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Strategies & Market Trends : India Coffee House -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Bread Upon The Water who wrote (12288)	6/19/2002 11:42:13 AM
From: ChinuSFO	Respond to of 12475

William Hickman, very good article. However it is silent on the fact that the basis of accession of the princely states to either India or Pakistan was based on the decision of the prince/king of that state. I did not see that fact of history mentioned in this piece. It does say that the prince dithered which is correct. It does not state why he dithered. My knowledge says that he dithered because he wanted to consider the third option which is to remain independent. And while the Indian leaders were very flexible in their approach towards the partition (as the article says about Nehru's and Gandhi's viewpoints), the Pakistani leadership at that time was unbending and did not want the prince to exercise that right to decide. They wanted to force the issue militarily. And then things went the way it did from then on. The article also says that Kashmir could have some autonomy. Currently, Indian held Kashmir does enjoy significant amount of autonomy in the Indian union. The Abdullah dynasty has democratically held power in that state (Sheikh and Farooq). The article talks about "…some formal political association with Pakistan….". Don't know what that means. But judging from history, we all know that Bangladesh had full political association with what is now Pakistan. But that association was very retrogressive to the expectations of the Bangladeshis causing for a breakup. So I would say that before we suggest that sort of a association as the article does, we should seriously examine if that would be of benefit to the promotion of democracy for which the West stands. And further, the article does not even raise the question whether the Kashmiris of 1947, given the choice to choose would be willing to have an association with Pakistan, given its history of military dictatorships and a not so impressive track record of its leaders in moving the country forward towards economic prosperity and political stability. To me and I hope to all the Western leaders, it is not important to do something merely to appease the extremists, Hindu or Muslim alike. Instead, we need to do what is right, especially exercise the thought process exhibited by Gandhi, Nehru and others and ensure that the solutions suggested would meet with the approval of and satisfy the aspirations of the general folks.

To: Bread Upon The Water who wrote (12288)	6/19/2002 11:44:58 PM
From: ChinuSFO	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 12475

