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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: elpolvo who wrote (5966)	9/9/2002 7:07:45 PM
From: abuelita	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 89467

i just don't know what to say.

To: elpolvo who wrote (5966)	9/10/2002 5:08:34 AM
From: stockman_scott	Respond to of 89467

In Defense of Deterrence Editorial / Op-Ed The New York Times September 10, 2002 The suddenness and ferocity of last September's terror attacks tore the United States free from the foreign-policy moorings that had served the nation well for more than five decades, including the central notion that American military power could by its very existence restrain the aggressive impulses of the nation's enemies. In its place, the Bush administration has substituted a more belligerent first-strike strategy that envisions Washington's attacking potential foes before they hit us. That may be appropriate in dealing with terror groups, but on the eve of the anniversary of Sept. 11 there is still an important place in American policy for the doctrine of deterrence. Deterrence is diplomatic parlance for a brutally simple idea: that an attack on the United States or one of its close allies will lead to a devastating military retaliation against the country responsible. It emerged as the centerpiece of American foreign policy in the early years of the cold war. Some of the debates that preceded its adoption sound strikingly similar to arguments being made today. During the Truman administration, some strategists suggested attacking the Soviet Union while it was still militarily weak to prevent the rise of a nuclear-armed Communist superpower. Wiser heads prevailed, and for the next 40 years America's reliance on a strategy of deterrence preserved an uneasy but durable peace. One advantage of deterrence is that it induces responsible behavior by enemies as a matter of their own self-interest. Even dictators tend to put certain basic interests above all else — pre-eminently their survival in power, with their national territories and a functioning economy intact. Aggression becomes unattractive if the price is devastation at home and possible removal from power. By contrast, the threat that America will strike first may give foes an incentive to use their military forces, including unconventional weapons, before they lose them. The logic of deterrence transcends any particular era or enemy. It has worked, for example, to restrain further North Korean aggression since the Korean War. A decade ago, a clear message of deterrence delivered by the first Bush administration persuaded Saddam Hussein not to use his chemical and biological weapons against America or Israel during the Persian Gulf war. In the wake of Sept. 11, President George W. Bush has made a convincing case that international terrorist organizations, which have no permanent home territory and little to lose, cannot reliably be checked by the threat of retaliation and must be stopped before they strike. Whether Saddam Hussein falls into that category is a question that the country will be debating in the days ahead. But by and large, we believe that deterrence can still be a powerful force in managing many of the threats the United States faces. Protecting America's security requires weighing all available policy options and choosing the wisest. Deterrence, the least risky and most time-tested tool in America's national security arsenal, should not be hastily discarded. nytimes.com