Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Gold/Mining/Energy : Gold Price Monitor -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: John Soileau who wrote (84400)	4/14/2002 7:14:24 AM
From: E. Charters	Respond to of 116798

Canada has had different colour bills for ages. All denoms were different hues since they first printed shinplasters. Now hues are more pronounced. European nations also have different hues to bills. Their money is complexly patterned and watermarked to defeat counterfeiters. Large sizes and rag bond paper common to Eurpopean money make it easier to detect counterfeit as the larger the bill, the more high quality texture and foldability becomes apparent. But there is more anti-counterfeiting built into a US bill in the way of microprinting and other stuff than most European money. Canadian bills feature shiny (and soon holographic) decals. Gold is hardest money to counterfeit. But fungible gold certificates traded with plastic cards with denominations in reprintable bar code that had pin numbers that were issued to the bearer in RSA code -- would be hard to beat. If the plastic had a bar code which was the public code, and it would be issued to your secret code, the money would be tied to you until transferred to another public code and signed by your secret code by your PIN number unlocking your secret code. This way the receiver could carry your public coded message signed by your secret code that he receive say 100 bucks in gold on his card, until he got to a bank and confirmed it. The message would be printed on his card in ink in bar code and also carried in mag strip. If the message were unreadable by the bank by the three available methods (ASCII, bar code, mag scan) it would print a message back to the receivor as a proof of non-transaction and send a message to the transferror too, if he can be discerned. The ID of the transferor would be carried in his public number, public code, ASCII text of the transaction level, ASCII ID -- and a digitally and hand-signed message containing his public code as well as the message. With 5 levels of redundancy ( credit cards have only two - possession and your signature - and require a line connection for verification) -- it (card money) would be fairly secure and fool-proof. Since all transactions are solely between the parties involved for sake of trust, it would be up to the parties to trust the system or depend on cash, gold, or a line connection. The advantage of the card system is that it would allow the user and the merchant to know what he had on hand immediately. The card machine that he carried would tell him and the merchant what he carried. (to a certain public limit) With RSA it could further be verified by both the secret code in a line connection and by a pin number AND a fingerprint number according to RSA or Diffie-Hellman technology. (The bank could provide a service which allowed verification of the person's secret code by decoding it with his public code. He has to have the pin number to send a signed message or release as message in the secret code.) EC<:-}