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To: OLDTRADER who wrote (3392)7/28/2002 1:59:27 PM
From: Rascal  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
It just keeps on coming!
Oldtrader, you are correct Sir.

NY Times Today
July 28, 2002
I.R.S. Loophole Allows Wealthy to Avoid Taxes
By DAVID CAY JOHNSTON

n recent months some of the wealthiest older Americans have been buying huge life insurance policies on themselves. Curiously, these people have shopped not for the cheapest rates but for the highest rates they can find. In some cases, they delightedly pay 10 times the lowest rates for that insurance.

Why would anyone willingly pay so much?

Taxes.

Through a technique invented by a lawyer in New York and a chemical engineer in California, each dollar spent on this insurance can typically eliminate $9 in taxes. Spend $10 million on this insurance, avoid $90 million or more in income, gift, generation-skipping and estate taxes.

"I'm not saying this is the best thing since sliced bread, but it's really good for pushing wealth forward tax free," said Jonathan G. Blattmachr, the New York lawyer who heads the estate tax department at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy and who explained the plan in a half-dozen interviews.

The technique is legal, blessed by the I.R.S. in 1996. But some leading tax lawyers, as well as some accountants and insurance agents, say it shouldn't be. They say it effectively disguises a gift to one's heirs that should be taxed like any other gift. They also say it is but one example of how a tax exemption on life insurance that was approved by Congress in 1913 to help widows and orphans has been stretched to benefit the very richest Americans.

Several thousand of these jumbo policies have been sold, according to agents who sell them, all under confidentiality agreements with the buyers and their advisors. One member of the Rockefeller family took out a policy, according to people who have seen documents in the deal.

The several billion dollars of this insurance already sold, much of it in the last 18 months, means that tens of billions of taxes will not flow into federal and state government coffers in the coming decade or so.

In recent months, policies with first-year premiums alone of $4.4 million, $10 million, $15 million, $25 million, $32 million and $40 million have been sold by New York Life Insurance, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance and other underwriters, according to insurance agents, accountants and tax lawyers who have worked on these deals.

The agents selling the policies find them hard to resist — they can earn millions of dollars for selling just one such policy.

The technique works this way. An older person — typically someone who does not expect to live long and who has at least $10 million and usually much more — wants to avoid estate taxes, which are 50 percent with such fortunes.

Under tax law, money from a life insurance policy goes at death to heirs tax free. The premium paid on that life insurance is considered a gift to those heirs. Any annual premium that exceeds $11,000 is therefore subject to the gift tax of 50 percent. Only the wealthiest Americans pay such large premiums and are subject to this tax.

The new technique sidesteps the gift tax in a two-step process. First, the person who is buying the policy reports on his tax return only a small part of what he really paid in premiums.

Wouldn't the I.R.S. say that is cheating? No. It's perfectly legal. The reason is that insurance companies offer many different rates for the same policy. And the buyer is allowed to declare on his tax return the insurance company's lowest premium for that amount of insurance, even if that person could never qualify for that rate because of his age and health, and even if no one has actually ever been sold a policy at that rate.

A low premium means a low gift tax. But in fact the buyer has really paid the very highest premium offered by that insurer for that amount of insurance. The insurer then invests the difference between the highest premium and the lowest premium. That investment grows tax free, paying for future premiums on the policy. At death, the entire face value of the policy is paid tax free to heirs.

In an example cited by one agent, a customer paid a $550,000 premium for the first year alone, the highest price offered by the insurance company, for a policy that was also offered at $50,000, the lowest price. So $550,000 can be passed on to heirs tax free. Yet the gift tax is only $25,000 — 50 percent of the lowest premium, instead of $275,000, which is 50 percent of the highest premium.

The I.R.S. would not comment officially. But an I.R.S. official who specializes in insurance matters said he had not heard that so many people were exploiting this loophole. He could not say whether the issue would be re-examined.

