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Non-Tech : The ENRON Scandal -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Baldur Fjvlnisson who wrote (4093)6/18/2002 5:09:36 AM
From: Baldur Fjvlnisson  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 5185
 
Enron's Top 144 Executives Got $621.7 Million in 2001 (Update2)
By Jim Kennett

Houston, June 17 (Bloomberg) -- Enron Corp., heading toward bankruptcy last year, paid its top 144 executives and directors at least $621.7 million plus another $311.8 million in restricted stock, court records show.

Former Chief Executive Kenneth Lay received $137.9 million, including salary, a bonus, stock options and $81.5 million in loans. As of Dec. 1, he had repaid all but $7.5 million of the loans using stock that is now almost worthless, the papers show. Lay also received restricted stock worth $14.8 million in 2001.

``The amount was a little bit of a surprise,'' said Rod Jordan, chairman of the Severed Enron Employees Coalition, a group that represents former employees. ``I knew they were socking away a lot of money. It's just an example of where the money went, instead of to the people who actually earned it.''

The figures were included in 16,000 pages of information filed with a federal bankruptcy judge in New York. The court papers described Enron's finances before the energy trader filed the largest Chapter 11 bankruptcy on Dec. 2.

Enron's bankruptcy has spawned dozens of federal and state investigations, including one announced today by the Senate Finance Committee into whether Enron shipped some executives' bonuses offshore to avoid taxes. In its court papers, Enron said 180 lawsuits have been filed against it.

Losses

The company also provided revenue and profit figures, including those for 67 bankrupt units. The businesses lost $310.6 million last year and $281.3 million in 2000, making 1999 the last profitable year for the parent and its units.

In November, Enron restated earnings for the entire company, including units that haven't filed for bankruptcy, going back to 1997. The company said it had inflated profits over a four-year period by $586 million. The revised profit figures were $643 million in 1999, $847 million in 2000 and $5 million in the first three months of 2001.

Lay deferred $300,000 in salary during the year, according to the filing. His spokeswoman couldn't be reached to comment.

``It was sort of an insult-to-injury kind of thing,'' Jordan said. ``You could take $100 million of it and pay all the employees all the severance they're due.''

Jordan estimated that the 4,500 employees fired after Enron's bankruptcy are each owed about $19,000.

Enron last week agreed to pay $28.8 million in severance to 4,200 fired workers. The severance, which must be approved by the bankruptcy judge, would be capped at $13,500 per person, minus any bonus already paid, and would average $6,850 for each worker.

Jeffrey Skilling, the former chief executive officer who resigned in August, received $28 million, including $19.3 million in stock options that were sold, and $26.1 million in restricted stock.

Fastow's Compensation

Former Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow, who oversaw the off-book partnerships that toppled the company, received $2.4 million in salary, bonus and other pay, and $1.8 million in restricted stock. He didn't sell any stock under his 2001 stock- options program, the documents show. Enron has said Fastow earned more than $30 million from the partnerships.

Spokesmen for Skilling and Fastow declined to comment.

Many of Enron's executives received a fraction of what the bankruptcy filings show, according to Jacks C. Nickens, an attorney representing 12 of them. These executives had to pay taxes on shares that weren't sold, cutting into salaries or profits from stock that was sold.

Richard Causey, a Nickens client and Enron's former chief accountant who was fired before the bankruptcy filing, was paid $1.9 million in salary, bonus and incentives, and received $2.5 million in restricted stock.

Causey paid taxes on the restricted stock, which became almost worthless by the end of the year, leaving him with about $600,000 in compensation, Nickens said.

``Hardly the scenario of someone who thought the company was going to become worthless,'' he said.

Retention Bonuses

Enron's court filings also detailed bonuses of between $50,000 and $400,000 to more than 200 employees as part of a plan to keep them from leaving during the initial months of bankruptcy. Bonuses, including smaller payments and bonuses to employees with units that haven't declared bankruptcy, totaled $54.6 million.

Another list details about $50 million paid to 76 employees who were considered critical to a Nov. 7 merger agreement between Enron and rival Dynegy Inc. Dynegy backed out of the agreement three weeks later.

During 2001, Enron made about $15.2 million in political contributions, mostly to Republicans, according to the court filings. It gave $13.6 million to charities.

Enron is due a $63.2 million income-tax refund for last year, the company said.



To: Baldur Fjvlnisson who wrote (4093)6/18/2002 2:52:02 PM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 5185
 
"The Bush administration's ability to restore confidence in the market is hobbled because its frontman on the issue has to be SEC
Chairman Pitt, who since he took office has been labeled as the accounting industry's defense attorney. Pitt is actually moving the
SEC in the right direction. He has launched initiatives on important accounting and accountability issues. He has sicced the
SEC's vaunted enforcement division on each new scandal that breaks, though they are rapidly running short of troops.

