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Non-Tech : The Enron Scandal - Unmoderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: stockman_scott who wrote (2474)8/23/2002 10:00:26 AM
From: Glenn Petersen  Respond to of 3602
 
Complaint says Fastow, Kopper worked closely to defraud Enron

Ex-CFO took finance manager under his wing

By Kathryn Kranhold And Alexei Barrionuevo
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

msnbc.com

Aug. 23 — When Michael Kopper negotiated last year to get bought out of Chewco, an Enron Corp.-related partnership, he demanded an additional $2.6 million to cover taxes on the $10 million payment he would receive from Enron. Jordan Mintz, an Enron lawyer, refused to sign off on the tax payment, telling Mr. Kopper it wasn’t part of the deal.

MR. KOPPER, a top Enron finance manager, was undeterred. He turned to his boss, then Chief Financial Officer Andrew Fastow, to lean on Mr. Mintz. But when Mr. Mintz refused to budge, Mr. Fastow told him he had spoken with Enron Chief Executive Jeffrey Skilling and that he had approved the tax payment, according to an interview with Mr. Mintz conducted last fall by special investigators hired by Enron’s board.

It was the type of scenario that played out over and over again during Enron’s salad days. Mr. Fastow and Mr. Kopper routinely used each other to persuade co-workers to craft deals to their liking. This week, it also became evident that the close working relationship between Mr. Kopper and Mr. Fastow helped to fuel the alleged fraud at Enron that ultimately triggered the collapse of the once-powerful energy-trading firm.

According to a criminal complaint filed against Mr. Kopper in a Houston federal court, Messrs. Kopper and Fastow worked hand in hand to siphon money from Enron into partnerships they controlled. Mr. Kopper told a federal judge Wednesday he “passed some of the proceeds [from Chewco] on to the Enron CFO and his family” while keeping $3 million for himself.

Mr. Kopper, who pleaded guilty to money laundering and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, admitted he and Mr. Fastow had used several Enron-related partnerships, not just Chewco, to disguise the company’s financial problems and make millions for themselves and unnamed others. Lawyers for Mr. Kopper and Mr. Fastow declined to comment on their relationship.

This week’s criminal complaint alleges Messrs. Kopper and Mr. Fastow hatched their scheme as early as 1997, about three years after Mr. Fastow tapped Mr. Kopper from Toronto Dominion Bank to join his corporate finance team in 1994. Shortly after recruiting him, Mr. Fastow took Mr. Kopper under his wing.

Soon, Mr. Kopper was getting plum assignments that frequently sent him to New York and London to negotiate with bankers. When he was in Houston, Mr. Kopper worked on the 25th floor but would routinely spend about two hours a day in Mr. Fastow’s office discussing matters. Mr. Kopper was viewed to have as much or more power than Enron’s treasurer.

Mr. Kopper was known as one of “Andy’s boys,” a group of exceptionally smart and skilled finance gurus willing to work long hours and “follow [Mr. Fastow] down blind paths if that what was required,” one former co-worker said.

While some were groomed in Enron’s system, Mr. Fastow preferred to hire ex-investment bankers that could “think outside the box.”

Some former co-workers also viewed Mr. Kopper as arrogant and disrespectful to executives lower on the ladder. He at times humiliated co-workers who came to meetings unprepared and tried to bluff their way through, former associates say. “Michael did not suffer fools well,” said one former co-worker.

Mr. Kopper had his critics outside Enron. John Ballentine, a former vice president at Enron who runs his own energy-consulting firm, ID3, sat on a college-recruitment committee for the University of California in Los Angeles with Mr. Kopper for two years. Mr. Ballentine says Mr. Kopper showed up late to meetings, talked over other executives, and routinely criticized any idea that wasn’t his.

“Whenever our committee met, Michael Kopper would unravel any consensus the team had built around strategies and plans for succeeding in our recruiting efforts,” Mr. Ballentine asserted.

Inside Enron, the deals Mr. Kopper worked on were highly secretive ventures known as “Andy’s projects.” People in Enron’s finance department knew better than to ask about them; they were on a need-to-know basis.

