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To: TFF who wrote (10155)5/6/2002 12:53:58 PM
From: TFF  Respond to of 12617
 
How Analysts' Pay Packets Got So Fat



It has been a frustrating 15 months for Daniel Peris, an analyst at Argus Research Corp. in New York. His efforts to cover AOL Time Warner Inc. (AOL ) have hit one brick wall after another. Unlike analysts at big-name investment banks, Peris was one of the few bearish voices on the stock for much of last year. He has been yelled at by AOL's investor-relations reps for spouting off in the press, he has been granted scant contact with senior management, and his calls seeking basic information are returned by low-level employees--often weeks later. "I'm sitting here in obscurity," he says. His consolation: Clients who followed his advice did better than those who followed more bullish calls.

What sets Peris apart from peers is that he works for an independent research firm that doesn't trade or do investment banking. And that means he has also missed out on the big bucks raked in by most other high-tech analysts. While AOL admits it gives priority to bigger firms, the company says it returns all analysts' calls, regardless of banking ties. Since the mid-'90s, those ties earned many Wall Street analysts fat paychecks by helping investment bankers win lucrative business, such as underwriting or merger deals. "The analysts who brought in deals drove huge changes in research compensation," says Joan Zimmerman, partner at New York's Rhodes Associates, an executive search firm.

Salaries for Wall Street's researchers skyrocketed with the surging stock market. Fueled primarily by the tech and initial-public-offering boom, equity analysts' pay jumped fourfold in a decade--and with it, all pretense that research was being written to benefit the investor. Because analysts' pay is tied so closely to the banking business, the Chinese Walls intended to keep them apart crumbled. "Technology drove a higher percentage of investment banking revenues, and [pay packages] started going up at a much faster pace as well," says C. David Bushley, a financial-services consultant at Buck Consultants Inc.

Senior analysts had no trouble pulling in a million in 2000, the blowout year. Those with a decade of experience tripled that by contributing heavily to the deal flow. A few hotshots at each firm earned anywhere from $12 million to $24 million. Even neophytes easily earned six-figure paychecks.

So how exactly are Wall Street analysts compensated? Increasingly, by yearend bonuses. A fixed portion of income is related strictly to old-school research duties, but the more that analysts are in fee-generating businesses, the higher their take-home pay. "The sales part of analysts' jobs became huge," says compensation consultant Alan Johnson of Johnson Associates Inc.

Wall Street denies there's any direct link between pay and deals. "There isn't anything you can track in a statistical, quantifiable way," says Lehman Brothers Inc. (LEH ) spokesman William Ahearn. Goldman, Sachs & Co. (GS ) and Merrill Lynch & Co. (MER ) also insist they have never paid analysts directly for generating investment banking business. "Their compensation is based on the overall profitability of the firm," says Merrill spokeswoman Susan McCabe. "They've never done a deal and gotten a check."

True, it's a bit more subtle than that. New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer found that in the fall of 2000, Merrill Lynch asked its analysts to tally up all the investment banking deals on which they had helped. In an Oct. 13 memo from Merrill's Equity Research Director Deepak Raj, the company was "once again surveying...contributions to investment banking during the year." Superstar Internet Analyst Henry Blodget replied, listing his team's involvement in generating about $115 million in revenue from 52 deals, including an IPO pitch for Pets.com. Blodget's compensation jumped from $3 million in 1999 to $12 million in 2001. He resigned in December, citing a "lifestyle change."

Attorney Jacob J. Zamansky, who has already sued two investment banks on behalf of investors, says he has seen employment contracts for analysts that promised specific compensation related to the volume of investment banking deals they pulled in. Specifically, he says, he saw confidential contracts that promised a $2 million bonus to analysts if they brought in $30 million in banking fees, and others that promised 3% to 7% of investment banking revenue. Banks such as Credit Suisse First Boston, PaineWebber, before merging with UBS, and Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette have paid analysts up to 2% of the banking fees generated at the peak of the market. The idea was an incentive to produce sales and to lure talent from the competition.

