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Politics : War -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: ChinuSFO who wrote (15689)	7/1/2002 1:36:30 PM
From: Thomas M.	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 23908

the reason that Saudi and others have been forced to accept the existence of Israel. I know that some would like to credit Ariel Sharon and his current military adventure for the Saudi turnaround. The turnaround happened 3 decades ago. The recent Friedman/Saudi peace proposal is a rehash of what the Arabs states and the PLO have been offering Israel for 25 years. In fact, the Saudis themselves initiated a similar movement in 1981, the Fahd Peace Plan. Israel responded by calling it a "peace offensive" and by sending fighter jets over Saudi oil fields. zmag.org Tom

To: ChinuSFO who wrote (15689)	7/1/2002 2:00:14 PM
From: goldsnow	Respond to of 23908

Israel rejected the Fez Initiative because it made all the usual demands of Israel but did not have anything new to provide for Israel's security. Still, it did represent a shift in Arab policy by a) its implicit recognition of Israel, and b) the possibility of negotiating a peace agreement of some sort, this a considerable change from the "three no's" of the Khartoum Resolution of 1967. Fez thereby opened the door, a little, to future negotiations and peace initiatives palestinefacts.org

To: ChinuSFO who wrote (15689)	7/1/2002 2:27:38 PM
From: goldsnow	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 23908

Mission The effort to build an enduring peace settlement after the June 1967 war was launched with guarded optimism on November 22, 1967, when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242. Intense diplomatic efforts had produced Resolution 242, which was accepted by all of the combatants except Syria as a framework for a settlement to the Arab-Israeli dispute. It called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories occupied during the June war in return for an end to belligerency and acknowledgment of Israel's sovereignty. The resolution also provided for a special representative to be appointed to facilitate negotiations on a peace settlement. On November 23 UN Secretary-General U Thant appointed Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, as the Special Representative, and Jarring set about the task of searching for sufficient common ground on which to build an enduring peace. His efforts served to highlight the mutual suspicion and animosity that would have to be bridged before peace could be established in the Middle East. (Documentation on the background of Resolution 242 is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX.) The Jarring mission stumbled immediately over varying interpretations of Resolution 242. The Arab governments viewed the resolution as self-implementing, and called upon Israel to withdraw from all conquered Arab territory as a preliminary to a general understanding to establish peace. (87, 113) The Arabs were not, however, prepared for direct negotiations with Israel. In August 1967 the defeated Arab states had met in Khartoum to coordinate strategy. They adopted a joint policy of "no peace with Israel, no recognition of it, and no negotiation with it." The three "no's" of the Khartoum summit effectively established the parameters of the Arab bargaining position with respect to a settlement with Israel and reinforced Israeli skepticism that the Arabs would be prepared to consider a peace settlement that Israel could accept. state.gov