In 1997, Mr. Fastow picked Mr. Kopper to run and become the limited partner of Chewco, one of the partnerships that contributed to the company’s collapse. Chewco was set up to be a separate entity with outside investors that would conduct transactions with Enron. In this case, Enron moved $700 million in debt in energy investments off of its books.

In the end, however, it turned out there was little outside money in the partnership. Mr. Kopper raised money by getting a loan from the British bank, Barclays PLC, for two paper vehicles, Little River and Big River. He signed the two entities over to his domestic partner, William Dodson, at one point. Enron had backed the loan to Little River and Big River. During the period that Mr. Kopper ran Chewco, he received millions in fees. This week, Mr. Kopper admitted to kicking back some of those payments to Mr. Fastow.

In 1999, Mr. Kopper also began working with two new third-party partnerships, LJM Caymans and LJM2, which Mr. Fastow controlled and from which he made millions of dollars. Enron conducted numerous transactions with the two partnerships that allowed them to remove mounds of debt off of the books and inflate profits.

In 2000, Mr. Kopper also set up Southampton, a subsidiary of LJM named after the affluent neighborhood where Messrs. Fastow and Kopper owned homes. With that partnership, Mr. Kopper was able to fraudulently obtain about $4 million for himself through a transaction with Enron, and another $4.5 million for Mr. Fastow’s family foundation. Mr. Kopper contributed $25,000 to Southampton, according to court papers.

Outside the office, Mr. Kopper and Mr. Fastow rarely socialized. Mr. Fastow ran in the elite Houston circles of the rich and established and Mr. Kopper’s lifestyle didn’t fit into that picture, say former co-workers.

Mr. Kopper preferred expensive hotels, restaurants and favored Armani suits. One former co-worker says Mr. Kopper knew where all the best W Hotels were located. He often traveled for work to London where Enron rented him an apartment at one time. Often, Mr. Dodson would join him. One former co-worker says Mr. Kopper used to boast that he had dinner reservations three nights a week at Nobu, a swank sushi restaurant owned by Nobuyuki Matshuhisa, who also has spots in New York and Los Angeles.

On his trips to London and Europe, Mr. Kopper was known to be a big shopper at Prada. Since Enron’s collapse and federal prosecutors started investigating, one of the jokes circulating at Enron was whether Mr. Kopper had checked out whether Prada made prison uniforms.

Copyright © 2002 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
All Rights Reserved.



To: stockman_scott who wrote (2474)8/23/2002 1:59:29 PM
From: The Duke of URL©  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 3602
 
It wasn't the Airplane, it was love that killed King Kong:

Martha's mess hits Silicon Valley
Venture capitalist accused of dumping shares in Stewart's company

Carol Emert, Chronicle Staff Writer Friday, August 23, 2002

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



The long arm of the Martha Stewart scandal spread to Silicon Valley this week as shareholders sued venture capitalist John Doerr, who until recently served on the board of Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia.

The suit alleges that Doerr, Stewart and other company insiders dumped 5.3 million Omnimedia shares worth $79 million based on private information about the scandal brewing over Stewart's sales of ImClone System shares.

Doerr, a general partner at Menlo Park's Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers and arguably the country's best-known venture capitalist, sold his firm's 2 million shares for $29 million in March and resigned from the board, according to the suit filed Wednesday in U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New York.

Stewart's sale of ImClone stock became public in June.

Doerr achieved a national profile in 1996 when, ironically, he successfully led the charge against California Proposition 211, which would have given shareholders more power to wage class-action lawsuits.


The answer is Campaign finance reform, and to allow the personal suits that were outlawed by the politicians who gave us mandatory arbitration.

Not all this side show.



To: stockman_scott who wrote (2474)8/24/2002 3:32:55 PM
From: Glenn Petersen  Respond to of 3602
 
Will Pitt Pick an Accounting Watchdog Who Can Bite?

SEPTEMBER 2, 2002

WASHINGTON OUTLOOK

businessweek.com:/print/premium/content/02_35/c3797061.htm?mainwindow

The accounting profession and its Republican allies stood by helplessly in July as a wave of reform swept the Sarbanes-Oxley Act through Congress. But in Washington, yesterday's defeat is just a prelude to tomorrow's battle. Capitol Hill's real response to Enron (ENRNQ ), WorldCom (WCOEQ ), and other corporate accounting scandals may well be decided in the fight now shaping up over who will chair the new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).

