While looking for Iraq Underground Bunkers on google: found this: Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq
May 6, 2002
"All options are on the table," President George W. Bush said recently, "But one thing I will not allow is a nation such as Iraq to threaten our very future by developing weapons of mass destruction."
cdi.org
On April 3, 1991, UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), Section C, declared that Iraq shall accept unconditionally, under international supervision, the "destruction, removal or rendering harmless" of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles with a range over 150 kilometers. On June 9, 1991, UNSCOM, the United Nations Special Commission, conducted its first chemical weapons inspection in Iraq in accordance with the approved and accepted Resolution 687.
Since UN inspectors were ousted in late 1998, most intelligence analysts feel that WMD research and development has continued in Iraq. Richard Butler, UNSCOM chairman from 1992 though 1997, stresses that the full nature and scope of Saddam's current WMD programs cannot be known precisely because of the absence of inspections and monitoring. He surmises that it would be "foolish in the extreme" not to assume that Iraq is: developing a long-range missile capability; at work again on building nuclear weapons; and adding to the chemical and biological warfare weapons that were concealed during the UNSCOM inspection period.
The United Nations, along with the Bush administration, has demanded that Saddam Hussein grant the UN Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) access to sites in Iraq. UN attempts over the last four years to establish talks concerning restarting inspections with Iraq have been either delayed or postponed.
On May 1, 2002, an Iraqi delegation headed by Foreign Minister Naji Sabri met with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Hans Blix, executive chairman of UNMOVIC, in New York to once more begin negotiations concerning the possible return of UN inspectors.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld has repeatedly stated that he is very doubtful concerning the ability of a new UN arms inspection regime to build any confidence that Saddam Hussein is not developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Despite such skepticism, it is of considerable value for the United States to get firmly behind and support all efforts to resume inspections. It is possibly the only step left between an all-out, unilateral military offensive by the United States, with the tremendous short- and long-term risks involved with such an operation. The U.S. government should move quickly to use every ounce of its political leverage, especially with Russia, to re-start the process of inspections in Iraq.
True, the UNSCOM inspections in the 1990swere constantly plagued by Iraqi concealment, deception, lies and threats, but the inspectors learned a lot, found a lot and destroyed a lot. The effort was worth it in the end.
Iraq is clearly seen by the Bush administration as the premier source of WMD to terrorist groups in the future. A resumption of inspections has the potential give the world a peek under the tent at what threat to global security Iraq really does pose. Inspections might also lead to containment Iraq's weapons programs, without the need for a U.S. military strike. The leadership in the United States must pull out all the stops and aggressively support the resumption of a tough, robust UN inspection regime in Iraq. Anything less could be viewed by some, both domestically and abroad, as criminally insane.
Listed below is a chronology of key developments in Iraq's WMD programs, including the latest U.S. and UN concerns.
Iraq has produced several thousand tons of chemical weapons over the last 20 years. Iraq had roughly 1,000 metric tons of chemical weapons on hand when it invaded Kuwait, split roughly equally between blister agents and nerve agents.
March 16, 1988 — Iraqi President Saddam Hussein attacks the Iranian occupied Kurdish town of Halabja with chemical weapons killing 5,000 civilians.
Iraq had a crash effort in 1990 to recover enriched fuel from nuclear reactors in an attempt to build a weapon by 1991. Coalition aircraft destroyed the facilities on Jan. 17, 1991.
The UN inspection regime (UNSCOM) destroyed more than 27,000 chemical bombs, artillery shells and rockets, including 30 Scud missile warheads. About 500 tons of mustard and nerve agents and thousands of tons of precursor chemicals (choline and phosphorus pentasulfide for example) were also destroyed.
Iraq admitted prior to the Gulf War that it maintained large stockpiles of mustard gas and the nerve agents Sarin (GB) and Tabun (GA).
Iraq had a large VX production underway, and has not offered any evidence that the capability and stockpile have been destroyed. In 1996, Iraq admitted it had produced at least 3.9 tons of VX and at least 600 tons of ingredients to make it. (It is one of the deadliest forms of nerve gas and easily storable.)
Defection of Iraqi Lt. Gen. Hussein Majid, formerly in charge of WMD programs, led Iraq to admit its bio-weapon program in August 1995. Baghdad admitted to producing 90,000 liters of Botulinium toxin, 8,300 liters of Anthrax, and significant quantities of other agents, plus a laboratory and industrial-scale facility to continue production.
Defectors reported in December 2001 and March 2002 the existence of mobile germ laboratories disguised as milk delivery trucks, and a network of underground bunkers for chemical and biological weapons production. U.S. officials released evidence on March 8, 2002, allegedly showing that Iraq has been converting dump trucks bought through a UN humanitarian program into military vehicles, in violation of UN sanctions. An Iraqi defector stated that he had converted Renault trucks into mobile laboratories with incubators for bacteria, microscopes and air conditioning.
Intelligence reports indicate that Iraq is also developing newer and longer range missiles, with initial ranges of 600-700 miles; far enough to hit Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Ankara in Turkey, Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt, and Tehran in Iran. During Desert Storm, Iraq launched some 45 Scud missiles: one at Bahrain, five or six at Saudi Arabia, and 39 into Israel. Development of the Al Samoud liquid-propellant missile is ongoing; Iraq also is actively developing solid-propellant engines to build a multi-stage surface-to-surface missile.
Several reports indicate that Iraq is closer to a nuclear bomb than most people think. It has an efficient nuclear bomb design - with the new warhead weighing only about 1,300 pounds and 2 feet in diameter. The one thing lacking is fissile material to fuel it. Nuclear weapon specialists estimate if Saddam could buy the materials he is missing, it would only be a matter of months until Iraq created a weapon.
In January 2002, U.S. intelligence sources estimated the United States could face a ballistic missile threat from Iraq by the year 2015, well before such a threat emerged from Iran or North Korea.
Rumsfeld stated on April 15, 2002, that new equipment had allowed Iraq's weapon program to become more mobile, "enabling them to go underground to a greater extent than they had previously."
Sources:
Editorial cartoon by Jimmy Margulies, New Jersey — The Record. 2001.
Richard Butler, "The Greatest Threat", Uncorrected Proof, New York, N.Y., Public Affairs 2000.
Cordesman, Anthony H., U.S.Forces In The Middle East, Resources and Capabilities, Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1997.
Newsweek (Web exclusive), "Access Must Be Unrestricted," April 15, 2002.
Greg Jaffe, "Skepticism Of New Weapons Search In Iraq Seems To Counter Bush Call," Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2002.
Colum Lynch, "Annan Urges Iraq To Permit Arms Inspectors' Return," The Washington Post, March 8, 2002.
Chris Alden, "Defector Reveals Extent Of Iraqi Weapons Program," The Guardian, April 4, 2002.
Chronology of UN inspections derived from an October 1998 UNSCOM document.
Howard Schneider and Walter Pincus, "Iraq And U.N. To Talk Today About Weapon Inspectors," The Washington Post, May 1, 2002.
Rear Adm. (Ret.) Stephen H. Baker, USN
CDI Senior Fellow
sbaker@cdi.org
Dr. Michael Donovan
CDI Research Analyst
mdonovan@cdi.org
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