The deal gets better because of a second step. Even that $25,000 tax can be avoided by shifting the gift-tax obligation to the spouse through a trust. In 1982, Congress made all transfers between spouses tax free, so the gift tax disappears.

If the policy holder continues to pay huge premiums year after year, he can pass along much or all of his fortune tax free if he lives long enough. Michael D. Brown of Spectrum Consulting in Irvine, Calif., said, many clients in their 50's and 60's, working with other agents, are now trying to do just that.

By far the biggest deals have been made by two insurance agents who work together, Mr. Brown, a former chemical engineer, and Louis P. Kreisberg of the Executive Compensation Group in Manhattan.

The technique was devised in 1995 by Mr. Blattmachr and Mr. Brown. Mr. Blattmachr has since expanded his idea and other estate tax lawyers have copied his methods.

"In 1995 I was told that this was the stupidest idea ever by a guy who is now collecting millions in commissions from selling" such insurance, Mr. Blattmachr said.

Among his peers Mr. Blattmachr is renowned for his creativity in finding ways to pass down fortunes without paying taxes and without breaking the law.

He is a busy man. Recently he set off to counsel clients in eight cities over three days — a trip made possible by a client who provided him with a private jet. Afterward he spent the weekend fishing with his brother, Douglas, whose company, Alaska Trust, helps wealthy Americans set up perpetual trusts, some of them using Mr. Blattmachr's insurance plan.

One buyer of an insurance plan like Mr. Blattmachr's paid $32 million in the first year for a policy that will pay $127 million tax free to the grandchildren, according to a lawyer who worked on the deal and spoke on condition of not being identified. No gift taxes were paid.

Sales of such insurance soared after the Internal Revenue Service announced 18 months ago that it was considering restrictions on similar techniques, which are known as split-dollar plans.

In Alaska, premiums for such insurance totaled just $1.1 million in 1999, but ballooned to more than $80 million last year, state records show.

This month, when the I.R.S. issued its proposed restrictions, it did nothing to stop Mr. Blattmachr's plan.

Indeed, the proposed I.R.S. rules can be read as strengthening the validity of his plan, Mr. Blattmachr and some other estate tax lawyers say.

Mr. Brown said that in some cases, when the policy holder dies quickly, both the government and the heirs come out winners, at the expense of the insurance company.

"This is a good deal because both the government and the heirs get 90 percent of what they could have gotten," he said.

He added: "We think it is good policy to allow this because it discourages games like renouncing your citizenship or investing offshore."

But many estate tax lawyers and insurance experts think that because Mr. Blattmachr's plan is similar to the plans the I.R.S. moved to stop on July 3, it should be ended as well.

While the I.R.S. in 1996 approved the outlines of the Blattmachr plan, these opponents argue that the plan as sold by agents like Mr. Brown and Mr. Kreisberg stretches that ruling so far that it no longer provides protection in an I.R.S. audit.

Some of them say it is the huge fees involved that are blinding their competitors to aspects of the Blattmachr plan that make it vulnerable to being banned as an abusive tax shelter.

Commissions for the insurance agents run between 70 percent and 200 percent of the first-year premium when it is $1 million or so, while on the jumbo policies commissions are typically 9 percent to 11 percent, or up to $4.4 million on a policy with a $40 million first-year premium, Mr. Kreisberg said.

He acknowledged that many peers in the estate tax world say that he earned $100 million in gross commissions last year, but said, "I wish it were half that." Mr. Kreisberg did not dispute a statement by someone with knowledge of payment records that his small firm's commissions this year have already reached $20 million.

Lawyers who opine on the validity of the deals can also earn big fees. Mr. Blattmachr gets $100,000 for his basic opinion letter and is reported to have charged as much as $250,000.

Sanford J. Schlesinger of the law firm Kaye Scholer said he passed up a chance to collect a six-figure fee for advising on one of these deals because he thinks the deals should not pass muster with the I.R.S. "My mother taught me that if something seems too good to be true, it isn't true," he said.

