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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: carranza2 who wrote (23333)4/3/2002 8:20:01 PM
From: Bilow  Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 281500
 
Hi carranza2; Re: "Your suggestion that the lessons learned by the French in Algeria are relevant is not well thought out because it ignores a huge distinction, i.e., the fact that the French in Algeria were not fighting for their survival as a nation on their own soil. I rather think that the result would have been different had the French been fighting the Algerians for French survival on French soil, like the Israelis are presently fighting the Palestinians."

There were two groups of French. Those who lived in Algeria and those who did not. The abandonment was of the ones living in Algeria by the ones who did not. The French who lived in Algeria largely moved to France.

There are two groups of Jews. Those who live in Israel and those who do not. The abandonment will be of those who live in Israel by those who do not. The Jews who live in Israel will largely move to other places.

The South Africans were faced with the same dilemma that faces the Israelis. Despite this, they negotiated a settlement where they gave up political power. This largely ended terrorism in their country. My guess is that the Israelis will come to the same place.

Re: "The destruction of Israel will require an enormous amount of conventional weaponry which the Palestinians do not have."

The Palestinians haven't been using conventional weapons much. The reason is that the Israelis outgun them. They'll only use conventional weapons when this fact has reversed, and in guerilla war that doesn't happen until close to the end. Anything else (other than giving up and accepting second class citizenship) would be a waste of money and lives. The Palestinians are using typical traditional guerilla tactics.

The objective of the Palestinian suicide bombers is not to make the Israelis give up, instead it is to damage Israel economically (military forces are expensive to maintain), and to goad the Israelis into committing atrocities and thereby convince foreign supporters of the Israelis (i.e. the US) to quit supporting them. Operations are only in Phase I of the three phases of insurgency, as defined by the US military, but there's some Phase II activity beginning.

Counterguerilla Operations
FM 90-8, USMC, August 1986
The aims, objectives, and methods of guerrilla warfare differ greatly from those of conventional warfare. To be successful in countering this type of war, the planners of counterguerrilla operations must understand the enemy and the unique environment in which he operates.
...
1-4. Prerequisites.
There are three requirements that must exist before an insurgency can occur.

a. Vulnerable population. For whatever the reasons — social, political, or economic — the population is generally open to change. The insurgents will offer hope for change and exploit dissatisfaction with the current government.

b. Leadership available for direction. A vulnerable population alone will not support an insurgent movement. There must be a leadership element that can direct the frustrations of a dissatisfied populace along the lines delineated by the overall insurgent strategy.

c. Lack of government control. Lack of government control may be real or perceived. The greater the control the government has over the situation, the less likely are the chances for insurgent success The opposite is also true: the less control the government has, the greater is the chance for insurgent success.

1-5. Other required conditions.
There are a number of other conditions that must exist or be produced for an insurgent movement to succeed.

a. Popular support. Support can be passive or active. It is not necessary that the entire population actively support an insurgency, but the majority of the population must passively support it.

b. Unity of effort. The overall thrust of an insurgent movement must provide a strength of unity that dedicates those involved to achieving the same goal.

c. Will to resist. It is not enough for the population to resist their government passively; at least a portion must be willing to resist actively.

d. Leadership. The activities and effort of the insurgent movement must be properly directed through the exercise of effective leadership.

e. Discipline. The aspect of the movement must be strongly maintained to ensure security and obedience.

f. Intelligence. Because the insurgent movement is usually inferior in numbers and combat power in relation to government forces, the intelligence effort must provide security for the insurgent organization and information to conduct successful operations.

g. Propaganda. It is used to gain popular support and intensify the populace’s dissatisfaction with the government.

h. Favorable environment. This includes attitudes of the people, the political environment, and the economic situation.

i. External support. The preceding eight conditions are theoretically the only ones that an insurgency must have to succeed. Historically, however, there seems to be one additional condition that must exist the condition of external support. This support may be physical or psychological. Examples of physical external support are equipment, weapons, supplies, ammunition, sanctuaries, personnel, and combat units. Examples of psychological external support include the political support given to the resistance when a country recognizes that movement in the world arena and the pressure a government might exert politically or economically to influence world opinion in favor of the movement.
...
1-7. Phases of development.
...
(1) Phase I: Latent and incipient insurgency. Activity in this phase ranges from subversive activity that is only a potential threat to situations in which frequent subversive incidents and activities occur in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity. The guerrilla force does not conduct continuous operations but rather selected acts of terrorism.

(2) Phase II: Guerrilla warfare. This phase is reached when the insurgent movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized continuous guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the government. This is an attempt to force government forces into a defensive role. As the guerrilla becomes stronger, he begins to conduct larger operations.

(3) Phase III: War of movement. When the guerrilla attains the force structure and capability to directly engage government forces in decisive combat, then he will progressively begin to use more conventional tactics and may obtain combat forces from an external source. He may also begin to conduct more extensive defensive operations in this phase to protect the areas he controls.

c. The goal of the insurgent movement, if achieved, will result in the replacement of the established government with a government structure developed by the insurgent movement. If this occurs, it is a political victory for the insurgents. The insurgent movement does not need to defeat host country forces to accomplish this. A parallel or “shadow” government may also be developed by an insurgent force. It must, however, win the support of the people away from the established government to achieve this political victory.
...
doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil

-- Carl

P.S. Interesting link between suicide bombers and VC actions in Vietnam, by the way:

In the film "Hearts and Minds," much anti-American propaganda use was made of General Westmoreland's admittedly clumsy statement to the effect that the Vietnamese people obviously had no respect for human life. But what is one to make of adults who will, as a friend of mine serving in Vietnam wrote, "hand a gap-toothed little six year old a grenade and send him out to `play in the traffic,' because they know that Americans are suckers for cute kids, and by the time they figure out he's not so cute they'll be dead?" I have trouble imagining parents of any nationality, no matter how committed to some cause, doing such a thing unless they were under the most dire duress.
usafa.af.mil