In one corner is the reform coalition that pushed the sweeping bill drafted by Senate Banking Committee Chairman Paul S. Sarbanes (D-Md.) to victory over industry and White House opposition. They're pressing the Securities & Exchange Commission, which will appoint the new board, to select an activist head who will be a scourge of wayward auditors. Their top pick: former Fed Chairman Paul A. Volcker.

Fighting back are the Final Four accounting firms and some reform skeptics. Their early favorite is Donald J. Kirk, a former member of the Public Oversight Board (POB), the group previously charged with reviewing auditors' quality controls. Kirk also appears to have an edge with some SEC officials. Chief Accountant Robert K. Herdman has repeatedly mentioned Kirk as a potential chairman, according to several people who have talked to Herdman. However, Herdman says he's not backing anyone yet.

The choice to head the new PCAOB--dubbed "Peek-a-Boo" by Washington wags--will be a key political test for SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt. He found himself sidelined, with his own accounting reforms dismissed as too weak, after the WorldCom bankruptcy gave Dems the momentum to push through corporate reform. Now Pitt can't afford to ignore Capitol Hill as he puts together a slate for the oversight board. Says a top SEC official: "There's an immense premium on making a unanimous choice [for the PCAOB]."

Pitt has only until Oct. 28 to recruit five board members--two of whom must be CPAs. It's still uncertain where the PCAOB will be headquartered or what the jobs will pay (most likely $535,000 for chairman and $435,000 for members).

If Sarbanes' backers can recruit Volcker, the job is likely to be his. Volcker became a reform hero for attempting to overhaul Arthur Andersen, and his stature would lend the PCAOB instant clout. Some wonder, though, whether Volcker, at age 74, wants the job of starting a new $50 million agency from scratch. Volcker did not return calls. If he bows out, the reform coalition might rally behind former POB chairman Charles A. Bowsher. But Bowsher led the POB's mass resignation in protest of Pitt's early plans for accounting reform--and Pitt has not forgiven him.

The pro-Sarbanes coalition opposes Kirk, a former Price Waterhouse partner who also chaired the Financial Accounting Standards Board. They maintain that he went too easy on accounting firms during his POB tenure. Kirk dismisses that charge. But even if Herdman is high on Kirk, another SEC official says Kirk is not Pitt's choice.

That leaves the SEC searching for a consensus candidate. Possibilities include Mary L. Schapiro, head of regulation at the National Association of Securities Dealers, former Fed Vice-Chairman Manuel H. Johnson, and John H. Biggs, retiring chairman of giant pension fund TIAA-CREF.

Whomever he picks, Pitt must touch all the political bases this time. "This is the first critical signal of how seriously the SEC takes this new law," says a Sarbanes aide. If Pitt doesn't please Capitol Hill, Dems could make him go bye-bye over the Peek-a-Boo.

By Mike McNamee



To: stockman_scott who wrote (2474)8/26/2002 3:24:37 PM
From: Glenn Petersen  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 3602
 
Scott, a local POS ahead of his time:

Farley forking over part of debt to Fruit
Deal ends fight over $65-mil. loan

Ahead of his time: The dispute over William Farley's company-backed loan predated current controversies over loans to top corporate executives.


August 26, 2002
By Alby Gallun

chicagobusiness.com

A three-year battle between Fruit of the Loom Inc. and William Farley over a $65-million company-backed loan to the former CEO has ended with Mr. Farley agreeing to repay part of what he owes.

Amid investor outrage over similar — and now illegal — loans to top executives at companies like Tyco International Ltd., Mr. Farley has agreed to pay the trust that is liquidating Fruit's assets $10 million in cash and a $2-million promissory note, according to a settlement recently approved by a bankruptcy judge. He'll also turn over the cash value of a life insurance policy, some artwork and other assets of undetermined value.


The underwear maker, formerly based in Chicago, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on Dec. 29, 1999, about four months after parting ways with Mr. Farley, the flashy dealmaker and onetime presidential aspirant who led a leveraged buyout of Fruit in 1985. The two parties have been battling in court over the loan — made earlier in 1999 — and other matters ever since.

