SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: H James Morris who wrote (2252)7/16/2002 1:54:23 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
From the Front Page of Tuesday's Washington Post...

For Cheney, Tarnish From Halliburton

Firm's Fall Raises Questions About Vice President's Leadership There
By Dana Milbank
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, July 16, 2002; Page A01

An executive sells shares in his energy company two months before the company announces unexpected bad news, and the stock price eventually tumbles to a quarter of the price at which the insider sold his.

George W. Bush at Harken Energy Corp. in 1990? Yes, but also Richard B. Cheney at Halliburton Co. in 2000.

When Cheney left Halliburton in August 2000 to be Bush's running mate, the oil services firm was swelling with profits and approaching a two-year high in its stock price. Investors and the public (and possibly Cheney himself) did not know how sick the company really was, as became evident in the months after Cheney left.

Whether through serendipity or shrewdness, Cheney made an $18.5 million profit selling his shares for more than $52 each in August 2000; 60 days later, the company surprised investors with a warning that its engineering and construction business was doing much worse than expected, driving shares down 11 percent in a day. About the same time, it announced it was under a grand jury investigation for overbilling the government.

In the months that followed, it became clear that Halliburton's liability for asbestos claims, stemming from a company Cheney acquired in 1998, were far greater than Halliburton realized. Then, in May of this year, the company announced it was under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission for controversial accounting under Cheney's leadership that inflated profits. Halliburton shares closed at $13.10 yesterday on the New York Stock Exchange.

There has been no serious allegation of wrongdoing by the vice president himself in all of this. But the highflying company Cheney hailed as a "great success story" during the 2000 campaign is now a troubled behemoth fighting for its life. The humbling of Halliburton raises doubts about Cheney's stewardship there and, by extension, his reputation as a smart executive bringing a businessman's acumen to the White House.

The developments at Halliburton since Cheney's departure leave two possibilities: Either the vice president did not know of the magnitude of problems at the oilfield services company he ran for five years, or he sold his shares in August 2000 knowing the company was likely headed for a fall.

Amid a wave of corporate accounting scandals, Democrats are eager to raise the issue of Cheney's leadership. Noting the collapse in Halliburton shares since Cheney sold, Rep. Henry A. Waxman (Calif.), the ranking Democrat on the House Government Reform Committee, wrote to Bush on Friday saying: "Vice President Cheney could provide an extraordinary example of personal responsibility by donating all or a portion of the profits" to a charity for displaced workers. Halliburton has shed 18,000 jobs since 1999.

Overall, financial analysts say Cheney was an unremarkable executive. "He came in at a time when any okay manager could ride the cyclical wave," said James Wicklund, an analyst with Banc of America Securities who has followed Halliburton for years. "He did okay. He did not blow anybody's doors off."

In particular, one of Cheney's actions, the 1998 acquisition of Dresser Industries, could end up ruining the company with asbestos liabilities. "You have to put that on Cheney," Wicklund said. "In hindsight, would they have done it? Of course not." Still, Wicklund added that the acquisition looked good at the time, and he wonders "how much could anybody have known" about the asbestos liability.

The vice president's office declined to comment for this article. "Until such time as the SEC concludes its review of Halliburton's practices, the vice president will refrain from commenting on this matter," Cheney adviser Mary Matalin said. "Any statement could be misinterpreted as an effort to influence the process of an independent regulatory body, which would be inappropriate."

After Aug. 16, 2000, his last day at Halliburton, Cheney exercised stock options and sold 660,000 shares between Aug. 21 and 28 for $35 million; Halliburton shares were soaring because of high oil prices.

Though Cheney was under pressure to sever his future financial interest in Halliburton, conflict-of-interest laws did not require the sale. "There's no conflict until I'm sworn in on January 20th," Cheney said Aug. 27. Four other Halliburton insiders also sold shares in August, including the vice chairman and the chief financial officer.

A Halliburton spokeswoman, Wendy Hall, said the sales were "pre-cleared with the legal department per company policy." She said the sales were made during a "window" before Aug. 31 in which "there were no trading restrictions imposed on executives due to inside information." The stock sales are not part of the SEC investigation.

Halliburton does everything from making drill bits and pipeline to building natural gas plants. The 83-year-old company provides a vast range of products and services to the energy industry, from exploration to production and maintenance.

When Cheney left, outward signs were good for Halliburton. On July 27, Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown analysts wrote that "quarterly earnings have impressively turned the corner, in our opinion." Even as late as Oct. 16, Jefferies & Co. analysts wrote that "Halliburton's earnings should show greater growth momentum in 2001 as the Engineering & Construction business turns decidedly more positive."

