Mitchell Report, concluded:
>>Cross-Community Initiatives: Many described to us the near absolute loss of trust. It was all
the more inspiring, therefore, to find groups (such as the Parent's Circle and the Economic
Cooperation Foundation) dedicated to cross-community understanding in spite of all that has
happened. We commend them and their important work.
Regrettably, most of the work of this nature has stopped during the current conflict. To help
rebuild confidence, the GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Israeli and
Palestinian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) already involved in confidence-building
through initiatives linking both sides. It is important that the PA and GOI support cross-community
organizations and initiatives, including the provision of humanitarian assistance to Palestinian
villages by Israeli NGOs. Providing travel permits for participants is essential. Cooperation
between the humanitarian organizations and the military/security services of the parties should be
encouraged and institutionalized.
Such programs can help build, albeit slowly, constituencies for peace among Palestinians and
Israelis and can provide safety nets during times of turbulence. Organizations involved in this work
are vital for translating good intentions into positive actions.
RESUME NEGOTIATIONS
Israeli leaders do not wish to be perceived as "rewarding violence." Palestinian leaders do not
wish to be perceived as "rewarding occupation." We appreciate the political constraints on leaders
of both sides. Nevertheless, if the cycle of violence is to be broken and the search for peace
resumed, there needs to be a new bilateral relationship incorporating both security cooperation
and negotiations.
We cannot prescribe to the parties how best to pursue their political objectives. Yet the
construction of a new bilateral relationship solidifying and transcending an agreed cessation of
violence requires intelligent risk-taking. It requires, in the first instance, that each party again be
willing to regard the other as a partner. Partnership, in turn, requires at this juncture something
more than was agreed in the Declaration of Principles and in subsequent agreements. Instead of
declaring the peace process to be "dead," the parties should determine how they will conclude
their common journey along their agreed "road map," a journey which began in Madrid and
continued — in spite of problems — until very recently.
To define a starting point is for the parties to decide. Both parties have stated that they remain
committed to their mutual agreements and undertakings. It is time to explore further
implementation. The parties should declare their intention to meet on this basis, in order to resume
full and meaningful negotiations, in the spirit of their undertakings at Sharm el-Sheikh in 1999 and
2000.
Neither side will be able to achieve its principal objectives unilaterally or without political risk. We
know how hard it is for leaders to act — especially if the action can be characterized by political
opponents as a concession — without getting something in return. The PA must — as it has at
previous critical junctures — take steps to reassure Israel on security matters. The GOI must —
as it has in the past — take steps to reassure the PA on political matters. Israelis and Palestinians
should avoid, in their own actions and attitudes, giving extremists, common criminals and revenge
seekers the final say in defining their joint future. This will not be easy if deadly incidents occur in
spite of effective cooperation. Notwithstanding the daunting difficulties, the very foundation of the
trust required to re-establish a functioning partnership consists of each side making such strategic
reassurances to the other.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The GOI and the PA must act swiftly and decisively to halt the violence. Their immediate
objectives then should be to rebuild confidence and resume negotiations. What we are asking is
not easy. Palestinians and Israelis — not just their leaders, but two publics at large — have lost
confidence in one another. We are asking political leaders to do, for the sake of their people, the
politically difficult: to lead without knowing how many will follow.
During this mission our aim has been to fulfill the mandate agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh. We value
the support given our work by the participants at the summit, and we commend the parties for
their cooperation. Our principal recommendation is that they recommit themselves to the Sharm
el-Sheikh spirit, and that they implement the decisions made there in 1999 and 2000. We believe
that the summit participants will support bold action by the parties to achieve these objectives.
END THE VIOLENCE
The GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and
undertakings and should immediately implement an unconditional cessation of violence.
Anything less than a complete effort by both parties to end the violence will render the effort
itself ineffective, and will likely be interpreted by the other side as evidence of hostile intent.
The GOI and PA should immediately resume security cooperation.