Vajpayee: third time lucky? By C. Raja Mohan Having come out with reasonable success from a dangerous and tricky strategic manoeuvre, Mr. Vajpayee must now prepare the nation for a substantive engagement with Pakistan. IN GETTING the United States to extract substantive commitments from the Pakistan President, Pervez Musharraf, to permanently end cross-border infiltration and dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism on Pakistani soil, the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, has some justification in claiming "victory without war". But the gains from India's coercive diplomacy could turn out to be rather fleeting, if they are not followed through with a serious effort to find enduring peace with Pakistan. No one might be more conscious of this than Mr. Vajpayee who has devoted considerable personal energy and diplomatic attention in reaching out to Pakistan over the last four years. Declaring victory might play well politically at home and appeal to the fringes of his party's ideological constituency. But it grates on the political sensitivities of our neighbour and the international community who are loath to seeing India celebrate the fruits of its coercive diplomacy. The game is not over with Pakistan's promises to the U.S. and Britain. There is the unfinished business of finding peace with Pakistan. The real victory for Mr. Vajpayee does not lie in the temporary cessation of cross-border terrorism by Pakistan, but in making it permanent and finding a political reconciliation with Islamabad. There will be enough for Mr. Vajpayee and his party to crow about when he gets there. Until then, it would be wise for the Prime Minister to restrain himself and his colleagues from going into a mode of political triumphalism. Victory is a dish that must be fully done and eaten cold. Having come out with reasonable success from a dangerous and tricky strategic manoeuvre, Mr. Vajpayee must now prepare the nation for a substantive engagement with Pakistan. During his tenure at the helm of the Indian polity, India and Pakistan have raised expectations of peace, fought a limited war and now have stared down the nuclear abyss. But the latest confrontation with Pakistan, Mr. Vajpayee understands, is also a historic opportunity to transform the subcontinent. For, it has rendered irrelevant all the previous markers about India-Pakistan relations. The six-months-old military crisis has fundamentally altered the political template of India-Pakistan relations and the challenge before New Delhi is to take full political advantage of the changed context to push through a settlement of all outstanding issues in its relations with Islamabad, including the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. There should be little doubt that if Mr. Vajpayee sticks to his instincts, India is likely to launch yet another peace initiative with Pakistan by the end of the year. In all probability, the political dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad will be resumed within weeks after the elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly. Assuming, of course, that those elections will be peaceful. It is a reasonable prospect that the U.S. and Britain would maintain pressure on Pakistan to resist the temptation to use violence to mar them. But scepticism abounds in the capital about Pakistan's readiness to implement its promises and the attention span of the U.S. Having tried twice before and failed — Lahore and Agra — will Mr. Vajpayee turn out to be third time lucky in finding a basis for peaceful coexistence with Pakistan? As he gambles on peace with Pakistan, the following five considerations should be at the top of his mind. First, look beyond getting Pakistan to end cross-border terrorism and explore a final settlement of the Kashmir question. Without a serious effort to resolve the Kashmir question, India will find that its war against terrorism will remain unfinished and peace with Pakistan elusive. Mr. Vajpayee seems to recognise this. In his New Year musings in 2001 and 2002, he had promised to get off the beaten track to work for a final settlement of the Kashmir problem, which Pakistan says is at the core of the bilateral tensions. In short, Mr. Vajpayee has shown he has the right sentiments about the urgency of ending the political deadlock with the western neighbour. He has also demonstrated a rare Indian boldness in taking political risks in dealing with Pakistan. He now needs to publicly reaffirm India's commitment to purposefully address the internal and external dimensions of the Kashmir question once Pakistan ends its support to cross-border terrorism. Second, make sure that Gen. Musharraf's promise, to end cross-border infiltration and dismantle the "plumbing" in Pakistan's state structures that supports it, is on a permanent basis. At Lahore and Agra, India calculated that goodwill on its part and a reasonable approach to de+aling with the Kashmir question might encourage Pakistan to yield on cross-border terrorism. But Pakistan had no desire to give up the "low-cost, high-value" strategy of bleeding India through a thousand cuts. For Islamabad, cross-border terrorism has been an instrument of shaping not just the process of dialogue with India but also its outcome. Now, for the first time since Pakistan adopted this approach in the late 1980s, India has found a way to get it to move in a different direction. Completing that transition in Pakistan remains the biggest immediate challenge. Third, keep the international community involved in the process. Without the changed international context after September 11 and the relentless Anglo-American pressure, Gen. Musharraf would not have promised to put an end to cross-border terrorism. India needs the support of the U.S. and the international community not only to get Gen. Musharraf to implement his pledges but also to find a reasonable solution to the vexed Kashmir dispute. Whatever be the residual sloganeering within India about "bilateralism" as the only means of dealing with Pakistan, international support has become the key to finding peace with Pakistan. The global community is engaged with the subcontinent in an unprecedented manner. Instead of resisting it, India should leverage it to its own advantage. Fourth, prepare well for the next summit with Gen. Musharraf. Part of the failure at Lahore and Agra must be attributed to the desire for quick results from high-profile summitry. This time, productive negotiations at the bureaucratic and political levels, as well as through back channels, must precede a decision by Mr. Vajpayee to travel to Islamabad some time next year. The next India-Pakistan summit must be designed to clinch substantive political understandings, not to initiate the process to arrive at positive outcomes. Mr. Vajpayee must continue to be informed by a grand vision on Pakistan that took him to Lahore and Agra. But it needs to be supplemented by careful diplomatic preparations this time. Finally, end, once and for all, the bickering in the Cabinet on how to deal with Pakistan and Kashmir and arrive at a unified strategy. The failure of Mr. Vajpayee's Ramzan ceasefire initiative in November 2000 and his negotiations with Gen. Musharraf at Agra are attributed by many to the serious political differences within the Cabinet. Ending that rift is the first step towards building a national consensus on a new political initiative towards Pakistan. A divided house cannot successfully negotiate peace. hinduonnet.com