To: Hoa Hao who wrote (37864 ) 8/15/2002 7:20:16 AM From: maceng2 Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 281500 Thanks for the links. Some people might shrink from trying to understand these concepts... 1. Strategic Futuring 2. Customer Research and "Functional" futuring 3. Competitive Analysis 4. Budget & Metrics development 5. Technology identification 6. Advanced project selection/Incremental analysis It's all common sense really. The creative thought process need plenty of opportunity to contribute. A very clear example of where it went wrong for the German Luftwaffe (see page 10) quote Following Udet's early lead,Colonel-General Hans Jeschonnek,Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff,had insisted that all future bombers must be able to dive-bomb. Jeschonnek's decision to produce only bombers that were dive bomber capable caused a more significant production problem for airplanes already in development. Half way through construction in 1939, third generation bombers (Do 217 and He 177,a four engine bomber)in the flight test stage were now being strengthened for diving attacks. It was not long before the Germans realized these planes were unsuitable for this new purpose. Engine cooling systems would burst into flames, which led to severe delays in getting the planes into action. The need to be dive bomber capable also caused the complete failure of the Me 210. In addition to dive bombing,it had to fill requirements as a heavy bomber and a fighter bomber, none of which could be accomplished satisfactorily. Not realized by the leadership in 1939,this factor became evident in 1941 and 1942 when these planes were needed to replace existing aircraft, but no one thought the war would last that long. Udet broadened his thinking in 1940 as British bombers made raids over Germany. Foreseeing the advent of American bombers,he became an advocate for more fighters. His concerns,however,fell upon deaf ears. Jeschonnek was not interested in fighters or long-range bombers.He wanted to develop a "wonder-bomber" that would be a dive bomber, night fighter,and long-range bomber "all rolled into one." This,however,became an impossible thing to do for the same reasons other aircraft had failed trying to fulfill the needs of multi roles. Even by 1943,when Udet's prediction concerning the destructiveness of British and American bombers over Germany had long since come true, Jeschonnek still had not acted to create a fighter force powerful enough to defend the skies over Germany.38 The medium bomber was still the choice among the German leadership, as will be shown later. Another production decision detrimental to the air war became apparent to the senior leadership during the Battle of Britain, where the Luftwaffe was used for the first time in a "long-range"strategic role. As stated earlier,the Luftwaffe served as a "strategic"weapon in support of the army in a Central European campaign and was equipped as such. It did not possess the required long-range,heavy four-engine bomber,nor a long-range fighter. Again, this was a conscious decision Udet had made early in the Luftwaffe's development and production cycle. He believed a bomber needed speed and evasion in order to penetrate enemy defenses,and the heavy,four engine bomber was merely a slow-moving target for the enemy. He, therefore, ordered only the medium twin-engine bomber be built. endquoteau.af.mil That's the problem with dictatorships. Nobody is allowed to think. Some bigshot "mandates" something that is thought to be a good idea -g- I think the Russians must have had several good systems because they came up with so much. Some things are just handed down on a plate though.. aeroweb.lucia.it