The banks insist that analysts' pay is based on complex formulas. Part hinges on the accuracy of analysts' stock recommendations and earnings estimates, part depends on "votes" about their value from investors. Sometimes they'll earn a premium if the sector they cover is viewed as key to the firm, or if they cover the largest industries. Analysts are graded for how much access they have to top brass at companies, and for getting inside scoops.

It's very different from the old days when analysts' compensation was linked to the trading commissions their stock picks generated. That world changed for good when the fixed-commission system was swept away in 1975, forcing banks to find other ways of bankrolling expensive research staffs. Now, compensation experts are scratching their heads over how regulators could sever the ties between deals and analysts' pay. It's not as if the two sides of the bank would stop talking to each other, points out Michael I. Franzino, senior practice managing partner at headhunters Heidrick & Struggles: "Is the head of investment banking going to go over to equities research and say, `We need a little help here'? Yes."

Franzino may be right. Research departments once generated enough money to pay for their own bonuses. They earned it from investors willing to pay for objective info. Now that the advice is "free," investors are getting exactly what they pay for.

By Mara Der Hovanesian, with Louis Lavelle and Tom Lowry in New York

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To: TFF who wrote (10155)5/6/2002 1:00:23 PM
From: TFF  Respond to of 12617
 
Spitzer: "My Job Is to Protect Investors"
New York's Attorney General explains why he released the Merrill Lynch e-mail and why the Street may need cleaning now more than ever


Eliot Spitzer is no stranger to controversy. Since taking office in January, 1999, the 42-year-old New York State Attorney General has sued the gun industry -- a case he plans to argue himself -- and filed the first-ever suit against utility companies in other states, alleging that they're polluting New York air.

He dropped another bombshell on Apr. 8, when he publicly displayed a series of e-mail messages that had been sent among Merrill Lynch research staffers. Spitzer says they're concrete proof that analysts were recommending stocks they didn't believe in. Although initially, Merrill said the messages were taken out of context, at a shareholders' meeting on Apr. 26, Merrill Lynch CEO David H. Komansky apologized to shareholders and clients for the firm's conduct.

Since then, Spitzer has taken heat from Wall Street, regulators, and other politicians, who have dubbed his investigation everything from "self-serving" to "a witch-hunt." In a May 1 interview with BusinessWeek Banking Editor Heather Timmons, Spitzer defended his inquiry, dismissed his critics, and waxed philosophical about what's wrong with Wall Street. Edited excerpts of their conversation follow:

Q: When you spoke during an Apr. 30 memorial service for your one-time boss, Manhattan Special Commissioner Edward F. Stancik, you said the legendary investigator strongly believed that "sunshine was a great disinfectant." That seems like an apt description of what you're trying to do on the Street -- drag everything into a public venue in order to expose, and consequently clean up, any corruption.
A: That's what I'm trying to do. To a certain extent the remedies we're promoting are "sunshine." We want to permit investors to understand conflicts [of interest] and potential conflicts. We need to go beyond mere sunshine though, and not just say that disclosure alone is sufficient. We need to go beyond the proposed National Association of Securities Dealers [NASD] rules, to more structural changes. We hope to really create a buffer between analysts and investment-banking fees.

There is another piece of this, and that's how do you protect the analysts from the pressure that will be inevitably applied by the investment banking side of the business?

Q: Isn't there also the issue of how do you protect analysts from pressure applied by corporations?
A: Correct. There are many points of potential conflict. If I'm Company X, and I'm going to an investment house, and I want them to underwrite my offering, I can say implicitly or explicitly, "How is your analyst going to cover me?" I've [heard about this from all perspectives, from having spoken] to at least 100 investment bankers and CEOs who have felt the pressure being pitched both ways.

