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Politics : Middle East Politics -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Thomas M. who wrote (1402)	4/17/2002 12:58:26 AM
From: Thomas M.	Respond to of 6945

The "Strategic Alliance" The U.S.-Israel "strategic alliance", which was formalized under President Reagan, has been perhaps the greatest accomplishment of the pro-Israeli establishment, together with the continuing large amounts of American economic and military aid. This concept was from its inception driven by the organized Zionists, not the national security bureaucracy. It began in earnest with a series of papers published in the early 1980's by JINSA, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, a Washington-based organization. JINSA's activities and personnel were devoted to "educate the American public on the geopolitical importance of Israel to the United States as an outpost of Western interests in the Middle East" . . . and to promote U.S.-Israeli "joint effort to block moves in the Middle East by the Soviet Union and its proxies, including the PLO." (Michael Saba, The Armageddon Network, pp 40-41) JINSA's Board of Directors included former head of AIPAC Morris Amitay, Senator Rudy Boschwitz, Eugene Rostow, and Michael Ledeen, (later of Iran-Contra fame). Its first executive director in 1979 was Steven Bryen who, at the time was under investigation by the Department of Justice for passing classified documents to the Israelis while serving as a congressional staffer. The investigation was dropped when Richard Perle, another neo-conservative Israeli supporter, became Reagan's Assistant Secretary of Defense and named Bryen as his deputy. This story is fully documented in the difficult-to-find Saba book published in 1984. The portent of the JINSA papers was that, as the U.S. moved to implement the Carter Doctrine to defend the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf in the face of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Shah, Israel was the logical choice for pre-positioning of military equipment, joint exercises and planning, medical facilities, military airfields and ports, and joint intelligence exchanges. In short, all of those things that would be required from the Persian Gulf states by the U.S. Central Command, which came into being on January 1, 1983, at MacDill AFB in Tampa, Florida. I served from 1982-85 as Political Advisor to the first Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command, General Robert Kingston. General Kingston and his staff were anxious to establish military-to-military relations with the states of the Persian Gulf and other key states such as Egypt and Pakistan and to establish a headquarters in the region. It was not surprising, therefore, that there was little enthusiasm for seeking military facilities and assistance from Israel since it risked undermining a budding relationship with these Muslim, mainly Arab, states. It was partly for political reasons too that Israel, Lebanon, and Syria were not included in the Area of Operations (AOR) of CENTCOM since the Persian Gulf was the central focus of the Command. It was thought that the establishment of a military presence in these states would be difficult enough without having the same command responsible for developing military-to-military relations with Israel. More surprising, was the reluctance of the European Command (EUCOM) which would have responsibility for implementing any joint security arrangements with Israel. Conversations with senior EUCOM officers at the time (1983-85) indicated their concern was that involvement with Israel would be a distraction and degrade the command's capability to perform its principal mission, fighting the Soviet Union. Back in Washington, the concept of strategic cooperation with Israel was so controversial within the national security bureaucracy (State, Defense, NSC) that negotiations were restricted to a tiny group which received its marching orders not through the normal chain of command, but from political appointees of the Reagan Administration. mediamonitors.net

To: Thomas M. who wrote (1402)	4/17/2002 1:05:21 AM
From: Thomas M.	Respond to of 6945

washington-report.org <<< Johnson had a dozen or more close associates and aides who were both Jewish and pro-Israel. There were Walt Rostow at the White House, his brother Eugene at State . . . >>> <<< Walt Rostow, in particular, had close Israeli connections, and met frequently with Israeli Embassy Minister Ephraim (Eppy) Evron. >>> <<< Several U.S. officials in a State Department Operations Room briefing could not conceal their glee over Israel's successes. With a wide smile, Eugene Rostow said, "Gentlemen, gentlemen, do not forget that we are neutral in word, thought and deed. " >>> <<< Walt Rostow, in a memo to the president, referred to the results of Israel's surprise attack on Egypt and Syria as "the first day's turkey shoot." On June 6, in another memo to the president, Walt Rostow recommended that the Israelis not be forced to withdraw from the territories they had seized-short of peace treaties with the Arab states. "If the Israelis go fast enough and the Soviets get worried enough," he wrote, "a simple cease-fire might be the best answer. This would mean that we could use the de facto situation on the ground to try to negotiate not a return to armistice lines but a definitive peace in the Middle East. " >>>

To: Thomas M. who wrote (1402)	4/17/2002 1:06:03 AM
From: Thomas M.	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 6945

<<< A network of prominent American Jews both in and out of government was advising President Johnson at every stage, and was at the same time apparently keeping the Israeli embassy and the Israeli government fully informed of every move contemplated by the United States. The network included the Rostow brothers in the White House and State Department . . . >>> washington-report.org

