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To: Mannie who wrote (50517)4/25/2002 4:48:47 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Once upon a time in Jenin

What really happened when Israeli forces went into Jenin? Just as the world is giving up hope of learning the truth, Justin Huggler and Phil Reeves have unearthed compelling evidence of an atrocity.

25 April 2002

news.independent.co.uk



To: Mannie who wrote (50517)4/25/2002 5:38:15 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 65232
 
Unusual book compares stock, bond and realty investing

By Robert J. Bruss
Tribune Media Services
Tuesday, April 23, 2002

VALUE INVESTING IN REAL ESTATE, By Gary W. Eldred (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 2002), $24.95, 268 pages. Available in stock or by special order at better bookstores, public libraries and www.amazon.com.

It's hard to explain Gary W. Eldred's scholarly tome "Value Investing in Real Estate." In it, he attempts to justify why real estate surpasses stocks and bonds as a long-term investment. The author has documented his research well, even going so far as to conclude investors will eventually flee the stock market for real estate investment.

As I studied this creative real estate book, I tried to figure out where Eldred was heading and what he was hoping to prove. He begins by explaining the investment theories of the famous Benjamin Graham and historic reasons why people have bought stocks. Though the first few chapters have virtually nothing to do with real estate, don't get turned off. Be patient. The book gets more interesting.

The author does slam many theories about the stock market, such as its purported 11 percent average annual return. He even revives the scandal of the Beardstown ladies whose false 24.4 percent annual stock market return, which sold more than 800,000 of their books, was really only about 9.1 percent annually.

Finally, in Chapter 3 the author begins explaining "The Case for Real Estate." After several pages of boring charts, which lose all but the most diehard engineer readers who love details, Eldred eventually comes to the conclusion, "Value investors should choose real estate."

This new book reminds me of my college days at Northwestern, where we were constantly writing term papers. After receiving a few B's and C's, I learned the key to earning A's was a lot of footnotes showing I had done "research." Eldred seems to follow the same formula, with many footnotes to show the sources for his statements.

In Chapter 5, the author makes a dramatic change in style, from professorial theory to practical reality. He shares some personal real estate experiences to justify his bias toward real estate investments. Eldred starts using phrases like "the magic of leverage" and even the worn-out "location, location, location."

Eventually the book gets to topics such as "The Ins and Outs of Market Value," referring to real estate, not stocks. By the second half of the book, Eldred has evolved into a "born again" real estate investor. Why he spent the first few chapters talking about the stock market in boring detail, when the book's topic is obviously real estate investing, is hard to understand.

Eldred is a superb author of some of the best practical "how-to" real estate books about home buying and real estate investing. But this one is dramatically different from his earlier books. His goal is obviously to prove real estate investing is more profitable over the long term than stock market investing. But he bounces between the stock market and real estate so often it's hard to keep track of what he is trying to prove or disprove.

This is a thinking-person's real estate investment book. It is not for the "how to make a million dollars by next Friday" crowd. One especially profound statement that caught my attention is "all properties are fixers." By that the author means virtually every property needs some work that will add to its market value.

In today's real estate market, Eldred suggests the best way to profit from real estate is to add value by fixing up a property. That is what he means by real estate "value investing." "Value investors don't wait for market appreciation," Eldred profoundly says, adding, "Through savvy purchases and property improvements, real estate investors can create their own appreciation."

Chapter topics include: Value Investing: The One Best Way; The Case Against Stocks for Retirement; Real Estate Risks and Returns; The Enterprising Investor; The Ins and Outs of Market Value; Is the Property a Good Buy?; Look Beyond Market Value; Predict the Future; and Create Value Now.

This is one of the most unusual real estate books I've ever read. It can easily be used as a college textbook in a real estate investment course. Or, it can be a personal guidebook for novice and experienced realty investors who want assurance they are doing the right thing to add profitable improvements to increase property market values. On my scale of one to 10, this excellent book rates a 10.



To: Mannie who wrote (50517)4/26/2002 4:44:54 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Israeli Reservists Tell Of Jenin Camp Assault
________________________________________
Ill-Prepared For a Battle Unexpected
By John Lancaster
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, April 26, 2002; Page A01

JERUSALEM, April 25 -- It was the second day of the battle for the Jenin refugee camp, and things were going badly for the Israelis. Palestinian gunmen, firing from sandbags hidden behind curtained windows, had pinned down advancing Israeli troops on the camp's western edge. Two Israelis had already died.

