SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Politics : PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Gordon A. Langston who wrote (267352)6/26/2002 7:16:25 PM
From: gao seng  Respond to of 769667
 
Daniel Weintraub: Surprise culprit in price rigging
By Daniel Weintraub -- Bee Columnist
Published 2:15 a.m. PDT Sunday, May 5, 2002
A California state senator plowing through boxes of subpoenaed Enron Corp. documents has finally unearthed a smoking gun, the first tangible proof that energy traders tried to manipulate the price of electricity amid short supplies last summer.

One problem: The evidence doesn't implicate Enron so much as the managers of California's electricity grid, whose Folsom-based trader was caught red-handed trying to game the market. In a bizarre twist, it turns out that the state-created Independent System Operator, or ISO, was the one rigging the price of power, not the evil private generators who everyone suspected.

The incident happened last July 3, a scorcher in California's Central Valley, with temperatures eventually hitting 106 degrees. It was the third straight day near or above 100 degrees, and the air conditioners were churning, pressing the grid to its limits.

The grid managers, whose job is to ensure that the lights stay on, had bought up electricity reserves for each hour of the afternoon in what is known as the day-ahead market. That electricity didn't come cheap. But as the Independence Day holiday approached, demand failed to surge as much as the grid managers expected. In the real-time market, the hour-to-hour trading that sets the final price for electricity, the cost of reserves sunk to almost nothing.

A handful of electricity traders, apparently in the Northwest, noticed this price trend and tried to capitalize on it. The traders, the day before, had promised California electricity and stood to be paid top-dollar for that juice. Now, with the price falling, they could swoop in and fulfill their obligation by buying up the surplus at a penny per hour, essentially nothing. They had sold high. Now they could buy low. The difference would be their profit.

That's how markets work. The traders made a promise. They also took a risk. If the price of electricity went up after they were committed, they might lose money on the deal. As it dipped, they were about to make a killing. All of that buying and selling is supposed to guarantee the greatest possible supply at the lowest possible price. Most of the time it works.

But California's grid manager -- the ISO trader -- didn't like it. He didn't like the idea of these private traders making easy money off the price fluctuations. So he tried to thwart it. And the only way he could do so, ironically, was to cause the price to go up. That way, the traders who had promised the state electricity couldn't get off the hook by buying low and selling at the pre-arranged, much higher price.

It's as if you've agreed to buy a car from an auto broker for $20,000, then, before taking delivery, realized that the broker was going to get that car at auction for only $5,000. You've overpaid by a huge margin, but you can't get out of the deal. Instead, jealous of your seller's profit, you send a shill to the auction to drive his price up. You still have to pay the $20,000. But the guy who sold you the car makes a lot less on the deal than he otherwise would.

The ISO's trader, a man named Allen, called Enron's trading desk on the afternoon of July 3. He explained the situation to an Enron trader named Ryan -- but not before telling him that the telephone line on which they were speaking was not being recorded. He didn't know the call was being taped by Enron.

Allen wanted Enron to bid for some power at 6 p.m., at $91 an hour.

"We want it to clear it at that because of some issues we are seeing as far as others that are taking advantage of the market," he said, according to a transcript of the conversation.

Ryan was confused. Why would the grid manager want him to drive up the price of power?

The ISO trader explained further: "See, the day-ahead was purchased at like $100, and then what happened is that the hour-ahead ... a bunch of these people were buying it ... for a penny ... So we wanted to keep the price up high."

Now Ryan understood. But he didn't promise to play along. "I'll see what I can do," he said.

Three minutes later the phone rang again. It was Allen again, from the ISO. Pushing harder. And trying to put the Enron trader at ease.

"If you have any questions, let me know," Allen said. "I hope you know this is me from the ISO. I don't know if you think I'm somebody else, but you can call me at the hour-ahead desk."

Ryan was still reluctant. "I'm talking to my boss right now as far as, because of, you know, I don't want to be doing anything that's wrong," he said. "Even if it is helping you guys out, if it's wrong, I can't do it."

As it turned out, Enron did place a bid at the price requested. But that bid was consistent with what Enron had been doing earlier in the day, and the company says it was formulated before the ISO trader called.

