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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: H James Morris who wrote (5714)9/4/2002 5:48:30 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
Venture firms have too much capital

Dearth of new deals leaves glut of cash on the sidelines

By John W. Schoen
MSNBC

Aug. 4 — With the stock market reeling and the late-90s tech bubble still unwinding, this is not a great time to be launching a technology start-up. Deal making is so slow, in fact, that venture capital firms are giving money back to investors — uninvested.

msnbc.com



To: H James Morris who wrote (5714)9/4/2002 6:10:36 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
Greenspan shouldn't try to pop bubbles

By Jay Hancock
Columnist
The Baltimore Sun
published Sep 4, 2002


THE LAWS governing Alan Greenspan and the Federal Reserve say nothing about pricking stock-market bubbles.

The 1978 Humphrey-Hawkins Act orders the Fed "to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates," not to crack down on the party when the Nasdaq reaches 5,000.

But that's not the excuse Greenspan is using.

In an extraordinary speech last week, he defended the Fed against critics who say the central bank should have tightened the money supply more than it did to keep the stock market from soaring in the late 1990s. By more or less freezing while money poured into dubious technology stocks, these critics charge, Greenspan helped generate the bubble and the post-pop doldrums.

In response, perhaps Greenspan should have stayed silent.

Or perhaps he should have replied: "It's not my job to chaperon loony investors. It's a free country, and if adults with financial resources choose to buy Ariba at $160 a share, that's their business. I'll worry about maintaining the value of the dollar. You decide what to do with it."

But he did neither of those things.

Instead, he defended the Fed's inaction by saying that there was no way of telling at the time that a bubble was forming and that, even if there had been, the Fed might have been powerless to prevent it without wreaking substantial damage.

"As events evolved, we recognized that, despite our suspicions, it was very difficult to definitively identify a bubble until after the fact - that is, when its bursting confirmed its existence," Greenspan said Friday at a monetary conference in Jackson Hole, Wyo.

"Moreover, it was far from obvious that bubbles, even if identified early, could be pre-empted short of the central bank inducing a substantial contraction in economic activity, the very outcome we would be seeking to avoid."

In other words, Greenspan seemed to suggest, if the Fed could have seen the bubble coming and deflated it without plunging the country into recession, it would have unsheathed the needle and poked away.

Human motives are always difficult to plumb, doubly so when it comes to deeds of omission. So the Fed failed to attack the bubble. It's history. Does it matter what its stated reasons were?

I think so. Greenspan has expanded the Fed's influence well beyond what the law strictly provides for. More than his predecessors did, he has routinely weighed in publicly and twisted arms privately on tax cuts, budget bills and other matters that the founders assigned to Congress and the executive branch, not the unelected central bank boss.

His speech in Wyoming came off as another presumptuous indicator of the Fed's ambitions. We didn't pop the bubble, he seemed to say, but only because we hadn't learned how. Just give us time.

Indeed, the Fed seems to be working on the problem.

"The endeavors of policy-makers to stabilize our economies require a functioning model of the way our economies work," Greenspan said at the end of his speech. "Increasingly, it appears that this model needs to embody movements in equity premiums and the development of bubbles if it is to explain history."

The unspoken but logical conclusion: Once the econometric models can explain and predict bubbles, "policy-makers" will be able to do something about them.

Yes, you could argue that breaking bubbles is part of the Fed's official job of promoting stable prices and full employment over the long term. But you could make the same case about industrial policy, trade laws and other matters that are none of the Fed's business.

Bubbles are a side-effect of Fed policy, not a statutory focus. By addressing the bubble question without explicitly acknowledging that bubbles do not fall into the Fed's portfolio, Greenspan encourages his successors to do something unwise - such as seeking, finding and busting bubbles that might or might not exist.

He has been a terrific Fed chairman, but he has been lucky to preside when inflation would have been tame and economies ebullient no matter what, so he might overestimate a good central banker's ability to fine tune.