To a young Israeli army sergeant watching from a nearby rise known as Antennae Hill, perhaps 400 yards above the camp, it was clear that his commanders had been wrong when they had confidently predicted a few days earlier that the Palestinians would surrender at the first sight of approaching tanks.

That's when he heard the orders to open fire.

"The orders were to shoot at each house," recalled the sergeant, a member of a heavy weapons company in the Yoav regiment of the army's Fifth Brigade, a reserve unit that did the bulk of the fighting in Jenin. "The words on the radio were to 'Put a bullet in each window.' "

The sergeant, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said he was troubled by the orders, which did not require soldiers to actually see the gunmen they were trying to kill. But he said the Israeli soldiers didn't hesitate. They pounded a group of cinder-block homes -- the apparent source of Palestinian sniper fire -- with .50-caliber machine guns, M-24 sniper rifles, Barrett sniper rifles and Mod3 grenade launchers.

"It's not true there was a massacre, because guys did not shoot at civilians just like this," the sergeant recalled. "However -- and this is terrible -- it is true that we shot at houses, and God knows how many innocent people got killed."

In separate interviews Wednesday, the sergeant and another Israeli reservist who fought in Jenin, Sgt. Shlomi Lanyado, offered a detailed account of the battle from the perspective of the Israeli forces. The Jenin combat was the heaviest of the recent military operation that Israel launched in the West Bank after a string of suicide bombings. Both sergeants participated in the house-to-house combat in the center of the densely built refugee camp.

The 10-day battle claimed the lives of 23 Israeli soldiers and at least 50 Palestinians -- more may be buried beneath the rubble -- and left the center of the camp in ruins. Israeli officials say most of the dead Palestinians were armed fighters who had turned the camp into a "nest of terror" used to launch suicide bombings against Israelis.

Palestinians say most of the dead were civilians and have accused the Israeli military of committing a massacre in Jenin, which Israel has denied. Israel and the U.N. Security Council are now arguing over the composition of a U.N. team charged with investigating the battle.

The sergeants' accounts add up to only a small piece of a much larger picture. Their recollections are parallel in some respects, but do not provide a comprehensive account of the battle.

Both sergeants have returned to civilian life, and spoke without the presence of Israeli army press officers.

The soldiers described a lack of preparation by Israeli reservists. They were hastily mustered from civilian life less than two weeks before, and were told to expect a Palestinian surrender within three days, the sergeants said. They spent barely a day rehearsing the operation. They also described the trauma of losing close friends in battle.

They expressed grudging admiration for a mostly unseen enemy that had meticulously planned for the assault, stockpiling ammunition, food and medical supplies as well as crude but effective bombs made frommetal canisters filled with phosphate and acetone.

"I can't be contemptuous of them," said Lanyado, 32, a cheerful, animated stage actor and producer who lives in a high-rise near Tel Aviv with his wife and two small children. "Somebody there had thought very much what to do and how to fight and succeeded for 10 or 11 days against a very big army."

Both Lanyado and the other sergeant said they do not believe that Israeli soldiers intentionally killed Palestinian civilians. Lanyado said he and the other members of his platoon went out of their way to treat Palestinians with respect, providing them with water and once summoning a medic to treat an elderly man who collapsed in his bedroom.

The other sergeant, however, said he was troubled not only by the order to fire through open windows without specific, identifiable targets, but also by what he said were insufficient efforts by the army to allow civilians to leave their homes in safety. He also questioned the decision to use bulldozers to knock down houses at a time when he said the fighting had mostly subsided.

Neither soldier said he was aware of Israeli troops using noncombatants as human shields, to open doors, closets or packages that could be booby-trapped, as Palestinians have charged. Both sergeants acknowledged, however, that soldiers often drafted Palestinians to knock on neighbors' doors as the soldiers moved from house to house in search of gunmen and terrorist suspects.

"The thought was that if there was a gunman behind the door, he'll think twice before spraying the whole door," said the sergeant with the heavy weapons company.