$30 million in charges

Under the settlement, Mr. Farley is likely to repay much less than the $57.1 million in outstanding principal on the loan, which was backed by Fruit's promise to repay the money if Mr. Farley defaulted, which he did. A person involved in the negotiations estimates the agreement is worth roughly $20 million.

Yet it's not entirely clear how much the deal shortchanges Fruit and Bank of America Corp. and Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., which provided the loan. That's because the liquidating trust is still selling off assets to raise money for creditors, and the banks have other, much larger claims arising from direct loans to Fruit.

Fruit, anticipating the potential liability, took $30 million in charges in the third and fourth quarters of 1999 to account for the bad loan. The company had paid $10 million in interest on the loan through the end of February, a Securities and Exchange Commission filing shows.

Mr. Farley's dispute with Fruit prefigured controversies now raging over company loans to Adelphia Communications Corp.'s Rigas family, Tyco CEO Dennis Koslowski and WorldCom Inc. CEO Bernard Ebbers.

"Obviously, he's a piker compared to Dennis Koslowski, but back in his day, Farley was one of the original pigs at the trough," says Patrick McGurn, vice-president of Institutional Shareholder Services, a Maryland-based corporate governance consulting firm.

Mr. Farley and his attorney declined to comment on the settlement. Charlotte, N.C.-based Bank of America and New York-based Credit Suisse First Boston also declined to comment.

During his tenure at Fruit, Mr. Farley, a former Lehman Bros. investment banker, was often criticized for his high pay, his hand-picked board and some $103 million in company-backed loans, including the disputed one for $65 million.

Still, some observers say he would have faced even harsher treatment today, with the stock market in the dumps and livid investors calling for the heads of CEOs at companies where there is the slightest hint of impropriety.

With Fruit's guarantee, the banks agreed to lend Mr. Farley $65 million in March 1999. Part of the money went to refinance two earlier Fruit-backed loans worth $38 million, and part went to cover Mr. Farley's personal expenses and investments.

When Mr. Farley defaulted, Fruit was on the hook for the loan. The company started paying interest to the banks in early 2000, soon after filing for Chapter 11 protection in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Wilmington, Del. In addition to the principal amount of the loan, Mr. Farley also owed Fruit about $3 million in fees for the guarantee as of this past February, according to the company's most recent annual report.

Since the Chapter 11 filing, the apparel company, which now operates out of Bowling Green, Ky., has been negotiating with creditors and selling off assets, a process that included the April sale of Fruit's core apparel business for $835 million to Warren Buffett's Omaha, Neb.-based Berkshire Hathaway Inc.

The court fight between Fruit and its former CEO has been one of the bigger sideshows in the bankruptcy case, with Mr. Farley claiming at one point that the company owed him more than $100 million in severance and pension benefits. As part of the settlement, Mr. Farley agreed to drop all claims against Fruit.

Early in the case, Judge Peter Walsh approved Fruit's decision to reject Mr. Farley's employment agreement, nullifying a $27.4-million severance package.

A risky — now illegal — practice

Aiming to persuade Judge Walsh to approve the settlement with Mr. Farley , Fruit's attorneys argued in a motion that continued litigation would be "protracted, expensive and uncertain." In addition, Mr. Farley "has demonstrated that his ability to satisfy any judgment obtained against him is limited," the filing said. Fruit's lawyers didn't return several phone calls.

Fruit's dispute with Mr. Farley demonstrates why company loans or company-backed loans to executives are a bad idea, says Charles Elson, director of the Center for Corporate Governance at the University of Delaware.

"One of the downsides of loaning to executives is the executive not being able to pay you back," he says.

Now illegal under the corporate and accounting fraud bill that President George W. Bush signed into law last month, such loans had become commonplace by the late 1990s. And it wasn't uncommon for companies to forgive the loans.

But Fruit's bankruptcy filing deprived Mr. Farley of that option, says Mr. McGurn.

"As long as he had that chummy arrangement going with the board, the chances are (the loan) would have been forgiven," he says. "But the rules change as soon as you go into bankruptcy."

©2002 by Crain Communications Inc.