Should we get Errol Flynn to play Bin Ladin? Bernard Lewis says he is the "Robin Hood" of the Arab world.
KNOW THY ENEMY Deconstructing Osama Bin Laden is still popular in the Arab world. Why?
BY BERNARD LEWIS Friday, August 23, 2002 12:01 a.m.
For most Westerners, Osama bin Laden presents an ogreish figure, equally indifferent to the suffering and death of his enemies, of his devotees, and of uninvolved bystanders. Some recent accounts have also suggested unpleasant personal traits--an arrogant and domineering personality, an inability to work with others. Yet he remains an enormously popular figure not only with the extremists and radicals who form his main support group, but in much wider circles in the Muslim and more particularly in the Arab world.
In a sense, the reason for his appeal is self-evident--that he responds, with words and with actions, to the seething resentment that has been growing for many years in the Muslim world, and offers some hope of vengeance and even of ultimate triumph. But others in the not-too-distant past have appealed to similar sentiments, and offered similar inducements, without evoking similar support. Something else is involved, which marks him off from earlier exponents of pan-Arab, pan-Islamic, and other revolutionary movements against Western domination.
The first and most obvious reason for his popularity is his eloquence, a skill much admired and appreciated in the Arab world since ancient times. Many tales are told of the great orators of the past. But in the modern Arab world there is little sign of eloquence, and indeed little need for it, since most rulers rely on repression rather than persuasion to secure the obedience of their subjects. Bin Laden is not a ruler, and therefore not tainted with tyranny and corruption. Most of the rulers are guilty of both, and not one of them has dared to submit either his accession to power or his retention of power to a genuinely free vote of his people.
Rule is personal; it is obtained and maintained by force; it is usually for life, and increasingly, it is hereditary even in states that call themselves republics. Older dynasties, especially those with claims to descent from the Prophet, like the Hashemites of Jordan and the ruling dynasty of Morocco, enjoy some legitimacy and can afford some relaxation. This is not enjoyed by more recent dynasties, still less by hereditary revolutionary presidents.
None of these has any need for persuasion and therefore for oratory, and some indeed have shown a quite remarkable lack of skill in handling the beautiful and supple Arabic language. At one time, during the political conflict between Egypt and Israel, the Arabic experts employed by Israeli radio made a point of recording some of President Nasser's speeches and then playing them back to the Egyptian public with a commentary drawing attention to his grammatical errors and stylistic infelicities. Thereafter, his speeches were marked by punctilious grammatical accuracy more than by eloquence. In his use of language, bin Laden brings a return to traditional virtues. Modern devices, notably satellite television, can bring his eloquence all over the Arab world.
Even more striking is the contrast demonstrated in his personal life, between himself and the present-day rulers of most of the Arab lands. The usual pattern--more so in republics than in monarchies--is rags to riches, a process by which people of humble, usually impoverished, origin contrive, through the exercise of military and hence of political power, to attain often great wealth, which they pass on to their children and extend to their kinsfolk. Osama bin Laden presents the inspiring spectacle of one who, by his own free choice, has forsaken a life of riches and comfort for one of hardship and danger.
But why would Arab governments, themselves threatened by his appeal to their subjects, show him such a remarkable degree of tolerance? Here there is a more practical consideration, involving rulers rather than subjects, and inducing them, at the very least, to take a more lenient line towards bin Laden and towards propaganda in his favor. More often than not, they confront a situation in which they have to choose between offending bin Laden and offending the U.S. In such a dilemma, the choice is not difficult.
If they offend Osama, the consequences can be very dire indeed. If they offend the U.S., they will suffer no penalties and may even--if the right people in Washington have their way--receive some reward. It therefore makes obvious good sense to do nothing against bin Laden, and even to pay him some hush money, a practice widely followed in some of the wealthier Arab countries.
All these helped to burnish his image as a latter-day Islamic Robin Hood, defending the poor and the downtrodden against a distant tyrant and his nearby henchmen. In the Middle East as in Europe, there is a strong tradition of bandit heroes, challenging authority and eluding capture. The tradition is indeed longer and stronger than in Europe, since it has continued from the Middle Ages into modern times.
The role of the Middle Eastern Robin Hood, unlike his Western prototype, is not to rob the rich and give to the poor, though some such expectation may lurk in the background; it is rather to defy the strong and to protect--and ultimately avenge--the weak. For Osama bin Laden and his merry men, the Sheriff of Nottingham is their local potentate, whichever that may be. The ultimate enemy, King John, lives far away, as he has always done--in Constantinople and Vienna, London and Paris, and now in Washington and New York.
This vision, comforting though it may be to those who hold it, is flawed at both ends. King John was not a democrat, and Robin Hood was not a terrorist. We live in a different world, and at a different level of reality. Those who cherish such delusions will sooner or later suffer a painful but salutary awakening. Mr. Lewis, professor emeritus of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton, is the author, most recently, of "What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response" (OUP, 2002). opinionjournal.com |