Pitt, however, still wears the scarlet letter -- A for "accounting" -- and he is facing a no-win decision on his future role in the
corporate credibility crisis.

When he took office last year, Pitt followed the rules and recused himself for one year from having anything to do with issues
involving his former clients. The year is almost up. There are calls for Pitt to extend his recusal indefinitely. If he doesn't, his
participation in accounting investigations will be suspect. If he does, he will have to sit out the most important work on his
agency's agenda."

Excerpt from No Market Rebound Until Companies Come Clean

washingtonpost.com

© 2002 The Washington Post Company

>>>>>>>>>>>>

Baldur, I think you are right! Also, if the country goes to war with IRAQ and this seems to be Bush's
intention the threat of terrorism will increase. Also, the war with Iraq could last a very long time.
Maybe five years or more.-- MEPHISTO

See following article:

>>>>>>>>>>>>>

The Case Against a Mini-Palestine


By Shibley Telhami
The Washington Post
Tuesday, June 18, 2002; Page
A19

As President Bush considers
an important speech on the
Middle East, the idea of a
limited Palestinian state is
one option on the table.
There is only one way such
an option can work: as part
of a staged implementation of a final settlement, after the
parties agree on its parameters. Establishing such a limited
state with the idea that it would then negotiate issues of
final settlement with Israel would be a serious mistake that
would come back to haunt the parties -- and the United
States.

Consider the problems. Any state, no matter how small, must
have international borders and thus the capacity, if not the
right, to import arms. It must be contiguous. So, Israel would
have to remove some of its settlements and pay the domestic
political price that comes with that.

The Palestinian Authority would face public fear that this
small entity was the final state, which would thus be rejected
by much of the Palestinian public. Arab states would be
unlikely to provide the incentives that they offered Israel at
the Beirut summit (normal relations with the Arab world)
without a final settlement. So each side would have to pay a
significant price while providing limited incentives to its
public.

In the short term, it might be possible to limit violence and
improve Palestinian lives -- the best feature of such an option.
But in the process of implementing this mini-state, and
making the case for limiting the violence, each side would
portray the agreement as a grand achievement. The United
States, in its effort to rally international financial support for
the Palestinian state, and to shift attention in the Middle
East from the Arab-Israeli issue to Iraq, would undoubtedly do
the same.

In the process, the Israeli public would feel that it had
already done most of its compromising just by accepting a
Palestinian state, while the Palestinians would believe that
this was only a minor step in the process to get full Israeli
withdrawal from the rest of the West Bank and East
Jerusalem. In the meantime, all the tough issues would
remain: Jerusalem, refugees, borders and settlements.

The primary advantage would be that the negotiations would
now take place between two legally sovereign states. But the
asymmetry of power would continue: The Palestinians would
have little leverage in negotiating the remaining issues, and
would be increasingly under pressure to allow a "military
option," this time with the capacity to import arms.

The Israeli public, feeling it had already offered a lot, would
have even less tolerance for violence emanating from a
Palestinian state. Worse yet, each side would maneuver to
maximize its leverage over the remaining difficult issues in a
way that would make their resolution even more difficult. It
would be Oslo all over again, except that the public on both
sides would have less patience and would not accept mere
promises.

From the U.S. point of view, it may seem that such an option
could at least buy time, perhaps a couple of years --
seemingly enough to go to war with Iraq. But the Iraq war
option is no less than a five-year effort, if one considers that
the goal of removing Saddam Hussein is the easy part
compared with the essential objective of ensuring a favorable
and stable outcome in Iraq and the rest of the region
afterward.

And just as this difficult later task was starting, the
Palestinian-Israeli issue might be stalemated again over
details of a final settlement. The ground in the Arab world
could become more fertile for recruitment into global terror
than before. Saddam Hussein might be gone, but terror might
increase.


All this, of course, assumes the best-case scenario in the
early stages of implementing a mini-Palestinian state and
leading up to a possible war with Iraq.

It is tempting to search for an easy way out, but t no solution
to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be arrived at on the
cheap. The administration is correctly trying to balance
demands in the Arab world for a comprehensive settlement
with the reality that Israel's current government prefers
incrementalism. But there are two ways to mediate these two
forces: the easy way of postponing the tough issues yet again,
in order to achieve a short-term success, and the more
difficult but prudent course of urging the parties to agree on
the final parameters of a settlement, while accommodating
Ariel Sharon through incremental implementation of an
agreement.

Nothing less than the latter path can lead to peace and
stability in the Middle East.

The writer is Anwar Sadat Professor for Peace and Development at
the University of Maryland anda senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution.

© 2002 The Washington Post Company

washingtonpost.com



To: Baldur Fjvlnisson who wrote (4093)6/29/2002 11:08:37 AM
From: Mephisto  Respond to of 5185
 
The entire financial system is probably corrupt, Baldur. Look at how easily Bush and his
cabinet members from corporate America got into the White House.

JMOP