A Plan Acceptable to Both Israelis and Palestinians
Friday, April 12, 2002
This partial transcript of Special Report with Brit Hume, April 11, 2002 was provided by the Federal Document Clearing House.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE COLIN POWELL: Even after 12 days of incursions, and that violence and that anger and frustration which fuels it will be there unless we find a negotiating process that both sides have confidence in and a negotiating process that will lead to what the Palestinian people want, a state where they can raise their children and design their own futures living side by side with Israel.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
BRIT HUME, HOST: Some people, though, say they've seen that movie and they know how it comes out, that at the end of the Clinton administration, Ehud Barak made a forthcoming offer. Yasser Arafat turned it down. And the rest is history.
So what was it about that offer that made it unacceptable to the Palestinians? And is there any chance that when all is said and done, a different offer might be forthcoming? Joining me now to try to answer those questions is Dennis Ross, a FOX News contributor and the former top adviser to the past two presidents on the very issue of Mid-East peace. Welcome, Dennis.
DENNIS ROSS, FOX NEWS CONTRIBUTOR: Nice to be here.
HUME: So let's — what about the idea that if they get back to the table basically it's going to be the same issues all over again, that Israel at its most forthcoming is not likely to do any better than the offer it made? And unless something changes happen among the Palestinians, or at least in Arafat's mind if he's the negotiator, he is likely to say no again. And why did he say no the first time? First of all, let's look at the terms.
ROSS: Let's look at the terms. Let me spell out exactly what it was. It was something that we offered, by the way. There's a kind of imagery out there that Barak made an offer. It was a U.S. offer.
HUME: Barak accepted it?
ROSS: Barak was willing to accept it.
HUME: Willing to accept it.
ROSS: And the offer involved the following. When it came to territory, there was — going around Jerusalem, there was going to be the following. There was going to be a divided Jerusalem in the sense that the eastern part of the city has Jewish and Arab neighborhoods. The Arab neighborhoods were going to become part of the Palestinian state. They would be the capital for that state. So there would be an east Jerusalem capital for the Palestinian state.
There would have been 97 percent of the territory that would have gone back to the Palestinians. When it came to the issue of refugees, there would have been a right of return to their state, not to Israel. We were talking about a two-state solution.
HUME: Right.
ROSS: Right of return to your state makes perfect sense. Right of return to their state makes no sense.
When it came to security, there would have been an international process in the Jordan Valley. Now, I will tell you that Palestinian negotiators clearly thought this was acceptable. It was unacceptable to only one man — Yasser Arafat.
And the question is why. I believe because in this agreement was a phrase that said end of conflict. Arafat can agree to all sorts of things as long as he doesn't have to admit the conflict is over. Arafat is someone who never closes a door on any option. He did not want to be in a position where he had to end the conflict. And the conflict in his eyes was to end himself.
HUME: Now, you do hear complaints from some Palestinian quarters that, A, the offer was never set forth in writing. Is that meaningful?
ROSS: It is not meaningful because they had it in writing, because when we presented it, they took down every word.
HUME: Right.
ROSS: We didn't present it in writing because we told them at the time, "If you don't accept it, we're going to withdraw it."
HUME: Right.
ROSS: If we put it on a formal piece of paper, it was harder to withdraw it.
HUME: Now, they also say that the offer would have divided Palestinian territory into four separate cantons and entirely surrounded and therefore controlled by Israel.
ROSS: Untrue, completely untrue. There were going to get a net 97 percent of the territory. In the West Bank, it would have been 95 percent of the West Bank. There was going to be a swap that would have added onto the size of Gaza.
They were going to have their own border with Jordan. There was not going to be an Israeli presence there. There were not going to be cantons. There were not going to be divisions. They were getting contiguous territory in the West Bank.
When they say that, they're referring to a map the Israelis showed to them first in May, and a map the Israelis presented at Camp David in July. That was not what the United States presented in December.
HUME: Which Barak accepted?
ROSS: Which Barak accepted.
HUME: So this idea that there was a nine-to-one land swap in Israel's favor is bogus?
ROSS: That's bogus. That is what Camp David was. It's not what the Clinton ideas were.
When you hear this, this is part of the mythology. They have never yet to this day honestly presented to their own public what it is that was presented because when you hear it as we just described it, you say it looks like a pretty good deal.
HUME: Right.
ROSS: What a surprise they haven't presented it to their own public.
HUME: Now, you see Powell there. He must know, as you do, that that was an offer acceptable to some of the people around Arafat, probably therefore acceptable to many people in the Palestinian world over there. Yasser Arafat was the guy who said no.
ROSS: That's right.
HUME: He was the ultimate final obstacle.
ROSS: That's right.
HUME: And yet, and yet here he goes into Jerusalem. He is going to meet with Sharon. He's even going to meet with Arafat. Is this crazy?
ROSS: It depends what the objective is. If the objective is to try to stop the violence and launch a process that can restore the legitimacy of peaceful coexistence while Arafat is still there, recognizing you won't end the conflict while he is still there, it's one thing. If the objective is to say we are going to end the conflict with Yasser Arafat, then he is chasing an illusion.
HUME: Because in the end, you don't think you can negotiate peace with this man, do you?
ROSS: Nobody spent more time with Yasser Arafat than I did. And all I can tell you is that the conclusion I drew based on everything we did with him is that he could not end the conflict. That was stumbling block.
Arafat wants to keep things always open. Never foreclose options. Never close doors. For him to end the conflict meant he closed the door.
HUME: And meant that he also went against the dream of so many Palestinians and Palestinians terrorists that someday they could drive Israel to the sea.
ROSS: Absolutely. He couldn't give up his mythologies. That was the key thing. He could not give up his mythologies.
HUME: Dennis Ross, it's always a pleasure to have you. Thank you very much.
ROSS: Nice to be here.
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