did not simulate much rise in industrial productivity in the 1990s. Industrial computerization was essentially in place long before 1995. The 1990s boom in the US was not an industrial boom but a financial boom. This was made possible by three developments: the deregulation of financial markets, the computerization of trading of financial instruments, and globalization, particularly financial globalization.

The entire structured finance (derivatives) phenomenon would not be possible without any one of the above mentioned developments. Structured finance in essence allowed an unprecedented explosion of credit, by unbundling risks for a wide range of risk-takers who sought corresponding compensatory returns. While hedging initially provided protection against volatility to individual market participants, it soon became a profit center for financial institutions. This led to the institutionalization of volatility as a market opportunity. Financial institutions actually sought volatility in the system to provide a continuous profit stream.

Creative accounting, whose peculiar logic evolved from structured finance, also made the traditional debt/equity ratio immaterial. Ways were devised for the large market participants to structure debt as hedges, through swaps that avoided taxes and balance-sheet liabilities. Swaps enabled borrowers legally to book loan proceeds as current operating income and loan liabilities as future capital expenditure that could be kept off the balance sheet, inflating current earnings. Circular counterparty risks suddenly became neutralized risk, and cash flow from swaps became net revenue. These practices are now known as Enronitis.

On the macro level, the global finance game has become a sure win for those who use dollars, especially those whose government issues dollars by fiat. The world market has become a place where the United States makes dollars and the rest of the world makes what dollars can buy. But after the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the whole world essentially adopted dollarization, if not directly, at least through hedges, albeit sometimes at prohibitive cost.

At that point, the US economy suddenly began to lose its exclusive dollar hegemony advantage because US entities were no longer the only ones with access to dollars nor could US transnationals avoid non-dollar revenue. To maintain the "strong dollar" monetary policy instituted by US treasury secretary Robert Rubin at the beginning of the Bill Clinton presidency, the US Federal Reserve progressively tightened dollar money supply throughout most of the 1990s. But this did not slow the US economy because structured finance permitted debt to expand without a corresponding expansion of equity. A strong dollar gave the US economy a boom in low-cost imports, while the US trade deficit merely forced foreign exporters to hold dollar reserves to finance the US debt bubble through a US capital account surplus. Japan did this for a whole decade, pushing its own economy into permanent recession while its dollar reserves mounted. Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan took up the slack from Japan by 1995 and the three Chinese economies together now hold more dollar reserves than Japan does. China, starved for capital for domestic development, thus finds itself stuck with US$200 billion in US Treasury bills that pay 5 percent while it is forced to offer foreign direct investment high double-digit returns. The annual interest gap alone is in excess of $20 billion, which amounts to half of China's current annual foreign-capital inflow.

Growth in the 1990s came from a structural shift of the US economy from industrial capitalism to finance capitalism. Through financial globalization, the US shifted labor intensive manufacturing off US soil to low-wage locations, thus lowering the cost of manufactured products. Financial products and services and intellectual property valuation constituted most of the growth, making the US a consumer market of last resort for the whole world. London, Frankfurt, Paris, Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore became financial outposts of New York, sucking up dollar reserves to support the US debt bubble.

This game is ending, as the US consumer market becomes saturated and condemned to low single-digit growth, regardless of business cycles. The wealth effect from a tripling of equity value did not double consumption in the US, because aggregate demand is constrained by a widening income disparity. The rich have bought all the manufactured products they need and the working poor cannot afford to buy all they want. The wealth effect did double investment globally, reflected in the phenomenal rise in market capitalization of US transnationals and financial institutions, particularly in the so-called New Economy. The competition for credit favored double-digit growth markets in the developing countries, but the US continued to dominate global finance through its sophistication and innovation in finance and through dollar hegemony.

The problem is that all unregulated markets eventually self-destruct. Weak competitors are naturally forced off the market, leading to monopolies that are the result of market failure of competition. Yet regulation cannot cure the problem preemptively because remedial regulation only makes sense after disasters, never before.

There is increasing evidence that the real threat to China is not democracy or the market economy per se but the peculiar US version of these institutions. The 19th-century industrial capitalism that Marx observed no longer exists. Finance capitalism is a system in which capital is only a notional value upon which to build a gigantic mountain of hidden debt. Representative democracy and unregulated market fundamentalism in the US mode now work as legalized constitutional devices to disfranchise the poor and weak, both locally and globally.

Greenspan acknowledged this in his semiannual monetary policy report to the US Congress, before the Committee on Financial Services on February 27: "From one perspective, the ever-increasing proportion of our GDP [gross domestic product] that represents conceptual as distinct from physical value-added may actually have lessened cyclical volatility. In particular, the fact that concepts cannot be held as inventories means a greater share of GDP is not subject to a type of dynamics that amplifies cyclical swings. But an economy in which concepts form an important share of valuation has its own vulnerabilities." He was of course referring to Enronitis.

Greenspan's observation about the vulnerabilities of conceptual valuation was on target, although his warning of vulnerability was disproportionately misplaced. Even after the Enron and Global Crossing controversies, Greenspan continues to resist regulation, preferring to rely on market discipline. The risk is much higher than he admits.

Past records do not reliably project future vulnerability risk. Any risk manager knows that accidents are always waiting to happen. The fact that it has not happened in the past does not mean it will not happen in the future. In fact, with each passing day without an accident, the risk of borrowed time increases. Low probability is only a source of comfort if the impact is not fatal.

Also, what Greenspan did not say, but admitted by implication, was that finance capitalism is operating with less and less reliance on capital. Capital has become a notional value in structured finance. Credit is no longer anchored by equity but by circular hedges. Debt-to-equity ratio is no longer a relevant consideration. Practically all US major businesses nowadays, with their high debt leverage, would have negative real equity if the price/earning (P/E) ratio were to return to historical norms. Blue chips are being shut out of the unsecured short-term commercial paper market. Corporate credit ratings are inflated by exorbitant market capitalization value, which in turn reflects irrational P/E ratios. Even now, during what many on Wall Street contend to be a savage bear market, the Standard & Poor's 500 Index yields 25 times earnings. It would have to fall by another 41 percent to reach the median valuation prevailing since 1957.

Such a decline can happen in a period of days in this age of program trading and socialized risk, even with circuit breakers and trading curbs. When that happens, structured finance will be a sea of dead and wounded in counterparty casualties, regardless of who won and who lost.
______________________
Henry C K Liu is chairman of the New York-based Liu Investment Group.