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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Mannie who wrote (4725)	8/18/2002 2:10:47 AM
From: stockman_scott	Respond to of 89467

<<...Isn't it great when your guests just happen to be your largest fund raisers? I love friends like that...>> Me too...=) btw, I just got back from Michigan...went to a bachelor party, did some beach walking along the coast of Lake Michigan, and went swimming (we had some awesome waves today for bodysurfing)...Hope you're enjoying the weekend...tomorrow I'm doing a sailboat race with some friends here in Chicago. regards, -Scott

To: Mannie who wrote (4725)	8/18/2002 2:31:37 AM
From: stockman_scott	Respond to of 89467

Fog of War By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN Columnist The New York Times 8/18/02 A remarkable news article from Gaza appeared in The Washington Post last week, and it deserved more attention than it got. The article reported that for the past month, the 12 main Palestinian factions had been holding secret talks to determine the "ground rules for their uprising against Israel, trying to agree on such fundamental issues as why they are fighting, what they need to end the conflict and whether suicide bombings are a legitimate weapon." Let me repeat that in case you missed it: two years into the Palestinian uprising, Palestinian factions were meeting to determine why they are fighting and whether their means are legitimate. I can't say I'm surprised. From the moment this uprising began, I, and others, argued that it was a reckless, pointless, foolish adventure. Why? Because at the time the Palestinians had before them on the table, from the U.S. and Israel, a credible diplomatic alternative to war — a peace offer that would have satisfied the vast majority of their aspirations for statehood. From the moment this intifada got rolling, Palestinians have never been able to explain why they were adopting armed struggle, killing Israeli civilians with suicide bombs and exposing their own people and institutions to utter devastation — when they had a credible opening diplomatic offer to end the occupation. Oh, yes, Palestinian spokesmen, and their chorus in the Western diplomatic corps and media, would tell you things like this: The U.S. offer wasn't for 96 percent of the West Bank, it was for only 90 percent (not true), or the U.S. and Israeli proposals did not offer the Palestinians a contiguous state in the West Bank, but just a collection of "Bantustans" (not true). But even if the opening U.S. and Israeli offers were as insufficient as the Palestinians claim, they never justified this ruinous war. A Palestinian peace overture to improve those offers would have gotten them so much more and spared them so much pain. But the Arab and European "friends" of the Palestinians, instead of confronting them on this issue, became their apologists and enablers, telling us why the Palestinians' "desperation" had led them to suicide bombing. It was their enabling that helped produce this situation where the Palestinians, two years into a disastrous war, are meeting to decide what it is about. And where was Yasir Arafat's leadership? Resting as usual on his motto: "It doesn't matter where my people want to go, even if it's into a ditch. All that matters is that I get to drive." But there is a message in this bottle for America, too. It's the first rule of warfare: never launch a war that you can't explain to your people and the world on a bumper sticker. If it requires an explanation from a Middle East expert on CNN, you're on the wrong track. The Palestinians could never explain why they were killing Jews to end an occupation that the U.S. and Israel were offering to end through diplomacy. There is only one bumper-sticker phrase that can explain such behavior: "Death to Israel." And if that is their real strategy, then a war to the death it will be. If it's not, then what have they been up to? Attention President Bush: What is your bumper sticker for justifying war with Iraq? I've heard a lot of different ones lately: We need to pre-emptively attack before Saddam deploys weapons of mass destruction. We need to change the Iraqi regime to give birth to democracy in Iraq and the wider Arab world. We need to eliminate Saddam because he is evil and may have been behind 9/11. We need to punish Saddam for not living up to the U.N. inspection resolutions. All of these are legitimate rationales, but each would require a different U.S. military and diplomatic strategy. If the Bush team is serious about Iraq, it needs to zero in on one clear objective, produce a tightly focused war plan around it and then sell it — with a simple bumper sticker — to America and the world. If the Bush administration's different factions — which are as divided as the Palestinians' — can't do that in advance, they shouldn't move. When you don't know where you're going, any road will get you there — just ask the Palestinians. But when you're talking about an unprovoked war to dismantle a government half a world away, any road just won't do. You need a clearly focused end, means and rationale. Because we certainly don't want to pick up a newspaper two years from now and read that there was just a heated meeting of Bush advisers about what the war in Iraq was supposed to be about. nytimes.com

To: Mannie who wrote (4725)	8/18/2002 2:59:57 AM
From: stockman_scott	Respond to of 89467