Both sergeants said the practice was aimed at saving Palestinian as well as Israeli lives. Israeli military spokesmen denied that Palestinian civilians were deliberately put at risk. The spokesmen said that from the first day of the assault, Israeli forces broadcast regular warnings over loudspeakers in Arabic offering residents a chance to leave the camp in safety and fighters a chance to surrender. They said bulldozers were brought in only as a last resort following the death of 13 soldiers in an ambush.

"Most of the civilians in the camp left very early on, which the [army] facilitated," a military spokesman, Capt. Jacob Dallal, said today. Those who remained behind, he added, were "mostly terrorists." Dallal said houses were fired upon only if they were identified as "sources of fire."

The sergeants were called to active duty on March 17, about two weeks before the start of Israel's offensive in the West Bank. Israeli intelligence had identified the camp as a center of operations for two militant groups, the Islamic Resistance Movement, known as Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, as well as fighters affiliated with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat.

On Monday, April 1, Lanyado said, he and other members of the company rehearsed their mission -- to round up terrorists and gunmen -- using empty buildings at an army base near Jenin. "We practiced knocking on the door and then waiting" to one side, he recalled.

In general, they said, the mood was relaxed. "We were told specifically that once the Palestinians see the tanks, they'll give up," the other sergeant said. "Those were the words my company commander told us."

The mood changed abruptly, however, on April 3, when the first soldiers set off down Antennae Hill, so named for two large radio towers atop the hill, which slopes toward the two- and three-story houses at the edge of the camp. The Palestinian gunfire was much heavier than the Israelis anticipated and it quickly claimed its first victim, Maj. Moshe Gerstner, felled by a bullet to the throat.

"We began to understand that the Palestinians are taking this very seriously," said Lanyado, who later that day led a squad of six men into the first row of houses. They spent the night inside one that had been abandoned. The next morning, "I got a call to bring a medic" to a house about 75 yards down the hill, Lanyado recalled. He raced toward the house, with bullets singing past his head. "This was the fastest running I've ever done," he said. "I don't know how the bullets didn't hit me. I was saying to myself, 'I'm going to fall.' "

He entered the house to find that a friend and company medic, Aynon Sharaabi, had been fatally wounded in the side by a ricochet, moments after washing in the kitchen, then binding his arm with a ritual leather strap, in preparation for morning prayers.

At that moment, "we started the war," Lanyado said.

A similar realization was dawning among the members of the Israeli heavy weapons company, which had remained up the hill in a supporting role. On the third day, said the sergeant with the company, he and his men were ordered to fire on a group of five or six houses to "soften the target" and "wake up the snipers" so they would shoot back and expose their locations.

After a few days, Lanyado and his men left the western side of the camp and moved to another area farther down the hill. It was too dangerous to travel in the open, he said, so the soldiers used sledgehammers to create a tunnel through the houses as they worked their way toward the center of the camp.

On one occasion, Lanyado recalled, he and his men burst through a wall to find 16 Palestinians -- four women, two men and 10 children -- sitting stiffly in a living room, "almost like they were waiting for us." Lanyado, the son of an Egyptian Jew, said he spoke to the family in Arabic to try to put them at ease, then passed out candy to the children after first popping a piece into his mouth to show them it wasn't poisoned.

As the Israelis penetrated deeper into the camp, the other sergeant's heavy weapons company could no longer fire from the hill without jeopardizing soldiers below. At that point, the sergeant said, he and his comrades moved into the camp as well, picking their way through streets and houses strewn with booby traps.

One such trap, he said, consisted of a loose tile that concealed two metal plates separated by a scrap of sponge. Anyone who stepped on the tile, he said, would have completed an electrical circuit and triggered a homemade bomb. Lanyado and his squad had many similar encounters.

"There were a lot of bombs in every place," Lanyado recalled. "You would see a door partly open, and there would be a wire that was connected to one of these soda canisters."

The other sergeant disputed official assertions that the army had made every effort to empty the camp of civilians. "The civilians, they never got a real chance to get out," he said.

