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To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (6012)9/10/2002 3:07:44 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
Impaired Intelligence

by David Corn
COMMENT
The Nation
September 23, 2002
thenation.com

In July the Washington Post, under the headline "Panel Finds No 'Smoking Gun' in Probe of 9/11 Intelligence Failures," reported that the House and Senate intelligence committees jointly investigating the September 11 attack had "uncovered no single piece of information that, if properly analyzed, could have prevented the disaster, according to members of the panel." With an implied that's-that, the committees then went on to examine broader matters concerning systemic weaknesses within the intelligence agencies. That was good news for the cloak-and-dagger set and the Clinton and Bush administrations. Systemic problems tend to be treated as no one's fault. The committees were signaling that there would be no accountability for mistakes made by the spies before September 11.

In the past year, numerous media accounts have revealed screw-ups, miscalculations and oversights. The FBI didn't pursue leads on potential terrorists enrolled at US aviation schools. The CIA had learned that a suspected terrorist--who would end up on the flight that hit the Pentagon--was in the United States after attending an Al Qaeda summit, and it failed to notify the FBI. The CIA didn't act on intelligence going back to the mid-1990s suggesting that Al Qaeda was interested in a 9/11-type attack. Time magazine noted recently that George W. Bush's national security team did not respond quickly to a proposal to "roll back" Al Qaeda.

Hints were ignored and the intelligence system failed, an indication that reform is vital. To reform effectively, it is necessary to zero in on specific mistakes as well as big-picture flaws. Yet the committees--distracted by personnel disputes and a leak investigation--have not indicated that this sort of comprehensive probe is under way (the Senate Judiciary Committee did examine the FBI's handling of its botched investigation into Zacarias Moussaoui, an alleged 9/11 conspirator, and identified numerous incidents of ineptitude).

While the meandering September 11 inquiry is far from done, in recent months both committees released little-noticed reports (accompanying the intelligence budget they approved) showing that the systemic stuff is pretty awful. The Senate committee observed, "it is very difficult to determine how much money the Intelligence Community has budgeted for counterterrorism, counternarcotics and counterproliferation." It complained that the CIA, the National Security Agency and other intelligence bureaucracies are not "able to produce auditable financial statements"; that thousands of intelligence slots in the military go unfilled each year, including scores of analysis openings at the US Central Command, which is responsible for the fight against Al Qaeda; that the intelligence agencies' terrorist databases are a mess; that FBI training for counterterrorism agents is inadequate. The committee also groused that the "community" has repeatedly ignored Congressional requests for information.

The House intelligence committee offered a grimmer assessment. It maintained that extra funding is being put "into an organizational framework that gives little indication of being prepared to produce intelligence capabilities that can address the national security demands of the future." The committee noted that "significant gaps in the Community's analytical capabilities are widening, and present opportunity for further surprise in national security areas." It implored Bush to act on the findings of a commission led by Brent Scowcroft, Bush Senior's National Security Adviser, which last year recommended placing the Pentagon's three largest intelligence-collection agencies, including the NSA, under control of the director of central intelligence. With that plea the committee was urging the reversal of a decades-long trend in which military imperatives--rather than political, economic or diplomatic concerns--drive the collection and analysis of intelligence. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, though, has thwarted such a shift.

And a House intelligence subcommittee put out a brief September 11 report in July that cited fundamental flaws within the intelligence bureaucracy. "CIA's problems," it said, "require more than just expressed commitment from senior CIA managers...the subcommittee will be looking for deeds rather than words." Did that mean that the subcommittee, ten months after September 11, was still not persuaded that the CIA was acting vigorously to correct the institutional defects that led to the surprise of that day?

Those reports, produced by committees traditionally cozy with the "community," hardly inspire confidence in the spies. They could cause one to wonder whether the committees are throwing money (the several billion dollars added post-9/11 to the classified $30 billion-plus intelligence budget) at a wasteful and disorganized bureaucracy. And the problems are probably worse than described. For years, the intelligence community has been plagued with fragmentation and insufficient coordination and dominated by military concerns as the bureaucratic rigor mortis that inhibits unorthodox thinking (as in how to better understand the world, rather than how to be like Bond) has deepened. Mel Goodman, a senior CIA analyst for twenty-four years, maintains that the "analytical culture" at the CIA has "collapsed" over time, leaving the agency without the ability to conduct effective long-term research and analysis. And Gregory Treverton, a senior analyst at the RAND Corporation and former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council, notes that within the CIA "an emphasis to be fast and quick drives out the ability to think longer and harder" about subjects not in the day's headlines. He sensibly favors transforming the analytical side of the CIA into a much more open shop that publicly interacts with think tanks, academics and nongovernmental organizations. "We need to put together unconventional sets of people to get a deeper understanding, one with a more historical foundation," Treverton says. "But how that gets done is the question."

Indeed. How do you get any bureaucracy--particularly a clandestine one--to behave creatively and responsibly? Inertia and infighting have often derailed well-intentioned intelligence reform (see Rumsfeld). Whatever its chances, fundamental reform--including demilitarizing intelligence, reshaping the bureaucracy and transforming internal values--is unlikely in the absence of a thorough, as-public-as-possible investigation into the errors of September 11, large and small.