But on Oct. 24, Halliburton delivered a different message in a conference call with analysts: Despite its strong current earnings, Halliburton was encountering weak orders and high costs in its engineering and construction businesses -- about a third of the company. To rectify matters, it announced plans to combine the unit's two businesses, essentially reversing Cheney's strategy, which was to make each stand alone.

The change would lead to asset sales, layoffs and a $120 million after-tax charge against earnings. Cheney's successor, David Lesar, told analysts he was "not at all satisfied with this situation," and analysts sharply reduced their earnings forecasts. Halliburton's Hall said plans for the overhaul were made after Cheney left.

The news, coming a day after Halliburton acknowledged it was the target of a federal grand jury investigation related to overbilling of the government at Fort Ord in California, was a surprise.

By Nov. 13, Jefferies wrote that "Halliburton's stock has lost between $3 billion and $4 billion of total market value." The researchers attributed half of that to the bad news about the engineering business, and half to worries about Halliburton's asbestos troubles "since Owens-Corning filed for bankruptcy protection" in October.

Lately, much of the news coverage of Halliburton involves the SEC probe, announced in May, into an apparent 1998 change in the company's accounting practices. The change allowed Halliburton to increase revenue by $89 million in the fourth quarter of 1998 by postponing possible losses from customers' nonpayments.

Lesar, in an interview with Newsweek, defended the accounting treatment as a long-standing practice and said Cheney knew about it. Hall confirmed that "the vice president was aware we accrued revenue on unapproved claims in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles." Cheney, in a 1996 promotional video, praised Halliburton's accountants, Arthur Andersen, for their advice "over and above the, just sort of the normal by-the-books audit arrangement."

Whatever the SEC finds in its investigation, the matter is not of major financial importance to Halliburton, which had revenue of $13 billion last year.

As a financial matter, Halliburton's overbilling of the government at Fort Ord is even less significant. It agreed in February to pay $2 million to settle the accusations from a former employee of Halliburton's Brown & Root subsidiary who said his superiors told him to bill the government for work not performed at the military base from 1994 to 1998.

When Halliburton announced the grand jury inquiry in October 2000, the Bush-Cheney campaign suggested the prosecution was politically motivated. Daniel Schrader, the lawyer for the whistle-blower, said he has "circumstantial evidence" suggesting the overbilling is "a company-wide practice," but he could not prove it.

Such accusations are directed at the area in which Cheney most excelled at Halliburton: government business. In his five years, the company obtained $2.3 billion in federal contracts, up from $1.2 billion the previous five years, according to the Center for Public Integrity. Halliburton also received $1.5 billion in guaranteed or direct loans from government lenders, up from $100 million in the previous five years.

Halliburton said it does not overbill. "We have a long and successful relationship with government agencies," Hall said.

By far the greatest threat to Halliburton is the huge asbestos liability incurred in the 1998 purchase of Dresser Industries for $7.7 billion. In a quarterly report issued Aug. 10, 2000, six days before Cheney's departure, Halliburton was sanguine, setting aside reserves of $24 million for cases involving the cancer-causing material. Though adverse court rulings could change matters, the company wrote, "we believe that the pending asbestos claims will be resolved without material effect on our financial position."

Even after the October bankruptcy filing of Owens-Corning, also a target of asbestos lawsuits, Halliburton did not change. "Although there is no guarantee," analysts at A.G. Edwards & Sons wrote Oct. 25, "management does not anticipate increasing the accrued liability beyond the current level." On Nov. 9, Jefferies wrote: "Halliburton believes that insurance should cover most of the litigation costs or settlements."

But 2001 brought evidence to the contrary. In June, it became known that Harbison-Walker Refractories, which Dresser had spun off in 1992, could not pay asbestos claims against it, and the victims would go after Halliburton. By year's end, Halliburton had raised its reserves to $125 million as the number of open claims against it grew to 274,000 from 129,000 earlier in the year. Credit rating agencies downgraded Halliburton's debt.

Early this year, Halliburton acknowledged that it has no idea what its asbestos liabilities may be and that its reserves "may not be sufficient." As Harbison-Walker headed into bankruptcy proceedings, Halliburton hired experts to estimate the liabilities; a report is due this year, which could allow Halliburton to reach a settlement next year.

Investors, meanwhile, are betting the liability is $8 billion to $9 billion, based on the amount Halliburton's market value, now just under $6 billion, has been discounted relative to others in its industry without asbestos woes.

The best hope for Halliburton, investors and analysts say, is for the federal government to pass a law limiting damages that can be claimed against former asbestos makers. Bush had planned to do just that by including a "tort reform" proposal in his State of the Union address in January. But Bush ultimately decided against calling for that, leaving the impression on Wall Street that the administration could not press for limits on asbestos damages -- because of Cheney's history at Halliburton.

