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Politics : Impeach George W. Bush -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: MSI who wrote (12683)5/26/2002 4:07:49 AM
From: jttmab  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 93284
 
I would hope that with the text fairly new, we'll start seeing some editorials on the subject this weekend. I don't expect that a lot of the public actually pulls the text of the treaty.

I don't recall how many times over the last year I've heard the Administration say that a treaty that isn't verifiable isn't worth the paper it's printed on. But I suspect that 'position' has dropped out of their vocabulary.

Other than the points I raised in the previous post, this particular agreement is a step back from what Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to. Clinton and Yeltsin agreed in principle to remove delivery vehicles and weapons from the inventory. The agreement that Bush offers falls far short of that agreement. I have read some analysis on the treaty that the language [as poor as it is] allows each side to interpret the reductions as reflected by 'deployed forces'. That may seem a small point, but it allows an accounting trick, sic, if a side recalls a nuclear capable sub into dock for retrofit of the kitchen...those weapons are no longer deployed hence, they don't count.

Though it did make a nice photo-op.

jttmab



To: MSI who wrote (12683)5/29/2002 1:14:22 AM
From: jttmab  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 93284
 
Senator Biden was kinder than I was.

Beyond the Moscow Treaty
By Joseph R. Biden Jr.
Tuesday, May 28, 2002; Page A17

The Moscow treaty signed Friday by presidents Bush and Putin is an important step forward for U.S.-Russian relations and toward a more secure world. Cutting the number of each country's strategic nuclear warheads from about 6,000 to between 1,700 and 2,200 moves us away from preparing to obliterate each other. President Bush should be applauded for his leadership on this issue, his partnership with President Putin and his willingness to codify the agreement in a binding treaty.

But while the treaty as a whole is a step forward, some of its specifics risk moving us backward.

The treaty does not require the actual destruction of a single missile or warhead. Rather, each country may warehouse its weapons and redeploy them later. Unfortunately, persistent security shortcomings in Russia mean that warheads in storage are more likely to fall into the hands of rogue states or terrorists than if they remained attached to missiles. The treaty allows Russia to place multiple warheads on its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), contrary to long-standing U.S. arms control goals. Multiple-warhead ICBMs are a cheap way to maximize Russia's forces, but they are vulnerable because an attacker can destroy many warheads with only one or two of its own. Russia is therefore likely to keep those missiles on hair-trigger alert, increasing the risk of accidental war.

The treaty sets no schedule for reductions and provides no new tools to verify each side's compliance. Russia cannot afford to maintain its strategic forces. Without U.S. transparency, however, a weakened Russia could fear a U.S. attack and keep a nervous finger on its remaining launch buttons. Nor does the treaty say how each country's strategic nuclear warheads should be counted. This omission could lead to acrimonious compliance disputes.

Can America move beyond the Moscow treaty? I believe that we can and must. Here are some steps that the president can take and that the Senate can consider during the ratification process:............

washingtonpost.com