Hi D. Long; Re: "1. Desert Storm wasn't against a developed nation. But even the developed nations aren't up to par with our weapons, now or in the immediate future."
(1a) We're outnumbered by several developed or quickly developing nations. We may need additional advantages. In addition, assuming that our weapons systems are 3 generations ahead of them may be to make the same mistake that lost the British ships against Argentina. Just because a US weapons system is sold to an ally is no guarantee that that ally will always be an ally. When economic times turn down strange things happen. For example, we've already sold the Paladin into export. We have zero generations advantage over those states (which include Kuwait and Taiwan at least as a start, but you can predict that more systems will be sold). In short, assuming that we have a multi generational advantage ignores our exports.
disam.osd.mil
Re: "2. Not quite sure what you're getting at." Desert storm was 10 years ago. The military wanted Paladin for 10 years after Desert Storm. If Desert Storm had shown that heavy artillery wasn't useful, the military would have figured it out a long time ago. But the facts on the ground are exactly in contradiction to that theory. More vehicle kills were recorded by US artillery and armor (each) in Kuwait than by the air force. For that matter, Iraq's air force was completely suppressed, while their artillery and armor sporadically made a showing. Let me translate this: Artillery and armor are the only thing that survive on the modern battlefield, and they're responsible for most of the kills, even in an environment that is as remarkably favorable for air power as Iraq was. Also note that the contribution of the air force to the victory was highly exaggerated. The simple fact that the air force was unable to suppress the SCUD problem should be enough of a clue. If it isn't, here's an unclassified reference from a fairly official US military document. The first is from the airforce itself:
In April 1991, a U.S.-Canadian Joint Intelligence Survey Team (JIST) conducted
the most thorough battle damage assessment of the KTO. The team examined 163 Iraqi tanks throughout Kuwait and southern Iraq, and concluded that 85 had been destroyed by Coalition weapons. Of those destroyed, only twenty percent had been struck by airdelivered munitions.165 [165: Hosmer, 35-36. (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified.] The JIST team examined only a small percentage of the several thousand tanks destroyed by Coalition forces, so generalizations should be made cautiously. The data may also have been invalidated by Coalition ground forces during the ground war. Coalition armor undoubtedly fired upon any Iraqi tank not burning or otherwise obviously destroyed, so tanks abandoned due to the threat of air attack may have been counted as ground battle kills in the post-war analysis.166 [166: Ibid., 36.]
papers.maxwell.af.mil
CENTCOM reported that 388 of the approximately 846 tanks in the three (Republican Gaurds heavy) divisions were destroyed from the air prior to the start of ground fighting. Multiple intelligence agencies expressed strong reservations about the rapidly mounting count of kills. But the key question remained unaswered: Who was right about the numbers and what did it mean? ... A unique post-war assessment is available to suggest some answers. By this analysis, 166 of the tanks in the three divisions had been kiled, versus the CENTCOM count of 388.
jbda.jte.osd.mil
Re: "3. Which is it Carl? Are we planning for a massive Eurasian land war, or guerrilla warfare? A simple howitzer would be just as effective against irregulars as the Crusader. Crusader would be damn overkill, if you ask me."
If what you're saying here is that a 155mm howitzer is useful against guerillas (and it was used quite a lot in Vietnam), you're right, but that also means that a 155mm long barrelled artillery piece, which has considerably more range and accuracy, is even more useful. Which would be most effective depends on the terrain.
Testimony of ground combat veterans of Korea and Vietnam; after-action reviews (AARs) from training engagements at the Army's National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California; and current Army artillery performance standards reveal that the original USMC requirement of 2 minutes, 30 seconds is dead on target. Army fire support performance standards for the Paladin, M109A6, 155mm howitzer specify a 75-second (outside the radius) responsiveness requirement for a "Hip Shoot."13 Time of flight for 155mm projectiles out to an 18.1-kilometer (km) maximum range (nonsuper-charged, nonrocket-assisted) is 68.5 seconds, for a total execution responsiveness of 2 minutes, 23.5 seconds—a tougher standard than the USMC requirement.
www-cgsc.army.mil
Re: "4. It's a grave mistake to count on our enemies being so gracious as to allow us time to build up overwhelming force to beat them into snot. ... Count on any great power not making Saddam's mistake."
You may think this odd behavior, but all the great powers have repeatedly demonstrated this error. But what's worse, it doesn't just apply to the other guy, it applies even more to us. War is a big deal, and democratic nations don't enter it instantaneously. For example, the US cut Japan off from scrap iron in mid 1941, but didn't bother to attack her. That gave Japan as much time as Iraq had to prepare before we "beat them into snot". The French and British gave Hitler better than 6 months before the fighting really began in WW2.
What I'm saying here is that even if the US did have the ability to instantaneously attack a major power we wouldn't do it. The Democracies always give peace (well, threats, anyway) a chance. Our attacks against Afghanistan, where we were directly attacked, were nevertheless preceded by diplomatic maneuvers that were probably close to unnecessary, as far as military requirements go. Our hesitation before attacking a great power over some insignificant 3rd country (as long as we're on the subject, isn't it interesting that 50 years after WW2 was largely fought to protect Czechoslavakian borders, the country dissolved peacefully anyway) will undoubtedly be even longer. We telegraph our punches. The primary reason for this is that humans are not naturaly killers of humans. We prefer to put up threat displays first. Part of the threat display is the rolling stock.
The real question is not how the US can quickly takedown a major power, but instead, what can the US put in the field to threaten a major power who has had 6 months of threats to prepare itself with. This is the way that the US got into every major war it has ever had against another great power, including the war of 1812, the Civil war, WW1, WW2, the Spanish American war, and even such items like the quasi war with France. In every one of these cases, the US was preparing for war before hostilities commenced. States do not go to war in a vacuum. This is why the US will have time to field the Crusader in any war with a major power.
More generally, hopes that wars between great powers would be over quickly and easily have been repeatedly dashed through history. Do we really want to make the mistake that Hitler made and launch an unprepared surprise attack against a great power thinking that our superior technology and the other side's lack of preparation will carry us through? Not only do we not want to make that mistake, the facts are that we are not going to make any surprise attacks against any great powers.
-- Carl
P.S. Here's some of the Rand's analysis on operations against cities:
• American forces should avoid cities where it is feasible.
• An attacker should encircle and isolate a city when possible.
• Airpower’s important role is to cut off the city defenders from
sources of supply and reinforcements.
• Armor has a definite role in MOUT. Armor and APCs must have
dismounted protection, however.
• Self-propelled artillery can be used to great effect as a direct-fire
weapon in close combat.
• Airpower and artillery can have a positive psychological effect.
• The defender has a “good chance to win or at least prolong the
battle and raise the cost for the attacker” if casualties and/or
collateral damage can be limited.
• Combined arms operations have the best chance of success, especially
when armor, infantry, and artillery train and develop
doctrine together.
rand.org |
