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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: SirRealist who wrote (41814)9/3/2002 7:49:48 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
WHERE'S OSAMA?

By Ted Rall
Op/Ed
Tue Sep 3, 7:02 PM ET

story.news.yahoo.com

Bush's Strategy of Distraction



NEW YORK--Bush's "war on terrorism" (one uses quotes for things which exist in name only) has already manifested most of the characteristics of the dystopian society described in George Orwell's "1984." Like Big Brother, Bush is an unelected figurehead for a secretive clan of wealthy hypocrites who live above the law. Like Orwell's fictional Oceania, the United States is engaged in a perpetual war in which victory isn't expected within our lifetime. Oceania bombs its own people, using the fear of faux terrorism to maintain control over the population. The United States trains and finances radical Islamist terrorists who predictably turn against Americans, then uses the specter of terrorism to justify everything from fast-track signing authority on free trade (opposition to NAFTA and the WTO, Bush's U.S. Trade Representative argues, is "an attack on freedom") to tax cuts for the Administration's wealthy chums to smearing Tom Daschle as a communist terrorist enemy-of-the-state.

Bush's Operation TIPS ("Terrorism Information and Prevention System") asks mail deliverers, meter readers, truckers (!) and other citizens to spy on their neighbors and customers (or, in FEMA jargon, "to report suspicious, publicly observable activity that could be related to terrorism"). Thanks to your federal government, 128 channels may not be the only electronic marvel your cable guy is installing in your home. And what could be more characteristic of Stalinist totalitarianism than "disappearing" hundreds of detainees into a covert prison system--no lawyer, no trial, no charges--never to be seen again?

In "1984" the ubiquitous Emmanuel Goldstein is the nation's bête noire, blamed by the government for everything that goes wrong. He leads the resistance; he's the author of a detailed historical treatise. Every afternoon the citizens of Oceania gather for a "two-minute hate," a cathartic scream-in during which Goldstein's smug face is flashed on screens, inspiring the delirious contempt of frenzied crowds.

Goldstein, however, does not exist. Nor does the resistance. The Party invented him to distract the citizenry from the real evildoers--themselves. And because Goldstein isn't real, Goldstein is immortal. The distraction, like the "war," is eternal.

George Orwell had Goldstein. George Bush has bin Laden.

Osama was blamed for everything that went wrong for the U.S. during the `90s. Whenever something blew up, whether it was American embassies in East Africa or the U.S.S. Cole or even the federal building in Oklahoma City, American officials trotted out bin Laden's name before the body count had even begun. So it was hardly a surprise when, on September 17 Resident Bush barked that bin Laden was "wanted dead or alive" for the 9-11 strikes, though in fact his role was probably limited to funding the 19 Egyptian jihadis who planned and carried them out.

Capturing bin Laden was Bush's top priority, or so he said time after time; the bombing campaign against the Taliban was marketed to the American people as a war against a regime that was "harboring" a wanted criminal. But after driving the Taliban out of Kabul, according to a senior U.S. military officer serving in Afghanistan ( news - web sites), "mission creep" began--U.S. forces lost focus. American intelligence sided with some warlords while trying to assassinate others. They became entangled in local politics. They shuttled Afghan officials between Central Asian capitals to cut oil and gas pipeline deals favorable to the U.S.

The elusive Osama became a low priority. The Defense Department story is that back in December and January they had America's Most Wanted cornered in the Tora Bora mountains on Afghanistan's eastern border with Pakistan--they know he was up there because they heard him on walkie-talkies--and they bombed his hideout so mercilessly that he must have been killed. But they couldn't be sure either way, because Afghan soldiers of the Northern Alliance and Eastern Shuria were the first to comb the hills. As documented in my book To Afghanistan and Back, 95 percent of those troops were Talibs on September 10; they were far more likely to offer bin Laden a ride home than to shoot or arrest him.

Some experts doubt that the U.S. was ever serious about capturing Osama. If he went on trial for 9-11, after all, his testimony about his years with the CIA ( news - web sites) could prove devastatingly embarrassing. This explains, they say, why Bush refused Taliban offers to turn over bin Laden, why Donald Rumsfeld bombed rather than invaded by ground, why Colin Powell ( news - web sites) never asked Pakistan to seal the border, why General Tommy Franks relied on unreliable local troops. And the Tora Bora escape tale doesn't jibe with Afghan topography or local eyewitnesses, who say that Osama left for Pakistani Kashmir ( news - web sites)--a far more typical exit for fleeing Afghans than the tribal areas of the Northwest Frontier Province--days after 9-11.

The Bush Administration denies such cynical motives for their actions, claiming stupidity rather than duplicity. Support for the inept-not-liars theory came with a February Hellfire missile attack launched by a drone plane in eastern Afghanistan. The airstrike targeted a group of men, one of whom looked to the drone's operator like the 6'5", white-tail-turbaned bin Laden. Three desperately poor scrap metal scavengers were blown to bits, but hey--one of them was fairly tall.

Like the Party in Oceania--sometimes at war with Eurasia, other times with Eastasia, the enemy always having been the same--the Bushies' line on Osama has alternated between vague, cunning and menacing. "I suspect we will [find bin laden and other Al Qaeda leaders]," Rumsfeld said in March. "I think we have a good crack at it. I suspect we'll get all or most [of them]." In April, he backtracked: "He's alive or dead. He's in Afghanistan or somewhere else." By June, Time magazine was reporting, "White House aides say bin Laden's name rarely comes up in meetings."

