PEACEWATCH #392
July 19, 2002
THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE'S SPECIAL REPORTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI
PEACE PROCESS
SPECIAL REPORT
THE RATIONALE FOR PALESTINIAN REFORM
KHALIL SHIKAKI
On June 27, 2002, Khalil Shikaki addressed a special Washington
Institute seminar on reforming the Palestinian Authority (PA).
Dr. Shikaki is an associate professor of political science at Bir
Zeit University and director of the Palestinian Center for Policy
and Survey Research in Ramallah. The following are excerpts from
his presentation, as transcribed by the Institute.
"Initially, Palestinian interest [in reform] was basically an
effort to address the issue of waste. . . . One year into the
establishment of the Palestinian Authority [PA], the Palestinian
comptroller issued a report which shocked everybody because the
report basically said we have been wasting something like $250
million. . . . Waste, corruption, violation of human rights in
Palestinian jails, security forces essentially ignoring any law
and order, were all factors that became of serious interest in
the early two or three years of the Palestinian Authority. . . .
The reason for all of this is the fact that the Palestinians so
far have failed to build strong institutions, structurally
speaking. . . ."
Why Institutions Were Weak
" We had no previous knowledge or experience with statebuilding
as Palestinians. We had a revolution, we had the PLO [Palestine
Liberation Organization], and the process of statebuilding
started from scratch. There were no clear rules of the game. An
old system was being demolished, with all its structures, but
none was being builtyet. . . .
" Because the interim agreement was transitional, because it
didn't create a state, it allowed the continuation and
functioning of the PLO. . . . The PLO legacy run by the old
guard was revolutionary, had little respect for accountability
and transparency, and it had its own institutions, very much
authoritarian in nature. The PA, on the other hand, was supposed
to be built on a system of law, with a basic law,
and on very clear transparent functioning of institutions that
would be elected by the will of the people. There was certainly a
great deal of conflict between the two, but since the creation of
the PA was done by sort of a decree from the PLO, it was the
PLO's institutions, values, culture -- in other words, PLO legacy
-- that dominated the process of statebuilding during this whole
period. . . .
" The Israelis were certainly interested in having a neighbor who
is peaceful, even democratic, but if that contradicted other
Israeli interests, certainly the democratic, open nature of the
system was not high on the Israeli agenda. . . . [Israeli prime
minister Yitzhak] Rabin believed that the Palestinians would be a
lot more effective ignoring the rule of law. . . . Israelis were
also interested in a Palestinian elite that would negotiate with
them terms that would be acceptable to Israel. Call it weakening
the Palestinian negotiating position. The Israelis were certainly
not interested in a strong Palestinian negotiating position. . .
. As a result, the Israelis had a direct role in the corruption
and mismanagement of the early period. It was under the different
Israeli governments that, for example, we had absolutely no
financial transparency. Monies that were collected from customs
and taxes and fees went into separate accounts that didn't go to
the treasury of the Ministry of Finance and that [weren't] part
of the budget that was submitted to the Legislative Council. The
Israelis knew about it. Most Palestinians didn't know about it. .
. ."
Why Do Palestinians Need Reform?
" First and foremost, every political system needs legitimacy,
and the search for legitimacy has been one that every
Palestinian, at one time or another, wanted to address. . . . If
we agree on the nature of the legitimacy that we would like to
use as a source for governance, then it becomes easier to
determine what kind of priorities we need. Should that source of
legitimacy be the PLO legacy? Or should it be the will of the
people and elections, statebuilding in the normal sense, like any
other country? Palestinians have not yet made that choice. . . .
" We want strong institutions because strong institutions are
ones that are capable of respecting and implementing their
commitments. If we don't have strong institutions, we certainly
cannot implement our agreements with the Israelis. This is what
we've been telling the Israelis for a long time. They were not
paying attention. I remember from the early, very early days, we
were not sure whether, in fact, the Israelis would be interested
in elections, even though this is what the Declaration of
Principles spoke about. . . . The first initial response we
received from Israelis -- and I am talking about Rabin himself -
was that the Israelis have little interest in our elections. . .
. We told the Israelis then, as we are discovering now, that weak
institutions are not capable of respecting their obligations, are
not capable of implementing their agreements, and this applies
not only to security services, but it applies to every other
aspect. Of course, we're not just interested in obligations we
made to the Israelis, but obligations made with everybody else.
" We wanted to establish a strong, effective government. We
wanted to be a democratic nation. . . . We certainly didn't want
to be a corrupt, mismanaged entity. Palestinians felt that they
would do better. They always believed that they could do better.
Surveys that we have done during this whole period indicated
[that] Palestinians embrace democratic values and values of good
governance in very impressive ways."
Old Guard vs. Young Guard
" It was very clear from the beginning that there was a lot of
tension between the old guard and the young guard. The old guard
are people who have been schooled in the Arab political culture.
The young guard, who led the first intifada and have lived under
occupation with no central government, learned to respect
democratic rules because they have to live in a pluralistic
society and respect each other. . . .
" It was the PLO that got the agreement with Israel. It was the
PLO that gave that agreement legitimacy. It was, therefore, the
PLO that put everything in place. It was the PLO that was in
control, and it was the PLO legacy therefore that won. And
therefore, it was the old guard who won. While in the early
period, the young guard were willing to allow this to happen, . .
. Gradually, the young guards came to feel that the old guard was
not responding to the needs of the society and the people...
" Many people in the young guard believed that there was a
conspiracy involving the Israelis and [the] corrupt old guard,
who wanted to put their own personal interests ahead of the
interests of the Palestinian people. And the failure of
negotiations, therefore, was seen as an outcome of that
corruption, which was nurtured by the Israelis. This is how the
young guard looked at the old guard and the process of
peacemaking. It was no longer about ending occupation, in their
eyes, but rather about consolidating the rule of a corrupt regime
with the PLO legacy. The intifada, therefore, I believe, was the
outcome of that disillusionment with the old guard's handling of
statebuilding, as well as peacemaking. The resort to violence was
also a direct consequence of that. The young guards believed that
the only way now to fundamentally change everything was through
violence. This would not only inflict enough pain and suffering
on the Israelis to force them to unilaterally withdraw, but it
would also weaken the control of the old guard. . . .
" We need strong institutions because we want to build our
economy. We've failed to do that. We want to provide security,
for us and the Israelis. We've failed to do that. We want [a]
strong judiciary so that we can have rule of law, so that
business can come and invest. We've failed to do that. . . . The
intifada, as I believe, weakened tremendously . . . and
marginalized the old guard and has led to the creation of a new
leadership. It's a de facto leadership. The next elections, I
believe, will basically institute this change. The old guard will
be out, and the new guard will be in."
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