The ISO employee has been fired, and an investigation continues. But the lack of outrage has been deafening. No congressional or legislative hearings on the subject. No indignant press conferences. No new calls for reforming the grid manager -- except from a few Republicans without any clout in Democrat-dominated Sacramento. Everyone has been assured this was an isolated incident, a lone ranger acting without the knowledge or approval of his superiors.

Maybe so. But this case should not be allowed to retreat so quickly into the shadows. The Independent System Operator is a non-profit private entity that, as its name suggests, is supposed to be independent. But its directors are appointed by the governor, and its hybrid nature makes it vulnerable to political influence. Electricity sellers and, ultimately, consumers need to have confidence that this impartial arbiter doesn't have its thumb resting on the scale.

sacbee.com



To: Gordon A. Langston who wrote (267352)6/26/2002 7:16:49 PM
From: gao seng  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 769667
 
May 17, 2002 15:38

California Energy Officials Doubt Enron Had Role in Blackout
Jump to first matched term
San Jose Mercury News, Calif.

May 17--State energy officials said Thursday that they would look into a report that blamed Enron trickery for a 2000 blackout, but emphasized that the Bay Area's weak transmission lines were the primary cause.

CBS MarketWatch quoted former Enron energy traders as saying they had created a kind of power traffic jam on the state's high-voltage lines -- causing 97,000 people to lose electricity on that 100-degree day June 14.

The traders said they purposely clogged a 112-mile-long, high-voltage line known as Path 26 to force the state to pay Enron extra to free up the line. But the article said the congestion also prevented power from reaching Northern California to avert the blackout.

"These robber barons purposely put people and businesses in the dark to pad their own wallets," Gov. Gray Davis said in response to the report. "They put human lives at risk for the sake of profit." Davis hopes to use such allegations to convince federal officials that the state was hoodwinked by power suppliers and should be refunded billions of dollars for the high-priced electricity it was forced to buy as a result.

Enron official Karen Denne declined to comment. But others familiar with the June 14, 2000, blackout said it couldn't have been caused by manipulating Path 26, which connects the power grids of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. and Southern California Edison.

Jim McIntosh, director of grid operations for the California Independent System Operator, which manages the flow of power across the state, said the problems that day initially were caused by record temperatures, which caused demand for power to soar. On top of that, he said, several key Bay Area electricity plants, which normally power homes and businesses, failed.

That forced state officials to attempt to pump more power into the Bay Area from other sources. But despite the CBS report's contention, he added, there was no problem getting power from Southern California to Northern California that day. The real problem, he said, was an inability to ship it the final few miles to Bay Area customers, because some transmission lines here couldn't carry that much juice.

Enron traders "may have been playing those games that they referred to in this article and made money" on their deals, "but it had nothing to do with grid reliability" in Northern California on June 14, 2000, McIntosh said.

Nonetheless, ISO official Stephanie McCorkle said the agency would look into the possibility that other Enron trading that day might have played a role in the blackout. "We plan on taking a look at all that," she said.

PG&E official John Nelson was also skeptical of the report.

"It was not a shortage of power" from Southern California that caused the blackouts, he said. "If what they are alleging is that they caused a traffic jam in Southern California, that wouldn't have had the impact June 14." Creating congestion on certain high-voltage lines to make a bigger profit from their electricity was one of a number of schemes alleged in leaked Enron memos that were the subject of congressional hearings this week.

Federal officials investigating whether Enron manipulated California's energy market declined to comment on the CBS MarketWatch report. But David Sandretti, a press officer for Sen.

Barbara Boxer, D-Calif., said Boxer's office "is open to pursuing every possible lead to get to the bottom of this, to find out what happened and how it happened."

By Steve Johnson and Jim Puzzanghera

newsalert.com



To: Gordon A. Langston who wrote (267352)6/26/2002 7:38:56 PM
From: gao seng  Respond to of 769667
 
I had to brush up on some old articles. The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, run by the man the governor put in charge of all of California energy policy, turned out to be a far bigger price-gouger than the Texas generators the governor railed against.

November 2000? Who was president then? Is this just another mess Bush inherited? Nah, that can't be. It must be a typo. I mean, if people believe that richocet means accounting transaction, they will believe that, right? I mean, Bush personally changed all the references to the energy crisis to the year 2000, just to protect his fat cat buds, right?