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Strategies & Market Trends : VOLTAIRE'S PORCH-MODERATED -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Sully- who wrote (50842)5/2/2002 12:37:13 PM
From: abstract  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 65232
 
I think your disagreement with Clappy is a blandly camouflaged effort to prop up Voltaire's thread on the Hot Coffee ranking. It's working. #5 now.

Here, let me contribute:

I was in a stall in the men's room 3 days ago, and there was a guy in the stall next to me.

He said, "Hey, how are you?"

Shees, whaddya say? I said, "I'm okay."

Then he said, "So, what's new?"

Well ya don't want to say much and ya don't want to be rude, so I said, "Hmmmm, not much."

To which he responded: "Listen, I'm going to have to call you back, some jerk in the next booth won't shut up!"



To: Sully- who wrote (50842)5/2/2002 12:44:29 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 65232
 
Bush shifts Mideast strategy and gains new leverage

USA Today Lead Editorial
05/01/2002 - Updated 09:37 PM ET
usatoday.com

After months of indifference followed by months of confusion, the Bush administration appears to have hit on a formula that infuses new hope for the inflamed Mideast.

For the first time, the United States will tightly coordinate its peacemaking efforts with others, most importantly Arab states led by Saudi Arabia. If successful — a long-term prospect at best — the strategy eventually would revive discussions that seemed tantalizingly close to bringing peace in 2000 and again six months later at talks in Egypt.

According to one scenario leaked first in The New York Times and partially confirmed elsewhere, the policy could unfold like this:

When Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon comes to Washington next week, he'll get an earful about doing more on his side to end the psychology of tit-for-tat violence.
The Saudis, taking a newly assertive and public role on the issue, will do the same to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat at an Arab mini-summit being planned.
The short-term objective: a cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian areas.
The not-so-long-term objective: getting back to serious talks about a final settlement that will permit Israel and an independent Palestine to live side-by-side in peace.
The means to get there: a peace conference including the U.S., Russia, the U.N. and the European Union — all meeting today in Washington — and key Arab states. Each would attempt to force a settlement.

As problematic as the Bush strategy may be, it seems the only way of pushing Arafat and Sharon to the peace table.

They're the ones who derailed the last round of talks; both remain obstacles to peace. Arafat lacked the courage to compromise on the final, most emotional issues and has shown no signs since of understanding his mistake. Sharon, long the Israeli most despised by Palestinians, provoked the first major round of violence with an inflammatory visit to a religious site revered by both sides. He remains a foe of compromise.

But the violence now threatens so many interests that other views have changed.

The Saudis, long among Israel's most implacable foes, have moved their Arab League allies to sign on to a "vision" in which the 54-year conflict could end if Israel gives up Arab lands seized in the 1967 war in exchange for promises of peace and security. Taken literally, that won't fly with Israel. But realists know that to have a chance of success any deal must closely resemble it; the talks were almost there in 2000-2001.

The administration's willingness to enlist the Saudis, as well as to involve the president deeply in the process, is a full retreat from its original naïve notion that the warring parties could negotiate a settlement on their own — and it's a smart one.

Arafat will never be Anwar Sadat, the courageous Egyptian president who was the first to make peace with Israel. Sharon will never be Yitzhak Rabin, who forged the landmark 1993 interim accord with Arafat. Both are too mired in a past of hostility and opportunism to lead their people to the brighter future they deserve.

The Bush administration and the Saudis now see that leaving them to their own devices has too high a cost to continue.