Public support for living the rest of their days fighting Bush's war had begun to wane over the summer. What was missing from the cocktail of propaganda?

Just in time for the build-up for the inevitable orgy of patriotic sentimentality to commemorate 9-11-02, Osama bin Goldstein has been brought back from the maybe-presumed-dead. On August 28, The New York Times quoted military sources as saying that the Evil One "is probably still alive and moving between mountain hideouts somewhere on a 250-mile stretch of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan." The on-again-off-again hunt for Osama is on again, according to General Franks: "What I will say is that we have not seen convincing proof that bin Laden [is] dead. I actually don't know whether he's alive or dead."

"Where's Osama?" has become America's favorite parlor game. My theory is that he is no longer with us; it's not like the sad-eyed egoist to skip his regular appearances on Al Jazeera TV. My friends think he's laying low in Kashmir or Yemen. We discuss this topic frequently. Wondering about Osama is a lot more fun than whining about the fact that the economy sucks, that everyone we know is getting laid off, that we're losing our civil rights, that we'll be paying off those $300 tax cuts for the rest of our lives. The search for bin Laden keeps us distracted, and that's just the way our leaders like it.

Bush may have read just one book, but it turned out to be the right one.
_____________________________________________

Ted Rall is an award-winning social commentary and political cartoonist and columnist for Universal Press Syndicate, Time Magazine and Fortune Magazine, as well as a freelance graphic illustrator.

(Ted Rall's new book, a graphic travelogue about his recent coverage of the Afghan war titled "To Afghanistan and Back," is now in its second edition. Ordering and review-copy information are available at nbmpub.com.)



To: SirRealist who wrote (41814)9/3/2002 7:54:28 PM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
The first cold warrior
Matthew Fontaine

During the early 20th century, Imperial Russia did little to capture the attention of the United States. In 1913, Woodrow Wilson began his presidency dedicated to domestic issues. The newly empowered Wilsonians simply did not give the creaky Russian autocracy much thought. Wilson, a former governor and president of Princeton, was a novice when it came to foreign affairs in general and knew very little of Romanoff Russia in particular. He could take comfort in the fact that the top American experts were not much better.
Most, if not all, policy advisers and diplomats were themselves ignorant of the impending Russian revolution that would change geopolitics forever. The learning curve would prove crucial and remains controversial to this day. Nevertheless, the remarkable thing, according to Donald E. Davis and Eugene P. Trani, authors of "The First Cold War: The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson in U.S.-Soviet Relations," is that by 1920 the Wilson administration cobbled together a Russia policy that would be influential for decades.
Wilson believed in doing less rather than more when it came to Russia. He opposed the interventionists and instead sought a quarantine approach that closely resembled the containment theory of the 1950s. As his Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby explained in 1920, the United States had "no confidence, trust or respect; hence no recognition" of the new Soviet state.
Critics of the Wilson administration believe that the United States was indecisive and ineffective when it came to dealing with the Bolshevik government. Mr. Davis and Mr. Trani, utilizing at least 100 American and Russian archives, are able to paint a fuller picture. Their account of the formation of the first American policy regarding the Bolsheviks is extremely well-researched. The backbone of the book relies on the numerous exchanges between the various international officials who took great interest in the happenings in Russia.
The reader may grow weary of these cables, ones often written in diplomatic shorthand. Nevertheless the authors convert somewhat dry material into a strong, scholarly work.
While in many ways this book is sympathetic toward Wilson's Russian legacy, a great deal of bungling in Washington and the American Embassy in Petrograd cannot be denied. Nearly always, American diplomats found themselves reacting to events rather than anticipating them. Russia was virtually an unknown beast when the Wilsonians took power. Of all the colleges and universities in the United States, Harvard was the sole institution to offer Russian language classes. The Wilson administration would have to act on instinct rather than knowledge when events in Russia became critical. The result, for better or worse, formed the basis of American Cold War policy after World War II.
The United States' entry into the World War I in 1917 suddenly made its ally Russia very important. The fall of the Romanoff regime came as a shock to the ill-prepared Americans. Wilson quickly recognized the liberal-leaning provisional government, but it, too, fell. The United States and its allies were furious that the Bolshevik government that took control in November 1917 would not continue the war against the Germans. They had lost their Eastern Front and the war would be considerably lengthened. The popular wisdom was that the Bolsheviks, like their predecessors, would quickly crumble. To Wilson's disappointment, this did not occur.
Many believe the Wilsonians squandered opportunities to expunge the Bolsheviks before they became entrenched. However, as Mr. Davis and Mr. Trani persuasively point out, Wilson created a cautious policy of quarantine that remained popular in American diplomatic circles for the rest of the century. This was accomplished by managing to overcome the pitfalls of a mediocre corps of American diplomats in Russia and President Wilson's frail health caused by several severe strokes. The duplicity of the Bolsheviks, the unpredictability of various anti-Lenin opposition groups and the constant French and British demands for American intervention in Russia did nothing to simplify the situation either.
However, it is clear that "Wilson's . . . appreciation of Russia matured in the Cauldron of World War I." The United States could no longer afford to be ignorant of Russia. By the end of his administration, the sick Woodrow Wilson was not unenlightened in terms of foreign affairs and had the distinction of being the first cold warrior.

Matthew Fontaine was an editorial intern on the book pages this summer. He has now resumed his studies at Valparaiso University.
washingtontimes.com



To: SirRealist who wrote (41814)9/3/2002 8:02:28 PM
From: JohnM  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Another nice bit of history, Kevin. Where in the world do you get this stuff? Is this an avocation or a vocation?