If We Must Fight . . . By Zbigniew Brzezinski Editorial The Washington Post Sunday, August 18, 2002 There is a right and a wrong way for America to wage war. Obviously, if it is attacked, America must respond with all its might. The same is true if an ally is attacked. But the issue becomes much more complex if a threat, but not an attack, is involved. America must then consider carefully the consequences of its actions, both for itself as the world's preeminent power and for the longer-term evolution of the international system as a whole. The United States may have to go to war to oust Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq because the potential nexus between conspiratorial terrorism and the weapons of mass destruction that Hussein is said to be producing cannot be blithely ignored. But war is too serious a business and too unpredictable in its dynamic consequences -- especially in a highly flammable region -- to be undertaken because of a personal peeve, demagogically articulated fears or vague factual assertions. If it is to be war, it should be conducted in a manner that legitimizes U.S. global hegemony and, at the same time, contributes to a more responsible system of international security. Accordingly, several essential steps should be followed: (1) The president himself has to make, in a speech addressed to the nation, a careful, reasoned case, without sloganeering, on the specifics of the threat. Detailed evidence needs to be presented that the threat is both grave and imminent. An explanation is also needed as to why one member of "the axis of evil" is seen as more menacing than the others. The president's case should also serve as the basis for serious and searching consultations with Congress and with key allies as well as other interested states. (2) Iraq's defiance of the international community is the central issue the world should be concerned about. Hence the focus of the U.S. concern must be on weapons of mass destruction that Iraq may be surreptitiously seeking to produce in contravention of U.N. resolutions, and not on Saddam Hussein personally. Moreover, insofar as Iraqi weapons of mass destruction are concerned, a persuasive case also needs to be made as to why, in the U.S. view, deterrence no longer suffices. The frequently cited but essentially demagogic formula that Hussein used weapons of mass destruction (specifically gas) against his own people ignores the fact that he did not use such weapons in 1991 against either U.S. troops or Israel, both of which had the capacity to retaliate and thus to deter. (3) The United States should itself take the lead in formulating detailed plans for a genuinely intrusive and comprehensive inspection regime, one that would define the rules of the game for Iraq's compliance with the will of the international community. America's European allies would find it difficult not to go along with that approach, while Iraq's recalcitrance -- either by an outright refusal or by subsequent efforts to sabotage the inspection process -- would then provide a highly legitimate casus belli for military action. (4) As the United States positions itself for war, it must become more active in pacifying the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by pressuring both sides. The current standoff between Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat has undone much of the progress achieved after Oslo by both Yitzhak Rabin and Arafat, while inflicting massive suffering on the Israeli and Palestinian people. In the absence of any serious effort by the Bush administration to push the Israelis and Palestinians toward peace, there is a high risk that a U.S. assault on Iraq will be perceived in the region (and probably also in Europe) as part of an American-Israeli effort to impose a new order on the Middle East without regard for either Iraqi or Palestinian civilian casualties. (5) The United States should soon begin discussions with its allies as well as other concerned powers, including its Arab friends, regarding possible postwar arrangements for Iraq, including a prolonged collective security presence and plans for international financing of the social rehabilitation of the country. Doing so would also reinforce the credibility of the U.S. determination to use force in the event that a nonviolent resolution of the issue proves to be impossible. It follows from the above that there is also a wrong way for America to initiate a war. That can be stated very briefly: (1) The initiation of a war should not be decided in camera by the president alone with just a few of his own appointees, without regard for either American or global public opinion. (2) Public support should not be generated by fear-mongering or demagogy, with some of it encouraged by parties with a strategic interest in fostering American-Arab hostility. Particularly disturbing in that regard has been the news report that some members of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board have been pushing, in addition to war with Iraq, a confrontation in U.S.-Saudi Arabian relations. (3) War should not start with a bolt from the blue but be the consequence of demonstrated Iraqi unwillingness to accept international rules. A sudden launching of war could prompt many in the world to justify any subsequent Iraqi retaliation against America or Israel, even with a weapon of mass destruction, while setting a dangerous example for the world of an essentially Darwinian international system characterized by sudden, preemptive attacks. War should be waged with meticulous attention paid to minimizing civilian casualties, especially given the widespread view abroad that U.S.-sponsored sanctions have already badly and unfairly hurt the Iraqi population. Ultimately what is at stake is something far greater than Iraq: It is the character of the international system and the role in it of what is, by far, the most powerful state. Neither the White House nor the American people should ignore the fact that America's enemies will, whatever happens, do everything possible to present the United States as a global gangster. Yet without a respected and legitimate law-enforcer, global security could be in serious jeopardy. America must thus walk a fine line in determining when, in what circumstances and how it acts as such in initiating the use of force. _________________________________________________ The writer was national security adviser to President Carter. © 2002 The Washington Post Company