Taking on the intelligence community (and forcing a transformation) appears to be too much for the committees, which have been slow to hold public hearings. They have politely issued complaints, but they mostly have eschewed fingerpointing for handwringing. In a slap at the committees in July, the House approved legislation to establish an independent commission to examine September 11 intelligence issues. In the Senate, Joe Lieberman and John McCain have been pushing an independent review that would also dissect transportation security and diplomatic and military matters. The less than impressive performance of the intelligence committees "has made people in both houses look at the independent commission bill again," says one Democratic Congressional aide. The Administration opposes such a panel.

In February CIA chief George Tenet testified that the agency had done no wrong regarding 9/11, and that the attack was not due to a "failure of attention, and discipline, and focus, and consistent effort." The committees ought to question his grip on reality. Yet they don't seem eager to disprove Tenet or to probe or challenge the covert bureaucracy. They show no signs of exploring all the intelligence and policy errors related to September 11. And so, they are unlikely to fix them.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (6012)9/10/2002 3:22:31 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
By Attacking Iraq, the US Will Invite a New Wave of Terrorist Attacks

Drain the Swamp and There Will be No More Mosquitoes
By Noam Chomsky
The Guardian
September 9. 2002

September 11 shocked many Americans into an awareness that they had better pay much closer attention to what the US government does in the world and how it is perceived. Many issues have been opened for discussion that were not on the agenda before. That's all to the good.

It is also the merest sanity, if we hope to reduce the likelihood of future atrocities. It may be comforting to pretend that our enemies "hate our freedoms," as President Bush stated, but it is hardly wise to ignore the real world, which conveys different lessons.

The president is not the first to ask: "Why do they hate us?" In a staff discussion 44 years ago, President Eisenhower described "the campaign of hatred against us [in the Arab world], not by the governments but by the people". His National Security Council outlined the basic reasons: the US supports corrupt and oppressive governments and is "opposing political or economic progress" because of its interest in controlling the oil resources of the region.

Post-September 11 surveys in the Arab world reveal that the same reasons hold today, compounded with resentment over specific policies. Strikingly, that is even true of privileged, western-oriented sectors in the region.

To cite just one recent example: in the August 1 issue of Far Eastern Economic Review, the internationally recognised regional specialist Ahmed Rashid writes that in Pakistan "there is growing anger that US support is allowing [Musharraf's] military regime to delay the promise of democracy".

Today we do ourselves few favours by choosing to believe that "they hate us" and "hate our freedoms". On the contrary, these are attitudes of people who like Americans and admire much about the US, including its freedoms. What they hate is official policies that deny them the freedoms to which they too aspire.

For such reasons, the post-September 11 rantings of Osama bin Laden - for example, about US support for corrupt and brutal regimes, or about the US "invasion" of Saudi Arabia - have a certain resonance, even among those who despise and fear him. From resentment, anger and frustration, terrorist bands hope to draw support and recruits.

We should also be aware that much of the world regards Washington as a terrorist regime. In recent years, the US has taken or backed actions in Colombia, Nicaragua, Panama, Sudan and Turkey, to name a few, that meet official US definitions of "terrorism" - that is, when Americans apply the term to enemies.

In the most sober establishment journal, Foreign Affairs, Samuel Huntington wrote in 1999: "While the US regularly denounces various countries as 'rogue states,' in the eyes of many countries it is becoming the rogue superpower ... the single greatest external threat to their societies."

Such perceptions are not changed by the fact that, on September 11, for the first time, a western country was subjected on home soil to a horrendous terrorist attack of a kind all too familiar to victims of western power. The attack goes far beyond what's sometimes called the "retail terror" of the IRA, FLN or Red Brigades.

The September 11 terrorism elicited harsh condemnation throughout the world and an outpouring of sympathy for the innocent victims. But with qualifications.

An international Gallup poll in late September found little support for "a military attack" by the US in Afghanistan. In Latin America, the region with the most experience of US intervention, support ranged from 2% in Mexico to 16% in Panama.

The current "campaign of hatred" in the Arab world is, of course, also fuelled by US policies toward Israel-Palestine and Iraq. The US has provided the crucial support for Israel's harsh military occupation, now in its 35th year.

One way for the US to lessen Israeli-Palestinian tensions would be to stop refusing to join the long-standing international consensus that calls for recognition of the right of all states in the region to live in peace and security, including a Palestinian state in the currently occupied territories (perhaps with minor and mutual border adjustments).

In Iraq, a decade of harsh sanctions under US pressure has strengthened Saddam Hussein while leading to the death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis - perhaps more people "than have been slain by all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history", military analysts John and Karl Mueller wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1999.

Washington's present justifications to attack Iraq have far less credibility than when President Bush Sr was welcoming Saddam as an ally and a trading partner after he had committed his worst brutalities - as in Halabja, where Iraq attacked Kurds with poison gas in 1988. At the time, the murderer Saddam was more dangerous than he is today.