Effective bilateral cooperation aimed at preventing violence will encourage the resumption
of negotiations. We are particularly concerned that, absent effective, transparent security
cooperation, terrorism and other acts of violence will continue and may be seen as officially
sanctioned whether they are or not. The parties should consider widening the scope of
security cooperation to reflect the priorities of both communities and to seek acceptance for
these efforts from those communities.
We acknowledge the PA's position that security cooperation presents a political difficulty
absent a suitable political context, i.e., the relaxation of stringent Israeli security measures
combined with ongoing, fruitful negotiations. We also acknowledge the PA's fear that, with
security cooperation in hand, the GOI may not be disposed to deal forthrightly with
Palestinian political concerns. We believe that security cooperation cannot long be sustained
if meaningful negotiations are unreasonably deferred, if security measures "on the ground"
are seen as hostile, or if steps are taken that are perceived as provocative or as prejudicing
the outcome of negotiations.
REBUILD CONFIDENCE
The PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful "cooling off period" and
implement additional confidence building measures, some of which were proposed in the
October 2000 Sharm el-Sheikh Statement and some of which were offered by the U.S. on
January 7, 2001 in Cairo.
The PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn and discourage
incitement in all its forms.
The PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis alike that
terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will make a 100 percent effort
to prevent terrorist operations and to punish perpetrators. This effort should include
immediate steps to apprehend and incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's
jurisdiction.
The GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the "natural growth" of existing
settlements.
The kind of security cooperation desired by the GOI cannot for long co-exist with settlement
activity described very recently by the European Union as causing "great concern" and by the U.S.
as "provocative."
The GOI should give careful consideration to whether settlements which are focal
points for substantial friction are valuable bargaining chips for future negotiations or
provocations likely to preclude the onset of productive talks.
The GOI may wish to make it clear to the PA that a future peace would pose no
threat to the territorial contiguity of a Palestinian State to be established in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip.
The IDF should consider withdrawing to positions held before September 28, 2000 which
will reduce the number of friction points and the potential for violent confrontations.
The GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies and procedures
encouraging non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators, with a view to minimizing
casualties and friction between the two communities. The IDF should:
Re-institute, as a matter of course, military police investigations into Palestinian
deaths resulting from IDF actions in the Palestinian territories in incidents not
involving terrorism. The IDF should abandon the blanket characterization of the
current uprising as "an armed conflict short of war," which fails to discriminate
between terrorism and protest.
Adopt tactics of crowd-control that minimize the potential for deaths and casualties,
including the withdrawal of metal-cored rubber rounds from general use.
Ensure that experienced, seasoned personnel are present for duty at all times at
known friction points.
Ensure that the stated values and standard operating procedures of the IDF
effectively instill the duty of caring for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
as well as Israelis living there, consistent with The Ethical Code of The IDF.
The GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and permit
Palestinians who had been employed in Israel to return to their jobs; and should ensure that
security forces and settlers refrain from the destruction of homes and roads, as well as trees
and other agricultural property in Palestinian areas. We acknowledge the GOI's position
that actions of this nature have been taken for security reasons. Nevertheless, their
economic effects will persist for years.
The PA should renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to the maximum
extent possible, that Palestinian workers employed within Israel are fully vetted and free of
connections to organizations and individuals engaged in terrorism.
The PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to fire upon Israeli
populated areas and IDF positions. This tactic places civilians on both sides at unnecessary
risk.
The GOI and IDF should adopt and enforce policies and procedures designed to ensure
that the response to any gunfire emanating from Palestinian populated areas minimizes the
danger to the lives and property of Palestinian civilians, bearing in mind that it is probably
the objective of gunmen to elicit an excessive IDF response.
The GOI should take all necessary steps to prevent acts of violence by settlers.
The parties should abide by the provisions of the Wye River Agreement prohibiting illegal
weapons.
The PA should take all necessary steps to establish a clear and unchallenged chain of
command for armed personnel operating under its authority.
