It's true enough that "Democracy in Iraq" isn't the main goal of the neocons, just their favored handwaving line for what happens afterwards. But it's not like it's a particularly rarely used line.
Amusingly, I checked back on some articles on the famous Murawied/Perle briefing on the "Saudi next" line. There was this viewer mail at the end that was, er, somewhat less diplomatic than I normally am, regardless of alleged "sneering".
The best initial comment about the Laurent Murewiec's power-point presentation on Saudi Arabia is that it is poorly done. I evaluate undergraduate presentations all the time, and as I was reading Murewiec's outline, I was thinking, "My God, this is a bad piece of work." What a loose jumble of lazy stereotypes! Didn't this guy do any research? But then, I've seen Richard Perle on tv and I know that he is a really smart guy. So why is a smart guy like Richard Perle promoting a guy like Laurent Murewiac who embodies the ultimate trifecta of incompetence. He's lazy, stupid, and wacko. My little theory on this is that part of what characterizes the Bush administration is "macho stupidity"—smart guys like Perle, Cheney, and Bush who show themselves and the world that they're real men by pursuing dumb and self-defeating ideas. One way to interpret the upcoming invasion of Iraq is as an exercise in "macho stupidity." In their heart of hearts, the Bush people know that invading Iraq will be a big distraction from the real terrorists. They know there will be unforeseen and unforeseeable consequences to occupying Iraq, and they know that the rest of the world will disagree. In other words, people like Cheney and Perle know that invading Iraq is stupid, but they feel driven to prove their manhood by pursuing stupid, simple-minded strategies and damn the consequences. The main problem that the Bush administration has for nuance is that they think that real men are John-Wayne simple and that nuance is for non-heterosexuals. slate.msn.com
Ahem. More diplomatically, from an article you linked a while back, which allegedly "makes the neocon case":
Hope Is Not A Plan
Another terrible thing critics worry about is that attacking Saddam might rattle Arab populations in nearby countries, to the point where regimes in Egypt, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia could fall. The hawks insist that any instability will be fleeting and easily weathered, and that a demonstration of American resolve will firm up wobbly allies. Again, we are in best-case-scenario land here. Press the point further, and the hawks do a clever bit of intellectual jujitsu, insisting that it would be a good thing if the repressive governments of Egypt or Saudi Arabia fell. "Mubarak is no great shakes," says Perle of the Egyptian president. "Surely we can do better than Mubarak." I put the same question to Perle's colleague from the Reagan administration and fellow hawk, Ken Adelman. Did he think wobbly or upended regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia were worth the price of removing Saddam? "All the better if you ask me."
These neoconservatives are not just being glib. They see toppling Saddam as the first domino to fall, with other corrupt Middle Eastern regimes following--just as the fall of the Berlin Wall was followed by the collapse of communism.
Here, as in so many other cases, the hawks have an amazing vision, but a deeply flawed grasp of how to act operationally and in the moment. It may not be in our long-term interests to ally ourselves with corrupt authoritarian governments in the Arab world. But it's quite possible that these governments, which are at least nominal allies of the U.S., will be replaced by corrupt authoritarian regimes that hate us. Moreover, the U.S. military understandably does not want Saudi Arabia disintegrating at its rear while it's in the midst of an operation in Iraq.
What the national security establishment does want is for the other Middle East regimes to be brought in as part of the anti-Saddam alliance. The hawks scorn such coalition building as a brake on our ability to act with moral clarity and decision. We're right and we don't need anyone else's permission, is the underlying mindset. But combining an intense diplomatic effort with military action is not about getting other countries' permission. It's about covering your flanks. One of the reasons American force worked in Kosovo in 1999 is that the U.S. had Slobodan Milosevic cornered not only militarily but diplomatically. He had no one to turn to, to play off against us. Given the state of opinion in the Arab world today, we probably cannot expect open support from the Saudis or the Egyptians or other frontline Arab states. But we do need an understanding with them because we cannot afford to see Crown Prince Abdullah materialize in Baghdad with a "peace plan" just as we are readying our assault.
The same goes for the State Department's efforts to get weapons inspectors back into Iraq. The hawks tend to view weapons inspections as a contemptible joke, a half-measure that will bog us down with kibitzing at the U.N. and rob us of our justification for invasion. Properly done, however, inspections are not a way to avoid war but to build the ground work for it. Before a single soldier hits the ground in Iraq, the U.S. should demand a virtually air-tight inspection regime--not the half-measures the U.N. is currently negotiating with Saddam. Our European allies would oppose this strenuously, as will Russia and China. But it is well worth drawing them into that conversation, because the force and logic of our argument is quite strong. Once the concept of inspections is granted, the need to make them effective is difficult to refute. If Saddam were to accept a truly robust inspections regime--one which would allow the inspectors to roam the country more or less at will--we will have achieved our aim of neutralizing the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. But, of course, when he doesn't agree--and he won't--then we will have forced our allies to confront the reality of Iraqi intransigence head-on. Some may still oppose our imminent military action. But others might join us, and that will make us stronger.
Taking our time, deploying large numbers of troops and weaponry, working the diplomatic channels, defusing possible sources of opposition from European states and the Arab world, all will help accomplish another aim. It will telegraph our seriousness, and by so doing increase the chance that domestic forces will overthrow (or at least weaken) Saddam before our soldiers even have to begin an attack.
It's difficult to imagine that the establishment and national security bureaucracies would have brought us to our current and correct focus on Iraq. But it's even more clear that the hawks' record of breezy planning, reckless prediction, and indifferent fidelity to the truth makes them unfit to be the ones in control of how the job gets done. The hawks have a vision. But as the folks in uniform are so fond of saying, "Hope is not a plan." Getting rid of Saddam really is necessary. But it has to be done right. So, Mr. President, when the time comes for you to make a decision about Iraq, talk with Paul Wolfowitz and let him tell you what the goal should be. Escort him to the door and lock it behind you. Then sit down for a serious talk with Colin Powell. washingtonmonthly.com |