For example, CEOs have told me "When they came in to solicit my business, they offered me a strong buy if we took the business to them." Sometimes [the pressure] is used by the investment house, sometimes it's used by the client company as a bargaining chip: "If you want my business you'll have to deliver."

The critical issue is: How do we insulate the analysts to insure integrity in his or her reports?

Q: Do you have a solution?
A: Well, we have a bunch of things we've been talking to Merrill about -- we've had some ideas, and they have some ideas. I think the people in the industry -- the ones who live with it and the ones who understand it -- are at least as likely as I to come up with some creative ideas. We haven't settled, and we aren't about to settle, but we've had some useful conversations. [He declined to give details.]

Q: Can you characterize the tone of the negotiations with Merrill? Were they hostile at any point?
A: I wouldn't say hostile, because I'd like to think that even though we have disagreed significantly about substantive issues, these are people I know and respect. These lawyers are friends and colleagues of mine.

There was a period prior to our going to court where we negotiated and couldn't reach an agreement with Merrill. One of the critical sticking points was the e-mails -- they didn't want them out.

I insisted they come out even if there was a resolution -- because, in order to get systemic reform, the e-mails had to be public. Only the e-mails could crystallize public opinion and [make] the regulators understand what was going on. The e-mails provided the evidence of a problem that many suspected but had never been able to prove. An agreement with Merrill to put some changes in place but then keep the e-mails private wouldn't work.

Q: You've gotten criticism from other regulators and legislators who call this political grandstanding.
A: Until we [made the e-mails public], the efforts by the others had come to naught. The proposed NASD rules were woefully inadequate, and the hearings that had been held by Congress hadn't provided any evidence of the underlying problems. So I would do again exactly what I have done, which is to provide the evidence to the public.

I look forward to working with all the other regulatory agencies to construct a uniform resolution, but I maintain that had we not acted as we have acted, none of this would be happening.

Q: At the Stancik memorial, you were sitting near New York City Mayor and Wall Street veteran Michael Bloomberg and former Mayor Rudy Giuliani, who Merrill Lynch enlisted recently for advice on the situation. There must be a lot of pressure from people with whom you've worked closely not to investigate this situation fully.
A: To investigate the major industry in New York City at this moment, when the city is in economic distress, is not only not good politics, but it's not something I enjoy doing. On top of that, half my friends work on Wall Street. We're right, so I'm going to do it. My job is to protect investors, but it's not easy or terribly fun.

Q: What's your next move?
A: I'm continuing to negotiate with Merrill. There have been fruitful discussions, but negotiations can break down over a range of things, so who knows how that could turn out.

Q: You sound like you're a long way away from a settlement.
A: Look, I don't want to lock myself in.... We have significant issues that haven't been resolved. [He declined to give details.]

We're working now with NASAA [North American Securities Administrators Assn.], and we'll benefit from the additional resources. Also, the Securities & Exchange Commission has asked us to join with them in their effort. At several levels is a more substantial inquiry is ongoing. Hopefully, a uniform set of rules that can guide the industry [will come out of all this].

Q: What does this investigation, and the need for it, tell us about Wall Street? There has always been a notion that it may be somewhat corrupt, but is it worse than it was before?
A: I'm troubled by what I'm seeing, as I think many investors are. I'm told by those that have been on the Street a long time that the behavior we're seeing today would not have been tolerated [before].

Is that true? Who knows -- but certainly there's a sense that something is a bit more...crass about the relationships today than in the past.

Q: How did things get so bad? One theory is that the excesses of the tech boom contributed to it.
A: I think, and I don't mean to talk around the issue or be too theoretical, it is something that extends to other sectors as well. In the not-for-profit world and in other major institutions, we've seen a lessening of standards. I think there has been a less-than-meticulous adherence to the proper rules of governance and conduct in many areas -- government as well.

Maybe there are moments where we step back and we say, "Wait a minute. We have to reapply the rules of law and the rules of behavior, be it not-for-profits, or Wall Street, or our religious institutions."