© 2002 The Washington Post Company

washingtonpost.com



To: H James Morris who wrote (2252)7/16/2002 2:24:11 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
STREET SMARTS

COMMENT
The New Yorker
Issue of 2002-07-22
Posted 2002-07-15

The old Merchants' Exchange, where George W. Bush delivered his big speech on corporate malfeasance last Tuesday morning, "was considered one of the 'most costly and pretentious' buildings within the United States when it opened in 1842." That's according to a brochure put out by the Regent Wall Street Hotel, which now uses the trading hall of the old Exchange as its grand ballroom. Awaiting President Bush's arrival there, many in the crowd of politicians, lawyers, business executives, and reporters could be seen gawking at the colonnaded marble magnificence around them. But the most striking object in the room was a blue screen that had been set up as background for the cameras. On it was emblazoned the phrase "Corporate Responsibility"—not once but something like fifty times. It was as if a stern schoolteacher had ordered some naughty boy to write it on the chalkboard, over and over again.

The afternoon before, the President had looked a very naughty boy indeed. At a press conference in the White House briefing room, most of the questions had touched on the corporate crime wave, and half of those had concerned a questionable business deal of Bush's own: in 1990, when he was a director of the Harken Energy Corporation and a member of its audit committee, he sold more than eight hundred thousand dollars' worth of Harken stock, not long before the share price started heading south, and neglected to file the relevant disclosure form until eight months after the legal deadline. The President answered these questions by saying that the Securities and Exchange Commission had "fully looked into" the matter—a formula he resorted to a half dozen times, on one occasion appearing to allude wittily to Gertrude Stein. (After pointing out that political opponents had long tried to use the incident against him, he quipped, "But nothing has changed. And the nothing that changed was the fact that this was fully looked into by the S.E.C., and there's no 'there' there.")

At the Regent Wall Street the next morning, he handled the preliminaries with affable aplomb. But the text itself he read in a joyless monotone, without inflection or conviction. The remedies he outlined were the feeblest he could afford to offer. He made no mention of such obvious steps as making corporations count stock options as an expense and preventing accounting firms from doubling as consultants to companies they audit. Some of his proposals (like requiring that a dishonest executive be convicted in criminal court before being barred from future service as an officer or a director of a public company) were weaker versions of measures that have been recommended by the S.E.C.'s professional staff or that are currently being rushed through Congress. Others (like calling for annual reports to describe a C.E.O.'s "compensation package" in plain English) are purely voluntary and therefore close to meaningless. The main emphasis was on tougher—or tougher-sounding—enforcement, notably a new "financial crimes SWAT team," an additional hundred million dollars for the S.E.C., and more prison time for wire and mail fraud. Even in this there was less than met the ear. The SWAT team will be essentially an information clearing house, and will involve no new net resources. The extra hundred million for the S.E.C. may be more than the increase that was called for in the President's last budget (i.e., zero), but it's barely a third of what Senate Democrats are proposing. And longer jail terms are beside the point, given the difficulty of obtaining criminal convictions in complex financial cases. The Administration's approach to financial crimes is like its approach to crimes committed with guns: make a show of calling for severe penalties after the fact, but don't bother trying to take away the tools of the criminal's trade.

George W. Bush is our first M.B.A. President. He boasted of his private-sector experience during the campaign, contrasting it favorably with his opponent's long record in public office. He has been pictured as the government's C.E.O., with Vice-President Cheney as his C.O.O. and the Cabinet as his board. All this looks different now. Bush's business experience is turning out to have been the wrong kind. His career in oil and baseball is studded with exactly the sort of insider-only benefits that are now the stuff of business-page scandal: unearned stock options, below-prime loans, curiously well-timed stock sales, earnings "restatements." The S.E.C. that "fully looked into" the Harken dealings of Bush the son had a chairman who served at the pleasure of Bush the father, and its general counsel had been the son's personal attorney.

"In the corporate world," Bush said last week, "sometimes things aren't exactly black-and-white when it comes to accounting procedures." No doubt. But what really compromises the Administration's crusade against corporate "malfeance," as the President recently called it, is something that goes beyond the ironies of Bush's résumé (and the irony of his sudden embrace of moral relativism). The substance of his Administration's domestic policy, as opposed to its rhetoric, has been to use the power of government to augment the wealth of the already wealthy, regardless of the country's circumstances—whether it's bubble or bust, whether we're at peace or at war, whether the budget is in surplus or, as happened last week, the national-debt clock on Forty-second Street has to be started up again. The Bush tax program, which in dollar terms dwarfs all the Administration's other initiatives put together, shifts the burden of paying for the common welfare and the common defense decisively away from the rich. Corporate responsibility? Fine, but let's not push it.

newyorker.com



To: H James Morris who wrote (2252)7/16/2002 8:28:35 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
For students, Accounting Fraud 101

More colleges offer courses on corporate abuse

By Diya Gullapalli
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

msnbc.com

July 16 — There will be a hot new course at many colleges this fall: how to tell if a company is cooking its books.

