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Strategies & Market Trends : World Outlook -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Les H who wrote (927)	8/28/2002 5:25:05 PM
From: Les H	Respond to of 49987

Deterring Saddam Dr. Michael Donovan, Research Analyst, mdonovan@cdi.org cdi.org There is much evidence to suggest that Saddam Hussein can be deterred. The twin threats of American retaliation and the Israeli nuclear arsenal were apparently sufficient to deter Saddam from using chemical or biological weapons against coalition forces or Israeli cities during the first Gulf conflict. He backed down in the face of U.S. military pressure in 1994 when he again seemed prepared to threaten Kuwait. These are the actions of a rational actor -- one who undertakes a cost-benefit analysis, weighs the risks, and acts according to the values he associates with them. Saddam is rational, but he is also willing to absorb inordinate casualties, economic losses, and international hostility in pursuit of his goals. He is also reckless, possessed of a crude world-view, and an unsophisticated decision maker. It is widely believed that Saddam places little value on the advice of others and is surrounded by sycophantic counselors that tell him what they believe he wishes to hear. Most importantly, Saddam is fundamentally at odds with the status quo in the Middle East and is governed by revisionist goals that encourage risk-taking. As a consequence, the list of Saddam’s miscalculations and strategic blunders is both extensive and profound. Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the subsequent decision to fight for Kuwait in 1991, the alleged plot to assassinate former president George Bush while visiting Kuwait in 1993, the move to again threaten Kuwait in 1994, and the obstruction of weapons inspectors all attest to a personality that is acceptant of risk and not easily deterred indefinitely. The problem of deterrence is compounded greatly by the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iraq. Concerns that Iraq might provide such a weapon to a terrorist group have been needlessly exaggerated, but they cannot be dismissed entirely. More worrisome are the scenarios Saddam might envision if he believes he has achieved a balance of terror with the United States. Even without a nuclear capability, Saddam believed he could annex Kuwait with impunity in 1990. Had he possessed such a weapon at the time, the process of evicting Iraqi troops would have been far more complicated and dangerous. Given Saddam’s track record of miscalculation, both regarding the intentions of his adversaries and capabilities of his own forces, there are few reasons to expect caution once he is emboldened by the possession of a nuclear weapon. In the final analysis, an approach to Saddam’s Iraq based on a strategy of deterrence is fraught with risks. Few of the factors that made for a stable deterrence relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union are present in the case of Iraq. Saddam always retreated from the brink when he believed his personal survival or that of his regime was at risk. But the absence of a formal communication link between Saddam and his adversaries, different value systems upon which decisions are based, a weak sense of nationhood, and an inclination towards escalatory rhetoric all magnify the risks of a strategy based on deterrence. The value Saddam attaches to weapons of mass destruction makes it unlikely that the Iraqi leader will forgo their development of his own volition. Saddam has constantly sought these weapons in order to underwrite his claim for leadership of the Arab world, as a challenge to the Israeli nuclear monopoly in the region, as a hedge against his regional rivals, and to support his own revisionist aspirations. He almost certainly sees the continuation of his regime as inherently tied to the possession of such weapons. Unless a solution can be found that includes either reliably and permanently disarming Iraq or overthrowing the regime altogether, he may be proven right.