He recalled that on the fifth day, he was inside an armored personnel carrier broadcasting appeals in Arabic for fighters to surrender. The commander of the vehicle, he said, asked a senior officer who was riding with them why they did not broadcast the appeal on more than one street. According to the sergeant, the officer replied, " 'These are my orders. Do you really think the brigade wants to give them a chance to give up?' "

The sergeant said there were still plenty of civilians inside the camp during the period of the fiercest fighting. On guard duty inside a house one night, he recalled, he heard a baby crying unattended for hours in an adjacent building. Fearing that the mother was dead, he asked an officer to investigate. But the officer said it might be a trap. "He said, 'I'm sorry. I wish I could, but I can't,' " the sergeant recalled.

Toward the end of the battle, he said, he was peering out the hatch of an armored personnel carrier when he noticed a young man in bluejeans crawling on his hands and knees through the rubble. His platoon commander, a lieutenant, who was in another vehicle ahead of him, ordered the man in Arabic to stop, then fired a warning shot. But the man kept crawling toward the vehicles.

Fearing a suicide bomber, the lieutenant shot him dead, he recalled.

Lanyado said his men often asked him why they didn't use more aggressive tactics and were greatly relieved when commanders decided to send in the bulldozers.

"All the time the soldiers asked me, 'Why aren't we using more strength?' " Lanyado recalled. " 'Why do I have to go from house to house and maybe not come back?' " Lanyado said he has been shocked, since hanging up his uniform, by the international storm of criticism over Israeli tactics in Jenin. "I'm ready to speak with anyone, to look them in the eye and tell them that I and my soldiers, we were as clean as we could be," he said.

© 2002 The Washington Post Company

washingtonpost.com



To: Mannie who wrote (50517)4/26/2002 5:47:28 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
The New York Times Lead Editorial Today...

Israel's Historic Miscalculation
Editorial / Op-Ed
The New York Times
April 26, 2002
nytimes.com

Late last week, senior Israeli Army officers called for uprooting several dozen isolated Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip because of the military burden involved in protecting them. Even though the proposal was focused on Israeli security interests, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon angrily dismissed it at a cabinet meeting, saying that as long as he was in power there would be no discussion of removing a single settlement.

It is hard to imagine a more dispiriting statement for those hoping for a negotiated land-for-peace end to hostilities in the Middle East. If Mr. Sharon sticks to this view he will leave little hope for peace between Israel and the Palestinians. We recognize that this is an exceptionally painful moment in a region where the focus has been on death and human suffering rather than on land. But ultimately this dispute is over land.

Just as terror is the greatest Palestinian threat to Middle East peace, so are settlements on territory captured in the 1967 war the greatest Israeli obstacle to peace. They deprive the Palestinians of prime land and water, break up Palestinian geographic continuity, are hard to defend against Palestinian attack and complicate the establishment of a clear, secure Israeli border.

Before the Oslo peace process began in 1993, settlements were a major American concern. The first President Bush threatened to withhold $10 billion in loan guarantees from Israel if it did not freeze its settlement building. The hostility between him and Yitzhak Shamir, then prime minister, over this issue contributed to Mr. Shamir's defeat at the hands of Yitzhak Rabin in 1992.

But for nearly a decade, settlements have earned little American attention. Since Israel and the Palestinians were engaged in peace negotiations, it was assumed that eventually many if not most of the settlements would go, and it was easier not to cause a political crisis by pressuring the Israeli right before a full peace agreement had been reached. The Oslo peace talks broke down, of course, and while primary responsibility for the collapse rests with Yasir Arafat, the settler population in the West Bank and Gaza has nearly doubled, to more than 200,000. This is an immense problem.

Two decades ago most Israelis considered the settlers to be oddballs spurred by messianism and nostalgia for the derring-do of Zionist pioneers. A few thousand and then a few tens of thousands set up cheap mobile homes on windswept hillsides and vowed to double their number. But by the early 1990's, when Mr. Sharon served as housing minister, the situation had changed radically. Aided by government subsidies and other inducements, there were more than 100,000 settlers. For Israelis, settlers were no longer zealots but ordinary fellow citizens. Suddenly their plumber or doctor or neighbor's sister was living in a big semi-detached house in a community on land captured in 1967. Many Israeli maps stopped demarcating the former border.