The PA should institute and enforce effective standards of conduct and accountability, both
within the uniformed ranks and between the police and the civilian political leadership to
which it reports.
The PA and GOI should consider a joint undertaking to preserve and protect holy places
sacred to the traditions of Muslims, Jews, and Christians. An initiative of this nature might
help to reverse a disturbing trend: the increasing use of religious themes to encourage and
justify violence.
The GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Palestinian and Israeli
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) involved in cross-community initiatives linking the
two peoples. It is important that these activities, including the provision of humanitarian aid
to Palestinian villages by Israeli NGOs, receive the full backing of both parties.
RESUME NEGOTIATIONS
We reiterate our belief that a 100 percent effort to stop the violence, an immediate
resumption of security cooperation and an exchange of confidence building measures are all
important for the resumption of negotiations. Yet none of these steps will long be sustained
absent a return to serious negotiations.
It is not within our mandate to prescribe the venue, the basis or the agenda of negotiations.
However, in order to provide an effective political context for practical cooperation between the
parties, negotiations must not be unreasonably deferred and they must, in our view, manifest a
spirit of compromise, reconciliation and partnership, notwithstanding the events of the past seven
months.
In the spirit of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements and understandings of 1999 and 2000, we
recommend that the parties meet to reaffirm their commitment to signed agreements and
mutual understandings, and take corresponding action. This should be the basis for
resuming full and meaningful negotiations.
The parties are at a crossroads. If they do not return to the negotiating table, they face the
prospect of fighting it out for years on end, with many of their citizens leaving for distant shores to
live their lives and raise their children. We pray they make the right choice. That means stopping
the violence now. Israelis and Palestinians have to live, work, and prosper together. History and
geography have destined them to be neighbors. That cannot be changed. Only when their actions
are guided by this awareness will they be able to develop the vision and reality of peace and
shared prosperity.
Suleyman Demirel
9th President of the Republic of Turkey
Thorbjoern Jagland
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway
George J. Mitchell, Chairman
Former Member and Majority Leader of the United States Senate
Warren B. Rudman
Former Member of the United States Senate
Javier Solana
High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Union
Notes:
1 A copy of the statement is attached.
2 Copies of the President's letters are attached.
3 When informed of the planned visit, Ambassador Dennis Ross (President Clinton's Middle East Envoy) said
that he told Israeli Minister of Interior Shlomo Ben-Ami, "I can think of a lot of bad ideas, but I can't think of a
worse one." See Jane Perlez, "US Envoy Recalls the Day Pandora's Box Wouldn't Shut," The New York Times,
January 29, 2001.
4 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000 (Israel), Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, February 2001, state.gov.
5 Government of Israel, First Statement, 28 December 2000 (hereafter "GOI, First Statement"), para 187.
B'Tselem (The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) reported that 70 police
were injured. See Events on the Temple Mount - 29 September 2000: Interim Report,
btselem.org.
6 Disturbances also occurred within Israel's Arab community, resulting in thirteen deaths. These events do not
fall within the mandate of this Committee and are the subject of an official GOI inquiry.
7 GOI, First Statement, para 118.
8 Id., para 110. According to the GOI, the Palestinian Minister of Posts and Telecommunications declared at a
rally in Lebanon in March 2001 that the confrontation with Israel had been planned following the Camp David
Summit. See Government of Israel, Second Statement, 20 March 2001 (hereafter, "GOI, Second Statement"),
para 2. The PA provided the Committee a translation of a letter from the Minister, dated March 12, 2001, in
which the Minister denied saying that the intifada was planned, and that his statement in Lebanon was
misquoted and taken out of context. We were told by an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) intelligence officer that
while the declaration itself was not definitive, it represented an "open-source" version of what was known to
the IDF through "other means"; knowledge and means not shared by the IDF with the Committee.
