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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: JohnM who wrote (42978)	9/10/2002 5:07:07 AM
From: stockman_scott	Respond to of 281500

In Defense of Deterrence Editorial / Op-Ed The New York Times September 10, 2002 The suddenness and ferocity of last September's terror attacks tore the United States free from the foreign-policy moorings that had served the nation well for more than five decades, including the central notion that American military power could by its very existence restrain the aggressive impulses of the nation's enemies. In its place, the Bush administration has substituted a more belligerent first-strike strategy that envisions Washington's attacking potential foes before they hit us. That may be appropriate in dealing with terror groups, but on the eve of the anniversary of Sept. 11 there is still an important place in American policy for the doctrine of deterrence. Deterrence is diplomatic parlance for a brutally simple idea: that an attack on the United States or one of its close allies will lead to a devastating military retaliation against the country responsible. It emerged as the centerpiece of American foreign policy in the early years of the cold war. Some of the debates that preceded its adoption sound strikingly similar to arguments being made today. During the Truman administration, some strategists suggested attacking the Soviet Union while it was still militarily weak to prevent the rise of a nuclear-armed Communist superpower. Wiser heads prevailed, and for the next 40 years America's reliance on a strategy of deterrence preserved an uneasy but durable peace. One advantage of deterrence is that it induces responsible behavior by enemies as a matter of their own self-interest. Even dictators tend to put certain basic interests above all else — pre-eminently their survival in power, with their national territories and a functioning economy intact. Aggression becomes unattractive if the price is devastation at home and possible removal from power. By contrast, the threat that America will strike first may give foes an incentive to use their military forces, including unconventional weapons, before they lose them. The logic of deterrence transcends any particular era or enemy. It has worked, for example, to restrain further North Korean aggression since the Korean War. A decade ago, a clear message of deterrence delivered by the first Bush administration persuaded Saddam Hussein not to use his chemical and biological weapons against America or Israel during the Persian Gulf war. In the wake of Sept. 11, President George W. Bush has made a convincing case that international terrorist organizations, which have no permanent home territory and little to lose, cannot reliably be checked by the threat of retaliation and must be stopped before they strike. Whether Saddam Hussein falls into that category is a question that the country will be debating in the days ahead. But by and large, we believe that deterrence can still be a powerful force in managing many of the threats the United States faces. Protecting America's security requires weighing all available policy options and choosing the wisest. Deterrence, the least risky and most time-tested tool in America's national security arsenal, should not be hastily discarded. nytimes.com

To: JohnM who wrote (42978)	9/10/2002 6:18:32 AM
From: stockman_scott	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

War should be considered, but only if all other remedies fail [IMO, this is a must read...Kerry seems to make too much sense and there's a part of me that hopes he becomes our next President] ----------------------------------------- War should be considered, but only if all other remedies fail By JOHN F. KERRY U.S. SENATOR Editorial Tuesday, September 10, 2002 WASHINGTON -- It may well be that the United States will go to war with Iraq. But if so, it should be because we have to -- not because we want to. For the American people to accept the legitimacy of this conflict and give their consent to it, the Bush administration must first present detailed evidence of the threat of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and then prove that all other avenues of protecting our nation's security interests have been exhausted. Exhaustion of remedies is critical to winning the consent of a civilized people in the decision to go to war. And consent, as we have learned before, is essential to carrying out the mission. President Bush's overdue statement last week that he would consult Congress is a beginning, but the administration's strategy remains adrift. Regime change in Iraq is a worthy goal. But regime change by itself is not a justification for going to war. Absent a Qaida connection, overthrowing Saddam Hussein -- the ultimate weapons-inspection enforcement mechanism -- should be the last step, not the first. Those who think that the inspection process is merely a waste of time should be reminded that legitimacy in the conduct of war, among our people and our allies, is not a waste, but an essential foundation of success. If we are to put American lives at risk in a foreign war, Bush must be able to say to this nation that we had no choice, that this was the only way we could eliminate a threat we could not afford to tolerate. In the end there may be no choice, but so far, rather than making the case for the legitimacy of an Iraq war, the administration has complicated its own case and compromised America's credibility by casting about in an unfocused, overly public internal debate in the search for a rationale for war. By beginning its public discourse with talk of invasion and regime change, the administration has diminished its most legitimate justification of war -- that in the post-Sept. 11 world, the unrestrained threat of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam is unacceptable and that his refusal to allow in inspectors is in blatant violation of the 1991 U.N. cease-fire agreement that left him in power. The administration's hasty war talk makes it much more difficult to manage our relations with other Arab governments, let alone the Arab street. It has made it possible for other Arab regimes to shift their focus to the implications of war for themselves rather than keep the focus where it belongs -- on the danger posed by Saddam and his deadly arsenal. Indeed, the administration seems to have elevated Saddam in the eyes of his neighbors to a level he would never have achieved on his own. There is, of course, no question about our capacity to win militarily, and perhaps to win easily. There is also no question that Saddam continues to pursue weapons of mass destruction, and his success can threaten both our interests in the region and our security at home. But knowing ahead of time that our military intervention will remove him from power, and that we will then inherit all or much of the burden for building a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, is all the more reason to insist on a process that invites support from the region and from our allies for that far tougher mission of ensuring a future democratic government after the war. The question is not whether we should care if Saddam remains openly scornful of international standards of behavior that he agreed to live up to. The question is how we secure our rights with respect to that agreement and the legitimacy it establishes for the actions we may have to take. We are at a strange moment in history when an American administration has to be persuaded of the virtue of utilizing the procedures of international law and community -- institutions American presidents from across the ideological spectrum have insisted on as essential to global security. For the sake of our country, the legitimacy of our cause and our ultimate success in Iraq, the administration must seek advice and approval from Congress, laying out the evidence and making the case. Then, in concert with our allies, it must seek full enforcement of the existing cease-fire agreement from the U.N. Security Council. We should at the same time offer a clear ultimatum to Iraq before the world: Accept rigorous inspections without negotiation or compromise. Some in the administration actually seem to fear that such an ultimatum might frighten Saddam into cooperating. If Saddam is unwilling to bend to the international community's already existing order, then he will have invited enforcement, even if that enforcement is mostly at the hands of the United States, a right we retain even if the Security Council fails to act. But until we have properly laid the groundwork and proved to our fellow citizens and our allies that we really have no other choice, we are not yet at the moment of unilateral decision-making in going to war against Iraq. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- John F. Kerry, a Democrat, represents Massachusetts. Copyright 2002 The New York Times. seattlepi.nwsource.com