SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Katelew who wrote (25921)4/18/2002 1:32:24 PM
From: Paul Kern  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Can anyone in this group justify why Israel opposes a U.N. peacekeeping force?

Because, in Lebanon, Hezbollah would set us their bases right against the fence of a UNIFIL base and use it for cover when they fired rockets. The same as they set up on the roofs of schools and hospitals.



To: Katelew who wrote (25921)4/18/2002 1:34:29 PM
From: Dennis O'Bell  Respond to of 281500
 
Can anyone in this group justify why Israel opposes a U.N. peacekeeping force?

Do you think such a force would prevent suicide bombers ?

Bosnia and Kosovo weren't a case of suicide bombers, so such a force had a chance of doing some good.

But in the Mideast, the only thing I can think of such forces accomplishing would be to prevent the IDF from doing anything about terrorism against Israelis, giving Hamas and other groups pretty much have a free hand. This is the main reason they probably oppose it.



To: Katelew who wrote (25921)4/18/2002 4:10:54 PM
From: art slott  Respond to of 281500
 
>>Can anyone in this group justify why Israel opposes a U.N. peacekeeping force? <<

There is no peace to keep. History shows us that peacekeeping forces only work when both sides have agreed to it. Where agreed upon bounderies have been set for example.
There was an excellent piece in the WSJ on the subject yesterday.



To: Katelew who wrote (25921)4/18/2002 7:23:45 PM
From: Nadine Carroll  Respond to of 281500
 
Three main reasons:

1. In asymmetrical warfare, the terrorism is not easily observable but the responses of an army are. Result: only the actions of the army are observed.

2. In asymmetrical warfare, terrorists have no clear "complaint department" if peacekeeping forces feel threatened or intimidated. The chain of command is clearer for an army, particularly if the political commanders of the army are under pressure to respect the peacekeepers, and/or have higher standards of behavior. Result: the peacekeepers are more likely to be scared of the terrorists.

3. The U.N.'s copious history of displaying behaviors 1) and 2) through the actions the UNFIL and TIPH Mideast peacekeeping forces.



To: Katelew who wrote (25921)4/19/2002 1:04:51 AM
From: Nadine Carroll  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Some historical background on why the UN is not a neutral player in the Middle East:

The U.N.'s Refugees
The international body gives aid and comfort to terrorists.

BY MICHAEL RUBIN
Thursday, April 18, 2002 12:01 a.m. EDT

JERUSALEM--On Monday, France, Belgium and four other European Union members endorsed a U.N. Human Rights Commission resolution condoning "all available means, including armed struggle" to establish a Palestinian state. Hence, six EU members and the commission now join the 57 nations of the Islamic Conference in legitimizing suicide bombers. By their logic of moral equivalence, terror is justifiable because its root cause is Israel's occupation. That Palestinian terror predates occupation, or that suicide bombings became a tactic of choice only after the initiation of the Oslo process, is too inconvenient to mention.

Unfortunately the U.N. goes beyond giving rhetorical support for terrorism. In a variety of ways, its agencies have been complicit in Middle Eastern terror.

Start with the refugee camps. The U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees began operation in 1950. The establishment of Israel, and its simultaneous invasion by five Arab states, resulted in the creation of approximately 600,000 Palestinian refugees. An equivalent number of Jews fled their homes in Iraq, Egypt, Yemen and other Arab countries, and settled in Israel.
As disruptive as it was, the number of Jewish and Arab refugees pales in comparison to that created by the partition of India. There are today more than 100 million descendants of the original 15 million Indian and Pakistani refugees. The U.N. remained outside the conflict, and provided no political or economic incentive for refugees not to settle. Too bad the same restraint has not characterized the behavior of the U.N. and Arab states in the Middle East.

As it is, UNRWA and the Arab League hold Palestinian refugees in limbo. UNRWA operates 27 refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza, and another 32 camps in neighboring Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. It counts nearly four million Palestinians as refugees, including those whose grandparents never saw Palestine. (If U.N. High Commission for Refugees criteria are applied, the figure is significantly lower.) In 2001 alone, UNRWA spent $310 million on the camps.