Other leading estate tax lawyers, as well as some accountants and insurance agents, say Mr. Blattmachr's insurance technique should fail because it is wholly outside the intent of Congress in giving tax breaks for life insurance, the I.R.S. ruling on the plan notwithstanding.

"If the I.R.S. understood this they would say that it relies on a disguised gift — and if you have to pay gift taxes, then Jonathan's insurance deal does not work," said an estate partner at a tax firm in New York, who like others, said they could not be identified because they have signed confidentiality agreements that are part of all such insurance deals.

Another legal expert said paying 10 times too much for insurance in a plan like this reminds him of a matriarch selling the family business to her granddaughter for $10 million when it was actually worth 10 times that amount. "The I.R.S. wouldn't let a family get away with selling the business for a dime on the dollar," this lawyer said, "and they should not allow it to work in reverse through insurance."



To: OLDTRADER who wrote (3392)7/30/2002 2:48:15 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
Merrill Replaced Research Analyst Who Upset Enron

By RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.
The New York Times
7/30/02

WASHINGTON — In the summer of 1998, when it was eager to win more investment banking business from Enron, Merrill Lynch replaced a research analyst who had angered Enron executives by rating the company's stock "neutral" with an analyst who soon upgraded the rating, according to Congressional investigators.

The move by Merrill Lynch came after two Merrill executives wrote a memo that April to the firm's president, Herbert Allison, saying that Merrill had lost a lucrative stock underwriting deal because Enron executives had a "visceral" dislike of the research analyst, John Olson, and what he told investors about Enron stock, according to documents obtained by investigators for a Senate panel looking into the relationship among Enron and its banks.

Merrill vigorously disputes that there was any link between its rating on Enron and its desire to win more business from Enron.

In the memo, the two investment bankers, Rick Gordon and Schuyler Tilney, noted that "our research relationship with Enron has been strained for a long period of time." Mr. Olson, they said, "has not been a real supporter of the company, even though it is the largest, most successful company in the industry." They also said that Enron viewed his research as "flawed" and that Mr. Olson — who left for another firm in August 1998 — "often makes snide and potentially embarrassing remarks about the company in meetings with analysts while in the presence" of Enron's top two executives, Jeffrey K. Skilling and Kenneth L. Lay. They also pointed out that all of the investment banks that had won a portion of the underwriting deal from Enron had "buy" ratings on Enron stock.

In early 1999, after the new analyst took over, Mr. Tilney wrote Mr. Allison to say that Enron's anger with Merrill's research had "dissipated" and that "to that end," Merrill had since won Enron business that would generate at least $45 million in fees.

Mr. Tilney wrote to Mr. Allison in an e-mail message dated Jan. 15, 1999: "I wanted to update you on recent developments in our relationship with Enron since you spoke to their C.E.O., Ken Lay, last spring regarding our difficult relationship in research. It is clear that your responsive message was appreciated by the company, and any animosity in that regard seems to have dissipated in the ensuing months."

The exchanges among Merrill executives, captured in internal Merrill documents and e-mail messages that have been subpoenaed by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, highlight the debate over one of the most contentious issues on Wall Street: To what degree do brokerage firms adjust their ratings on publicly traded companies to try to win investment-banking business.

To investigators with the Senate panel, which is holding a hearing Tuesday examining Merrill Lynch's relationship with Enron, the episode suggests that Merrill executives hoped the firm would raise the rating on Enron stock to obtain more business from the company. At the very least, it shows that senior Merrill executives actively discussed the way a less-than-positive rating on Enron's stock would limit the business that Enron executives were willing to do with the firm.

A Merrill spokesman, William Halldin, said investment bankers at the firm never asked superiors to take action against Mr. Olson. "Our research was not compromised," he said. Merrill also said it believed its employees "behaved properly" in their dealings with Enron. A lawyer for Mr. Tilney, Robert Trout, declined to comment.

