Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Politics : High Tolerance Plasticity -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: kodiak_bull who wrote (15127)	7/16/2002 10:47:52 AM
From: jim_p	Respond to of 23153

Yes. My plan was to be 100% in high bata tech stocks that lead the market. From there I hope to take profits and buy in the OSX and high yield beat up utility stocks. So far it's working like a charm. In the last three trading days, I've got three stocks up over 35%, four stocks up over 20%, and four stocks up over 10% and I don't plan to sell any. Yesterday I had to run for cover and hide a few times, but ended the day with a big grin. Weshallsee. Jim

To: kodiak_bull who wrote (15127)	7/16/2002 10:54:59 AM
From: jim_p	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 23153

KB, The most important thing to keep in mind is that panic buying always follows panic selling after the market turns on days like yesterday. 90% down volume and 90% decliners as we saw during the day will led to 90% up volume and 90% advancers. On that day, no one can afford to be out of the market. Jim

To: kodiak_bull who wrote (15127)	7/16/2002 10:21:40 PM
From: stockman_scott	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 23153

The Talent Myth by Malcolm Gladwell Are smart people overrated? newyorker.com Enron, LTCM ... is there a pattern here? An interesting passage from the article... <<...Among the most damning facts about Enron, in the end, was something its managers were proudest of. They had what, in McKinsey terminology, is called an "open market" for hiring. In the open-market system—McKinsey's assault on the very idea of a fixed organization—anyone could apply for any job that he or she wanted, and no manager was allowed to hold anyone back. Poaching was encouraged. When an Enron executive named Kevin Hannon started the company's global broadband unit, he launched what he called Project Quick Hire. A hundred top performers from around the company were invited to the Houston Hyatt to hear Hannon give his pitch. Recruiting booths were set up outside the meeting room. "Hannon had his fifty top performers for the broadband unit by the end of the week," Michaels, Handfield-Jones, and Axelrod write, "and his peers had fifty holes to fill." Nobody, not even the consultants who were paid to think about the Enron culture, seemed worried that those fifty holes might disrupt the functioning of the affected departments, that stability in a firm's existing businesses might be a good thing, that the self-fulfillment of Enron's star employees might possibly be in conflict with the best interests of the firm as a whole. These are the sort of concerns that management consultants ought to raise. But Enron's management consultant was McKinsey, and McKinsey was as much a prisoner of the talent myth as its clients were. In 1998, Enron hired ten Wharton M.B.A.s; that same year, McKinsey hired forty. In 1999, Enron hired twelve from Wharton; McKinsey hired sixty-one. The consultants at McKinsey were preaching at Enron what they believed about themselves. "When we would hire them, it wouldn't just be for a week," one former Enron manager recalls, of the brilliant young men and women from McKinsey who wandered the hallways at the company's headquarters. "It would be for two to four months. They were always around." They were there looking for people who had the talent to think outside the box. It never occurred to them that, if everyone had to think outside the box, maybe it was the box that needed fixing...>>