It is these camps that have been at the center of violence between Israeli forces and Palestinian gunmen. On Feb. 28, following a series of Palestinian terror attacks in Israel (including an attack on a young girl's bat mitzvah celebration), Israeli forces rolled into the Jenin and Balata refugee camps. They remained for three days. Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer explained the Israeli strategy: "We are interested in one thing only, to stop and disrupt this wave of suicide attacks. We intend to go in and get out."

U.N. officials were instantaneous in their condemnation. Kofi Annan called on Israel "to withdraw immediately." High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson labeled the incursions "in total disregard of international human rights." On March 21, a UNRWA spokesman called on Israel to compensate the agency for damage to its refugee camps.

Israel's raids did damage the camps. But as a result of the operation, Israel uncovered illegal arms caches, bomb factories and a plant manufacturing the new Kassam-2 rocket, designed to reach Israeli population centers from the West Bank and Gaza. Confronted with evidence of illegal Palestinian mines, mortars and missiles, no U.N. official questioned how it was that bomb factories could exist in U.N.-managed refugee camps. Either the U.N. officials were unaware of the bomb factories--which would suggest utter incompetence--or, more likely, the U.N. employees simply turned a blind eye.

Unfortunately, UNRWA is not alone in reinforcing the U.N.'s reputation as an organization incapable of fighting terror. On May 24, 2000, Israel unilaterally pulled back from southern Lebanon, a withdrawal the U.N. certified to be complete. Terror did not end, though. On Oct. 7, 2000, Hezbollah guerrillas crossed the border and kidnapped three Israeli soldiers (including one Israeli Arab), all of whom they subsequently killed. Observers from the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon videotaped the scene of the kidnapping, including the getaway cars, and some guerrillas.
Inexplicably, they then hid the videotape. Questioned by Israeli officials, Terje Roed-Larsen, the U.N. Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, chided Israel for "questioning the good faith of senior United Nations officials." When after eight months the U.N. finally admitted to possessing the tape, officials balked at showing it to the Israeli government since that might "undermine U.N. neutrality." That U.N. observers protected and defended guerrillas who crossed a U.N.-certified border, using cars with U.N. license plates while under the cover of U.N. flags, was apparently of no consequence to UNIFIL. Pronouncements aside, U.N. moral equivalency in practice dictates that terrorists are equal to states. Fighting terror compromises U.N. neutrality.

The U.N. has turned a blind eye to terror in Iraq as well. Throughout the spring and summer of 2001, a series of bomb explosions wracked the safe haven of northern Iraq. Kurdish authorities long suspected the complicity of certain U.N. drivers who crossed freely between the safe haven and Iraq proper. On July 19, 2001, Kurdish security arrested a Tunisian U.N. driver found in possession of explosives. A Yemeni national serving as deputy director of the U.N. mission in northern Iraq demanded that the driver be released before any investigation could be completed; he was. The U.N.'s reputation, in other words, trumps protecting innocents from Saddam Hussein's bombs.

The U.N. has a terrorism problem. Syria, a nation that hosts more terror groups than any other, sits on the Security Council. Along with Iran, Syria is a prime sponsor of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Just two months after Nasrallah declared that "Jews invented the legend of the Nazi atrocities" and that Israel was a "cancerous body in the region . . . [which] must be uprooted," Mr. Annan bestowed international legitimacy upon Nasrallah by agreeing to an unprecedented meeting.

U.N. officials can make all the high-sounding pronouncements they desire, but if the U.N. wishes to defuse regional tensions and signal that terrorism is not acceptable, then there must be no equivocation. Perhaps Mr. Annan can be forgiven for not being aware that U.N.-funded refugee camps housed arms factories, or for allowing U.N. complicity in terror cover-ups in Lebanon and Iraq. But in a Middle East where perception is more important than reality, Mr. Annan's silence is deafening and his moral equivalency is interpreted as a green light for terror. The main casualty is U.N. credibility.

Mr. Rubin is an adjunct scholar of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

opinionjournal.com