Mr. Halldin said the memo simply showed that while Mr. Olson's research prompted the phone call to Mr. Lay, the call had been focused primarily on getting Merrill into the Enron underwriting on the basis of the firm's long relationship with Enron and leadership in the business. He added that Mr. Olson, after joining another firm, had also increased his rating on Enron — and that Mr. Allison's phone call to Mr. Lay had resulted in Merrill's securing a role as co-manager for the underwriting.

Donato J. Eassey, the analyst who upgraded Enron in 1998, to "accumulate," angrily dismissed the idea that he had done so to help Merrill win business, saying his decision had been based on careful research.

"It infuriates me," Mr. Eassey said. "When you go to bed at night as an analyst, all you have is your integrity." Mr. Eassey added that in August 2001, after the surprise resignation of Enron's chief executive, Mr. Skilling, he downgraded Enron two notches, to "neutral" — months before other analysts did the same.

Mr. Eassey said Mr. Olson had had a difficult relationship with some Merrill investment bankers before he left in 1998. "He left Merrill because he and the bankers didn't get along," Mr. Eassey said. "John was getting beaten up at Merrill Lynch." Mr. Eassey declined to elaborate, but he said, "The fact of the matter is, we didn't get any more business with John there or John gone."

In an interview this afternoon, Mr. Olson said he took early retirement from Merrill in August 1998 "in lieu of other options" at the firm. He declined to elaborate, saying he needed to review whether terms of an agreement he signed with Merrill when he left allow him to say anything more. He now works for Sanders Morris Harris, an investment research firm in Houston.

Mr. Halldin, the Merrill spokesman, said Mr. Olson had left Merrill because of a "consolidation in the research department." Mr. Olson's rating on Enron or any other stock was not discussed by Merrill officials who made the decisions about the consolidation, Mr. Halldin added.

The chairman of the Senate committee, Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan, said Merrill was part of several "troubling" deals with Enron. The panel's ranking Republican, Susan M. Collins of Maine, added that it appeared Merrill "knowingly participated in deals that were used to make Enron's financial position appear more robust than it actually was."

Last week, Merrill placed Mr. Tilney, now head of the firm's energy investment-banking practice, on paid administrative leave for refusing to testify to the Senate panel on Tuesday about the company's dealings with Enron. A former Merrill banker, Robert Furst, will also decline to testify, Merrill has said. Merrill said Mr. Tilney opted not to testify after learning of a Justice Department inquiry into at least one transaction that involved Merrill and Enron.

In addition to the episode involving Mr. Olson, the Senate committee also plans to examine other deals by Enron with Merrill, including the firm's role in raising money for LJM2, a partnership run by Andrew S. Fastow, Enron's chief financial officer at the time, that played a central role in Enron's collapse.

The panel will also examine Enron's December 1999 sale to a Merrill entity of a part-interest in a Nigerian barge operation that investigators say allowed Enron to book a $12 million profit. Investigators say documents show that Enron intended to have Merrill bought out the following summer, so the transaction was not a true sale but instead a sham deal that allowed Enron to increase its earnings for the previous year. One document obtained by investigators quotes a Merrill official as saying that "it was our understanding" that Merrill would be repaid, with a profit, by June 30, 2000.

Merrill disputes that characterization, saying it was "likely, though not certain," that an unaffiliated third party would acquire the interest.

The Senate panel will also look at other ways Merrill sought to increase its business with Enron, including the firm's decision to take $40 million of a $482 million offer of Enron debt early last year in a deal called Zephyrus.

One internal Merrill document states that Enron executives had "informed Merrill Lynch that it is at a distinct disadvantage because of Merrill's reluctance to use its balance sheet to support Enron's business activities" and that investing in Zephyrus was part of Merrill's efforts to "improve its relationship." Merrill said the deal had been approved "pursuant to the firm's applicable policies and procedures."

nytimes.com