Today the biggest settlements are real towns, with tens of thousands of inhabitants, major access roads, neighborhoods, shopping malls, industrial parks, even a university. This is in addition to some 200,000 other Israeli Jews who live in neighborhoods of East Jerusalem also captured in 1967. Palestinians consider these to be settlements as well.

In the year that Mr. Sharon has been prime minister, some 35 new settlement outposts have been established, in contravention of his coalition agreement with the Labor Party. Opinion polls show strong Israeli public support for removal of some settlements in exchange for peace, a position embraced by previous Israeli governments. Yet Mr. Sharon refuses to consider such a move.

Mr. Sharon has said he is willing to make "painful compromises" for peace, and has called for a regional peace conference. He has welcomed the Saudi peace framework, which posits the return of all land captured in 1967 in exchange for full diplomatic ties with the Arab world. But to take out of negotiation even the most isolated settlements — this week Mr. Sharon said Netzarim, a Gaza settlement, was the same to him as Tel Aviv — is to undermine the possibility that following his military action, a meaningful political dialogue can begin. The Israeli public and the American government must not turn away from this painful reality. The Palestinian and Arab leadership must also realize that the longer the Palestinians rely on terrorism and fail to return to negotiation, the harder it will be to remove these "facts on the ground."



To: Mannie who wrote (50517)4/26/2002 2:52:48 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
This Ha'aretz Editorial Makes Too Much Sense...

Occupation has a price
HA'ARETZ English Edition
Friday, April 26, 2002 Iyyar 14, 5762 Israel Time: 21:44 (GMT+3)

haaretzdaily.com

Finance Minister Silvan Shalom, when presenting the highlights of his new economic program on Wednesday, said Israel is in a state of emergency of both security and economics. Increased defense spending is needed to fund the war on terror, especially Operation Defensive Shield and was one factor that made the emergency economic program necessary. But this is not the only factor, or even the most important one. The real problem in the state budget developed even before the operation began - and it is not on the expenditures side of the ledger, but on the revenue side - the sharp drop in tax income that started in 2001 and has worsened this year.

The reason for the decline in tax revenues is the standstill in economic activity. This year, it has acquired dramatic dimensions due to the gap between the original forecast made in 2001 for economic growth - a 4 percent increase in gross domestic product - and actual growth, which will be zero at best, and might even be negative.

It is true that the worldwide economic slowdown, especially the collapse of the dot-com and high-tech sectors, has contributed to the Israeli recession. But the severity of the downturn here is immeasurably greater than in other western countries, so it is clear that there are also other factors. The principal reason can be found in the fact that Israel continues to hold the territories it conquered in 1967.

On the surface, it might seem that increased security spending is an accurate measure of the cost of the occupation, but this is not so. That cost is also hidden in dozens of other line items in the budget that are not necessary related to security - in civilian expenditures that relate to the cost of maintaining the settlements.

And even these outlays, which along with defense costs come to billions of shekels a year, do not reflect the true economic cost of the occupation. To find this figure, one must work out the value of the national product that is not being created because of the recession. Every percentage point of GDP is equal to at least $1 billion, and the economy's growth potential is an estimated 4.5 to 5 percent of GDP per year. Thus we are talking about a loss of GDP equivalent to billions of dollars.

The shortfall in the state budget and the GDP that has not been created are abstract numbers to most Israelis, but their painful effects are very tangible. Over the next few months, and in fact at least through the end of 2003, people will have to pay higher taxes, subsist on smaller transfer payments, make do with reduced government services and meet more stringent criteria to obtain benefits.

And some of the price is being paid in other ways, which are sometimes even more painful. Because of the recession, the number of businesses that have shut down and the number of people who have lost their jobs has grown, and will continue to grow. Those businesses that have managed to stay afloat are encountering ever-increasing difficulties - in the domestic market because of the decline in demand, and in the export market because of the reservations many companies and organizations have about doing business with Israel.

It is hard to assess the total effect of the occupation on the economy, but it is rapidly acquiring traumatic proportions. While the developed world, and particularly the United States, is showing clear signs of recovery, Israel is sinking deeper and deeper into recession. In the absence of any political horizon to the conflict, which would include an end of the occupation, this decline is liable to become permanent.