To: Thomas M. who wrote (1402)	4/17/2002 3:04:20 AM
From: Thomas M.	Respond to of 6945

mideastfacts.com This proposal was accepted by President Sadat of Egypt in February 1971. Israel recognized it as a genuine peace offer, but rejected it; the Labor party was committed to broader territorial gains from the 1967 war. Note that the Jarring-Sadat proposal offered nothing to the Palestinians. The basic problem is not Palestinian rights per se, but rather the fact that recognizing them would bar Israeli control over the occupied territories. At the insistence of National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, the US backed Israel's rejection of the Sadat offer, adopting Kissinger's policy of "stalemate." As usual, the US decision to back Israel's rejection of the Jarring-Sadat peace proposal removed the events from history and public discussion, at least in the United States. In Israel, in contrast, even conservative Middle East specialists recognize that Israel may have "missed a historic opportunity" in 1971 (Itamar Rabinovitch, asking whether Israel also missed such an opportunity when a Syrian proposal was rejected in 1949). The Jarring-Sadat proposal was virtually identical to official US policy, formulated in the State Department plan of December 1969 (the Rogers Plan). It also conformed to the general interpretation of UN 242 outside of Israel. The Rogers plan suggests that this was also the US interpretation at the time, a conclusion supported by other evidence. In an important article in a British Middle East journal, Donald Neff, a well-known US journalist and historian specializing on Middle East affairs, reviews a State Department study based on records of the 1967 negotiations.30 This study, leaked to Neff, has been kept secret "so as not to embarrass Israel," Neff concludes. The study quotes the chief American negotiator, Arthur Goldberg, who was strongly pro-Israel. Goldberg informed King Hussein of Jordan that the US "could not guarantee that everything would be returned to Jordan; some territorial adjustments would be required," but there must be "a mutuality in adjustments." Secretary of State Dean Rusk confirmed to Hussein that the US "would use its influence to obtain compensation to Jordan for any territory it was required to give up," citing examples. Goldberg informed officials of other Arab states "that the United States did not conceive of any substantial redrawing of the map." Israel's withdrawal would be "total except for minor adjustments," Goldberg assured the Arabs, with compensation to Jordan for any such adjustments. His assurances led them to agree to UN 242. In a private communication to Neff, Dean Rusk recently affirmed that "We never contemplated any significant grant of territory to Israel as a result of the June 1967 war." The US interpretation of UN 242 contemplated "minor adjustments in the western frontier of the West Bank," "demilitarization measures in the Sinai and Golan Heights," and "a fresh look" at the status of Jerusalem. "Resolution 242 never contemplated the movement of any significant territories to Israel," Rusk concluded. Advocates of Israeli policies in the United States commonly claim that this interpretation of UN 242 is contrary to the stand taken by Arthur Goldberg and the US government generally. Thus the news columns of the New York Times inform us that the Israeli version of UN 242, which permits Israel to incorporate unspecified parts of the conquered territories, is "supported by Arthur J. Goldberg," citing later comments of his in which he did indeed support the Israeli version. One of the more extreme apologists, Yale Law professor and former government official Eugene Rostow, claims that he "helped produce" UN 242, and has repeatedly argued that it authorizes continued Israeli control over the territories. In response to his claims, David Korn, former State Department office director for Israel and Arab-Israeli affairs, wrote in November 1991 that helped produce' Resolution 242, but in fact he had little if anything to do with it." He was an "onlooker," like "many others who have claimed a hand in it." "It was U.S. policy at the time and for several years afterward," Korn continues, "that [any border] changes would be no more than minor." Korn confirms that "Both Mr. Goldberg and Secretary of State Dean Rusk told King Hussein that the United States would use its influence to obtain territorial compensation from Israel for any West Bank lands ceded by Jordan to Israel," and that Jordan's acquiescence was based on these promises. Rostow's pathetic and evasive response contests none of these statements.

To: Thomas M. who wrote (1402)	4/23/2002 2:44:57 PM
From: Thomas M.	Respond to of 6945

More on UN 242: <<< During the June 1967 war, Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, completing the Zionist conquest of British-mandated Palestine. In the war's aftermath, the United Nations debated the modalities for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the Fifth Emergency Session of the General Assembly convening in the war's immediate aftermath, there was "near unanimity" on "the withdrawal of the armed forces from the territory of neighboring Arab states occupied during the recent war" since "everyone agrees that there should be no territorial gains by military conquest." (Secretary-General U Thant, summarizing the G.A. debate) In subsequent Security Council deliberations, the same demand for a full Israeli withdrawal in accordance with the principle of "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" was inscribed in United Nations Resolution 242, alongside the right of "every state in the region" to have its sovereignty respected. A still-classified State Department study concludes that the US supported the "inadmissibility" clause of 242, making allowance for only "minor " and "mutual" border adjustments. (Nina J. Noring and Walter B. Smith II, "The Withdrawal Clause in UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967") Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan later warned Cabinet ministers not to endorse 242 because "it means withdrawal to the 4 June boundaries, and because we are in conflict with the Security Council on that resolution." >>> normanfinkelstein.com