AT THE University of California at Irvine, MBA students will be offered “The Enron Case,” a two-credit course in which they will comb through the energy company’s financial statements looking for red flags. They also will learn about some of the factors blamed for Enron’s fall, including special-purpose partnerships, derivatives contracts and pension fraud.

THINKING INDEPENDENTLY

At Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Prof. S.P. Kothari plans to present case studies on Tyco International Ltd., Global Crossing Ltd. and Xerox Corp. in his accounting classes, then test his students’ knowledge of these companies’ accounting problems.

Professors say these new courses at some 20 colleges go way beyond traditional accounting classes that stress rote learning of the trade’s rules and regulations. Instead, they hope to teach students how to sleuth through corporate books.

“Enron has reinforced the difference between skills and memorization,” says Steve Albrecht, associate dean at Brigham Young University’s Marriott School of Business. “We don’t want to just teach kids how to copy information from books, and that’s what’s been happening.”

The American Institute for Certified Public Accountants even plans to change the CPA exam for 2004 so it will better measure students’ ability to think independently as accountants. The new test will be open book and require students to build spreadsheets and do research online during the test. This past spring the group distributed free computer disks with new practice questions to the nearly 900 U.S. schools with accounting programs.

Some say it’s about time that universities addressed the issue.

“The problem in accounting education is that professors presume to be engaged in high-level scientific research,” says Abraham Briloff, a professor emeritus at Baruch College in New York City. “They develop exotic and esoteric mathematical models when they should be rolling up their sleeves and teaching students how to dig into the 10Ks and 10Qs,” he adds, speaking of the annual and quarterly financial reports that public companies must file with the government.

Still, getting accounting instructors to change their methods may be an uphill battle, says Bill Schwartz, chairman of the teaching and curriculum committee at the American Accounting Association, a group that promotes accounting education. “When you have an aging faculty that’s within 10 years of retirement, sometimes there’s no incentive to make drastic changes,” he says. “Hopefully these scandals will push us.”

In fact, organizers of next month’s AAA annual meeting expect the biggest draws to be sessions on “earnings management,” “aggressive financial reporting,” “regulating the accounting profession” and “insider information and corporate disclosure.”

CASE STUDIES V. MEMORIZATION

Students say they can already feel the new approach.

As an undergraduate, “I did math problems and memorized dozens of GAAP [generally accepted accounting principles] rules and legal statutes,” says Michael Rockwood, an MBA student at the University of Texas at Austin. But his brother, now an undergraduate accounting major at his alma mater, Utah State University, is doing more case studies, he says.

At the University of Virginia, accounting major Brendan Abrams says “we discussed problems at different firms regularly” in accounting classes last spring, and this, he says, has prepared him well for his current internship as an auditor at Ernst & Young.

This isn’t the first time accounting scandals have prompted business colleges to revamp their courses. In the 1990s, bookkeeping problems at firms such as Waste Management Inc. and Cendant Corp. led professors to make some changes, such as adding accounting fraud minors at schools such as Bloomsburg University in Bloomsburg, Pa.

While nationwide enrollment in the accounting major has declined an average of 27% a year for the past five years, academics say the current accounting scandals might actually attract more students to the profession.

An accounting fraud class at the University of Texas at Austin this spring had three times the enrollment it did the summer before, with many of the students coming from majors other than accounting. At Hilbert College, a small liberal arts college in Hamburg, N.Y., professors say they have received dozens of inquiries from other colleges this year about starting majors in economic-crime investigation similar to theirs. And at the University of Delaware, Professor Charles Elson says he had 45 students in his corporate governance class this past spring, compared with 22 a year earlier. He plans to respond to the demand with more lectures on the role of the audit committee of corporate boards of directors.

This new emphasis on audit committees has spurred other schools to boost the discussion of corporate governance in accounting classes this fall. The National Association of Corporate Directors reports that over 20 additional colleges have requested reports and lecture material in the past four months and repeat clients such as Harvard University, Yale University and Xavier College in New Orleans have requested up to three times as many articles as last year.

Yet some professors have worried that initiatives intended to give future accountants broad-based business skills could further blur the line between auditing and management consulting-an issue in many of the current accounting scandals. Big accounting firms have given millions of dollars to business schools, sometimes with strings attached as to the type of classes they offer and research that is done. Now “schools want to distance themselves from the accounting firms,” says the AAA’s Mr. Schwartz, who also is dean of the School of Business and Economics at Indiana University in Bloomington.

Copyright © 2002 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
All Rights Reserved.