Edited by Patricia O'Connell



To: TFF who wrote (10155)5/6/2002 1:02:35 PM
From: TFF  Respond to of 12617
 
Felix Rohatyn on Wall Street's Corruption
This respected veteran says unethical behavior by stock analysts could harm the U.S. financial system -- and the economy


Evidence uncovered in the investigation of stock analysts is shocking even some of Wall Street's most experienced players, including Felix G. Rohatyn, former head of the New York City arm of international banking house Lazard Frères. Rohatyn became widely known nearly three decades ago for successfully restructuring New York's debt and resolving the city's fiscal crisis. He went on to negotiate for major corporations in the takeover wars of the 1980s and capped his career by serving as U.S. Ambassador to France at the end of the 1990s.

He's alarmed that analysts were apparently recommending stocks they knew would hurt their investing clients. Surely, analysts and investment bankers have always been inclined to believe in deals that will make them money. But going so far as to knowingly promote bad investments does real damage to the American financial system, says Rohatyn. Now a corporate consultant, he spoke with BusinessWeek Associate Editor David Henry on Apr. 30. Edited excerpts of their conversation follow:

Q: Has the evidence on analysts gathered by New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer surprised you?
A: Yes. The tenor of these e-mails -- where [there] was deliberate falsification -- was quite stunning.

Another thing that I found stunning is the view I've seen in editorials that buyers should've known to beware of being lied to.... Our entire modern capitalistic system is based on disclosure and veracity...on the notion that you protect the public by making sure that people disclose what has to be disclosed, that it's fairly presented, and that people are telling the truth.

Q: What is the consequence?
A: Look, we have to import $500 billion a year to deal with our deficits. Most of that money comes in investments in our markets by foreigners. The moment foreigners begin to think "buyer beware," this may change. It could have dramatic repercussions on the dollar, on domestic inflation, on the economy.

One of the precious things we have is the integrity of the financial market. That integrity should be partly protected by the way security analysts behave and recommend securities to their clients. After all, it is their clients who are supposed to be serviced, not the investment-banking department.

If Wall Street knows what is good for it and what is good for this country, it will very definitely clean up its act.

Q: Some stock analysts have apparently given in to the temptation of investment-banking fees and promoted bad investments. Have investment bankers likewise been pushing companies to do bad deals?
A: There has always been the temptation to urge a deal on a client, because if he doesn't do the deal, you don't get a fee. That was as true in the 1980s, when we had a big merger boom, as it was in the 1990s. It's not an issue of a conflict of interest. It's an issue of judgement and ethical behavior.

Q: Are ethical lapses making for bad takeovers?
A: Frankly, I've never seen it happen. I've seen a lot of bad deals. I've seen a lot of deals where people got overenthusiastic, paid too much, or bought the wrong company. What can happen is an overenthusiastic banker can team up with an overenthusiastic client and make the wrong deal.

But the notion that you would just push somebody into the wrong deal is unlikely. It goes to the board of directors of the client company, their lawyers, and their experts. You have a lot of people around who can ring the alarm bell if something looks wrong.

What you have in these analyst situations -- where people knowingly write something false to induce people to buy in order to generate more investment-banking business -- is fundamentally different than succumbing to overenthusiasm to push a deal.

Q: There are many hungry investment bankers around, people hired during the boom. Aren't they under pressure to promote bad deals just to survive?
A: You may get bad deals promoted, but managers are much more leery today of making deals. That's why the deal flow is very much dried up. They're suspicious of overeager investment bankers in very lean times. They're leery about their auditors. They are leery about the market...about analysts.

And, with Enron, Tyco, and Global Crossing...you have a very careful climate. Think of the trillions of dollars of market value that have vaporized. When you see a company like WorldCom seem to melt down, that just reinforces the view that people have to be supercareful.

Edited by Patricia O'Connell