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Politics : Idea Of The Day -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: IQBAL LATIF who wrote (42558)	5/10/2002 3:24:51 AM
From: IQBAL LATIF	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 50167

Are US troops fighting Al Qaeda? The US and the ISAF are not pitched against Al Qaeda or their pathetic friends, the Taliban, but against the tribes. And to deal with them they will have to do some hard research on how the British dealt with these difficult people The US military faces a paradox. While it has a long experience of guerilla warfare, extending over two centuries, it still considers high technology as the answer to tactical problems and a means to avoid sweat and blood. The recent encounter of US troops with the so-called Al Qaeda group in Eastern Afghanistan is a grim reminder of what the British faced in the region. The official history of operations in the North-West frontier (1920-35) says: Armaments and battlegrounds change with each upheaval. The tribes of the North-West frontier of India however remain as heretofore an unsolved problem. The Indian Army of the future will still have to deal with Mohmands and Afridis, Mahsuds and Wazirs. The Tangis (passes) and Kandaos ravines of the past will be contested. History repeats itself. Let it be read profitably. Khost is adjacent to North Waziristan, where “Operation Anaconda” was conducted on the ridges around the Shahi Kot area. Although, the Pentagon trumpeted victory, war correspondents have a different story to tell. One of them, Isabel Hilton, concludes: We will probably never know the truth about Operation Anaconda, as we have not known the truth about 90 percent of the fighting in Afghanistan. A TIME magazine correspondent quoted US SOF (Special Operations Forces) servicemen about the elusiveness of their “enemies” during their involvement in Khost. The precision attacks against the cave complexes did not yield any tangible results. The conflict in Khost is actually a rivalry between a chieftain and some Mujahideen commanders, both of the Zadran tribe. This was a trial of strength between Zadran and Zadran and it drew in the Americans, who naively believed that anyone who volunteered information on Al Qaeda hideouts was reliable and friendly — not realizing that there is no such thing as a reliable and trustworthy informer west of the Indus.. The British experience in their frontier wars was that it was extremely difficult to establish alternative independent sources of information “in a small and close-knit tribal society.” Despite their best efforts, British found it difficult to obtain reliable information. In fact, they were invariably fed misleading information. An intelligence handbook issued by the GHQ in India in 1925 warns of the Afghan penchant for making a clean break when faced by superior strength: The celerity and case with which they disperse, and the consequent difficulty of pursuit: they scatter and, if unable to get right away, hide their weapons and meet their pursuers in guise of peaceful villagers. This observation explains a number of unanswered questions about the Shahi Kot action. The keyword for the Afghan mode of warfare over the centuries is survival. They will never fight to the last man, last bullet. Unlike the Rajput concept of fighting till no one is left alive, the Afghans run to live and fight another day. General Sir Andrew Skeen, one of Britain’s most experienced frontier warfare officers, describes in his book, “Passing It In,” the Pathan’s capability to move fast: Mobility is a weak wood for the tribesman’s power of movement. In pursuit... These fellows are wonderful. They come down hillside like falling boulders, not running but bounding, and in crags they literally drop from foot-hold to foot-hold. To deal with such mobility on their own lines is impossible. About their elusiveness his remarks are worth quoting: Their power of moving concealed is astounding, not only in moving from cover to cover, but in slipping from light to shadow, and background to background. It has to be seen to be believed. Any commander who makes a tactical mistake will find the Pathan a merciless punisher. The last major disaster for British arms occurred in 1940 during operations is Waziristan. A picquet of 5/8 Punjabis failed to follow the laid down drill for abandoning their position and the unit lost 66 killed and as many wounded. The US and the ISAF are not pitched against Al Qaeda or their pathetic friends, the Taliban, but against the tribes. And to deal with them they will have to do some hard research on how the British dealt with these difficult people. High technology and the weight of firepower are only instruments to be judiciously applied; they don’t resolve such situations themselves. In fact, an indeterminate use of force will only aggravate matters and create difficulties for the shaky interim government in Kabul. The writer is a former military officer and intelligence analyst