Stick to fighting unemployment and inflation, Mr. Greenspan, and don't even speculate about a more grandiose role. Remember that the Fed, too, is a government agency. Your job is to provide a cushion for the markets, not a ceiling.

Copyright © 2002, The Baltimore Sun

sunspot.net



To: H James Morris who wrote (5714)9/5/2002 6:34:26 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
Beware the Hedgehogs

By WILLIAM SAFIRE
Columnist
The New York Times
September 5, 2002

WASHINGTON — In the course of writing a Nixon speech imposing wage and price controls (I was only playing the piano downstairs, officer), I zapped "speculators" who were roiling the global gold and currency markets.

Arthur Burns reminded me that it was Bernard Baruch who startled Congressional investigators in 1917 by asserting coolly, "I am a speculator." Arbitrageurs, speculators and short-sellers, Baruch and later Burns explained, all help spread risk and make markets more liquid. That was then; now it's gotten out of hand. The hidden hands of speculators, profiting from bad-news rumormongering, good-news insidership and no-news accounting, made markets unsafe for ordinary investors.

Prosecutors hungry for publicity are subjecting billionaire suspects to "perp walks" in handcuffs before cameras. But few of the supposed watchdogs and gatekeepers deal with the market's structural weaknesses that go beyond ethical blindness and outright fraud.

One cause of the unusual, unstable jerking around of the stock markets - with dizzying swings of 4 percent in a day - is the kudzu-like growth of hedge funds, which have quintupled in the past decade.

These are not your usual mutual funds. Because these agglomerations of capital are set up by wealthy and supposedly sophisticated investors, the government leaves them largely unregulated, and the funds' managers can keep their investments secret. Because many of those managers take not just a fee but 20 percent of any profits from the funds' investments, their incentive is to borrow heavily from a friendly bank or broker and roll the dice.

So what, you say - let the richies take their chances. But such leveraged risk-taking, now on a huge scale, adds to the volatility of all markets. Also, some managers who have hedged their investment bets - by selling short in expectation of a decline in a stock - have an incentive to spread rumors of bad news, just as buyers have an incentive to tout stocks with rosy predictions.

Hedge funds are deliberately opaque. This concealment of investments protects them from competing funds, claim the 20-percenters. However, their secrecy masks an operation that the public would benefit from opening to the light of day.

Stealthily, the S.E.C. in June began an investigation into this $300 billion world. Two months ago the commission sent demands for information to registered investment advisers about hedge-fund activity. More recently, unregistered advisers who are more active hedgehogs were sent similar letters from the S.E.C.'s Division of Investment Management.

Though its acronym is DIM, the division's brighter staff members are at first looking into fraud in hedge-fund operations. These investment vehicles have long been unmonitored solely because they are supposed to be limited to institutions, university endowments, net-worthies and other high rollers. Later, as the investigation with its subpoena power moves into the audit stage, DIM's questioning is expected to broaden: What kind of new investors are being lured into hedge funds?

Many of these funds have done less badly than stock indexes in the recent past's sinking market, and some shrewd managers earn the high percentage of profit they take down. (Such feigning of fairness is known in my dodge as the "to be sure" sentence; it is followed by a "but.")

But one of those reputable managers tells me that in recent years his industry has attracted sharpies and crapshooters eager to get in on a deal that enables them to profit handsomely on no personal investment - while other investors take the high risk.

Many hedgehogs will tell you that market volatility is caused less by their leveraged machinations than by the growth of program trading. They say the computer is the culprit, regularly forming what used to be illegal "bear pools" to drive down stock prices. I don't buy that.

Hedge funds, with their bank-backed leverage multiplied by investment in derivatives, ought to be required to disclose their operations, same as mutual funds. "Protect the rich" is not much of a bumper sticker, but what the risk-prone hedgehogs do has a nervous-making effect on the rest of the market. In economics as in politics, secrecy generates suspicion. Disclosure, especially in detail, begets the bored yawn of confidence. We can use a little more of that trust this year.

nytimes.com