As for a US attack against Iraq, no one, including Donald Rumsfeld, can realistically guess the possible costs and consequences. Radical Islamist extremists surely hope that an attack on Iraq will kill many people and destroy much of the country, providing recruits for terrorist actions.

They presumably also welcome the "Bush doctrine" that proclaims the right of attack against potential threats, which are virtually limitless. The president has announced: "There's no telling how many wars it will take to secure freedom in the homeland." That's true.

Threats are everywhere, even at home. The prescription for endless war poses a far greater danger to Americans than perceived enemies do, for reasons the terrorist organisations understand very well.

Twenty years ago, the former head of Israeli military intelligence, Yehoshaphat Harkabi, also a leading Arabist, made a point that still holds true. "To offer an honourable solution to the Palestinians respecting their right to self-determination: that is the solution of the problem of terrorism," he said. "When the swamp disappears, there will be no more mosquitoes."

At the time, Israel enjoyed the virtual immunity from retaliation within the occupied territories that lasted until very recently. But Harkabi's warning was apt, and the lesson applies more generally.

Well before September 11 it was understood that with modern technology, the rich and powerful will lose their near monopoly of the means of violence and can expect to suffer atrocities on home soil.

If we insist on creating more swamps, there will be more mosquitoes, with awesome capacity for destruction.

If we devote our resources to draining the swamps, addressing the roots of the "campaigns of hatred", we can not only reduce the threats we face but also live up to ideals that we profess and that are not beyond reach if we choose to take them seriously.

truthout.org



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (6012)9/10/2002 3:58:58 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 89467
 
There's Safety in Numbers: Tips for Managing the Coming Crash

By Thom Calandra
CBS.MarketWatch.com
Thursday, September 5, 2002

In the coming bad months and years, a period that will annihilate nearly all paper assets and shrink the oceans of debt and credit sloshing around the world, investors and workers will be asking what they can do to sidestep a meltdown of their personal portfolios.

"It a question everyone should be asking themselves right now, and it's not too late," Elliott Wave International forecaster Robert R. Prechter Jr. told me Thursday. "What's going to happen when the stock market finally bottoms? You'll be able to go in there and buy stocks that used to trade at $85 a share for maybe half a dollar or a quarter of a dollar."

The coming meltdown, in the eyes of Prechter and others alarmed by the global credit expansion of the 20th century, will include homes, bank deposits, insurance policies, even paychecks. Here are some starter-tips, gleaned from many fine sources, including the Weiss Safe Money Report, Prechter's new book, "Conquer the Crash," and "Crisis Investing" author Doug Casey's International Speculator.

Do investigate the integrity of all money markets, bank deposits and other cash instruments at your disposal. Not all money market accounts or funds are created equal. Those that are based on risky short-term paper, from corporations or even government agencies, probably won't allow you peace of mind in the event of a fiscal meltdown. Several sources, including the Weiss Safe Money Report, Bankrate.com and Grant's Interest Rate Observer, examine safety and liquidity issues surrounding commercial banks and the fund companies that manage money markets.

Do investigate cash equivalents that exist outside of your home country, in the event of political risk. Switzerland's bank reserves, unlike those in the United States, are backed by a 25 percent savings rate that is required of citizens by law.

Do sell all stocks that are losing you money. Do sell all stocks that are making you money.

Don't consider buying any stocks, or bonds, or anything considered a paper asset, unless you are prepared to take a 25 percent loss. Or unless you are prepared to hold for 15 years or longer (just ask the folks who still own Ford Motor.

Don't be lulled into a sense of false security by the interim rallies staged by Wall Street. The rallies are perfectly normal in that they allow sellers to exit with just a bit more cash than they had a month ago, but not nearly enough to make up for losses in this, a third consecutive year of falling equities.

Do buy gold and silver -- coins, bars and even some bullion proxies, such as Central Fund of Canada, if personal storage of the metal is a challenge. If currencies self-destruct from the drag of decades of credit issuance by national and corporate treasuries, bullion almost certainly will become a commodity with monetary status.

Do eliminate as much debt as you can -- credit cards, automobile loans, margin interest, mortgages, second mortgages. The credit overhang in the United States, more than $30 trillion owed by U.S. companies, individuals and the government, is three times gross domestic product, the highest ever. Besides saving you or your home from personal bankruptcy, default or repossession, your elimination of debt will be a service to this country's economy.

Keep your day job, sell the gas-guzzling SUV and if you really see the red writing on the wall, start short-selling some of the major equity indexes, especially the price-weighted Dow Jones Industrial Average's exchange-traded Diamond Trust and its major components, like high-priced 3M.

"Why should you be taking a risk with your college money, your retirement money and all the money you worked so hard to save?" Prechter says in the CBS MarketWatch interview. "First thing is, you need to get out of those very risky areas. The stock market is the No. 1 (risk) in a deflationary environment. No. 2 is the real estate market. And the third one is in bonds that have been issued by risky enterprises."

truthout.org