9 Palestine Liberation Organization, Preliminary Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the
International Commission of Inquiry, December 8, 2000, p. 10. Note: submissions to the Committee from the
Palestinian side were made by the PLO.
10 Palestine Liberation Organization, A Crisis of Faith: Second Submission of the Palestine Liberation
Organization to the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, December 30,2000 (hereafter "PLO, Second
Submission"), p. 16.
11 See GOI, First Statement, para 286.
12 Palestine Liberation Organization, Third Submission of The Palestine Liberation Organization to the
Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, April 3, 2001 (hereafter "PLO, Third Submission"), p. 51.
13 GOI, Second Statement, para 4.
14 GOI, First Statement, para 19.
15 PLO, Third Submission, p. 25.
16 Id., pp. 46-50.
17 Id., pp. 27-28.
18 PLO, Second Submission, p. 14.
19 Id., pp. 14-15.
20 GOI, Second Statement, para 82.
21 GOI, First Statement, para 99.
22 GOI Second Statement, para 19, referring to the Exchange of Notes Between the Prime Minister of Israel
and the Chairman of the PLO, 9- 10 September 1993.
23 Id., para 21.
24 Testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, 102nd
Congress, May 22, 1991.
25 On March 21, 1980, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, speaking on behalf of the Carter Administration, stated:
"U.S. policy toward the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is unequivocal and has
long been a matter of public record. We consider it to be contrary to international law and an impediment to the
successful conclusion of the Middle East peace process."
On September 1, 1982, President Ronald Reagan announced what came to be known as The Reagan Plan for
the Middle East, stating that: "[T]he immediate adoption of a settlements freeze by Israel, more than any other
action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is
in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final
outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated."
On December 16, 1996, at a press conference, President Bill Clinton stated: "It just stands to reason that
anything that preempts the outcome [of the negotiations] ... cannot be helpful in making peace. I don't think
anything should be done that would be seen as preempting the outcome." Asked if he viewed the settlements
as an obstacle to peace, President Clinton replied, "Absolutely. Absolutely."
On April 5, 2001, a U.S. State Department spokesman, speaking for the current administration, stated:
"Continuing settlement activity does risk inflaming an already volatile situation in the region"; he described
that activity as "provocative."
26 There are 400 settlers in the "H2" sector of central Hebron, and 6,000 in the Kiryat Arba settlement on the
eastern edge of the city. See "An Introduction to the City of Hebron," published by the Temporary
International Presence in Hebron, tiph.org.
27 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2000,
cia.gov
28Ha'aretz, English Language Edition, April 10, 2001, p. 5.
29 GOI, First Statement, para 286.
30 Id., para 189.
31 B'Tselem, Illusions of Restraint: Human Rights Violations During the Events in the Occupied Territories,
29 September-2 December 2000, December 2000, p. 4.
32 GOI, First Statement, para 306. "The stated policy of the IDF is that whenever a Palestinian in the Occupied
Territories dies at the hands of a soldier, an investigation is to be made by the Department of Military Police
Investigations (MPI), except in cases defined as 'hostile terrorist activity.'" See B'Tselem, Illusions of Restraint,
p. 24. See also, Alex Fishman, "The Intifada, the IDF and Investigations," Yediot Aharonot (in English, Richard
Bell Press, 1996, Ltd.), January 19, 2001.
33 GOI, Second Statement, para 69-80.
34 PLO, Third Submission, p. 69.
35 Id., p. 60.
36 GOI, Second Statement, para 78.
37 GOI, First Statement, para 305.
38 Israel Defense Forces, The Ethical Code of the Israel Defense Forces,
us-israel.org.
39 See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2000 (Occupied
Territories), state.gov. See also, B'Tselem, Illusions of Restraint,
pp. 15-16, reporting on the alleged practice of separating rubber bullets into individual rounds, as opposed to
firing them properly in a bound cluster of three. Separation increases range and lethality.
40 GOI, Second Statement, para 92.
41 Id., para 89.<<
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