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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: maceng2 who wrote (43643)9/12/2002 10:19:38 PM
From: maceng2  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Shevardnadze to raise issue of Russian peacekeepers' withdrawal in case of military action - speaker

(it's amazing how these boarder disputes have a fractal like character. Russia bullies Georgia who bullies Abkhazia...pb)

Interfax. Thursday, Sep. 12, 2002, 7:38 PM Moscow Time

TBILISI. Sept 12 (Interfax)- In the event that Russia launches a military operation against Georgia, including bombing that country's territory, President Eduard Shevardnadze will raise the issue of Russian peacekeepers being withdrawn from the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict area, according to Georgian parliamentary speaker Nino Burdzhanadze.
The speaker said that the president outlined this position at a National Security Council session on Thursday.
On Wednesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin strongly urged Georgia's authorities to put an end to rebel sorties into Russia and warned that otherwise, Russia will exercise the rights envisioned in a UN Charter article stipulating the right to use self defense.
Burdzhanadze said that the National Security Council decided to intensify the anti-criminal operation in the Pankisi Gorge and to finish it as soon as possible.
The speaker indicated that the National Security Council issued instructions to Foreign Minister Irakly Menagarishvili, who is currently in New York. He is due to address the UN Security Council session and provide an explanation why no progress has been achieved towards normalizing Georgia-Russia relations.
Burdzhanadze said that according to Shevardnadze, no telephone conversations took place between the Russian and U.S. presidents, and Georgia "will not fall victim to deals between these two countries."
The speaker noted that the National Security Council expressed readiness to continue contacts with Russia at all levels



To: maceng2 who wrote (43643)9/13/2002 1:00:42 AM
From: maceng2  Respond to of 281500
 
CADET PROTEST IN AZERBAIJAN INDICATIVE OF MILITARY TENSION
Fariz Ismailzade: 9/12/02

eurasianet.org

Azerbaijani military and political leaders are downplaying recent upheaval at Azerbaijan’s top military academy, saying the school is again operating on a "normal schedule." But some observers say the cadet protest is an indicator of serious unrest within the military establishment. Opposition parties are hoping to utilize the incident, along with the ongoing controversy surrounding the August constitutional referendum, to step up the pressure on President Heidar Aliyev.

Nearly 2,000 cadets at the Higher Military Academy in Baku went on strike September 3 to protest poor living conditions and abusive treatment at the hands of instructors. The protest occurred several weeks after President Aliyev personally participated in the academy’s graduation ceremony, and praised the Ministry of Defense for its training programs.

The Ekho newspaper in Baku reported September 10 that students, prior to staging their walkout, appealed to Mammad Beydullayev, deputy defense minister for personnel, who shrugged off the students’ complaints. "I wish you good luck, but you will regret it," he reportedly told cadets, who shortly thereafter staged their protest action.

The source of student discontent was the departure of Turkish military instructors several months ago, and their replacement with Azerbaijani officers, according to several published reports. Conditions under the Azerbaijani administration rapidly deteriorated, and some instructors reportedly demanded that cadets pay bribes. "When the school was under Turkish supervision, things were put in order," Ekho quoted Alakbar Mammadov, head of the Democratic Center for Citizens’ Supervision of the Armed Forces, as saying September 6.

"After the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry started to supervise the school, negative tendencies started to emerge," Mammadov continued. "They are similar to those existing in the army – corruption, bribery and embezzlement. The food was bad. There was a shortage of uniforms and no normal conditions for military training."

President Aliyev has portrayed protest as a "minor incident." Most cadets have returned to classes after receiving assurances from authorities that they would not be punished. At the same time, a government commission investigating the incident is expected to recommend the dismissal of the academy’s commandant, Tofik Gasimov, along with his deputies and several instructors.

Though the protest exposed a festering mood of discontent throughout Azerbaijan’s military establishment – all connected with lax discipline, pervasive corruption and abusive behavior by senior officers – political analysts differ on the incident’s implications.

Opposition parties and independent press were quick to describe the cadets’ action as evidence of a "conflict between NATO standards and the Soviet legacy." To a large extent, the incident shows that government efforts to reform the country’s military structure, initiated following Azerbaijan’s disastrous performance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, have failed. Despite large amounts of Turkish military assistance, Azerbaijan’s armed forces remain a long way from reaching NATO standards.

The cadet protest came on the heels of the August referendum in which voters supposedly approved constitutional changes that could potentially help Aliyev transfer power to his son, Ilham. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archive]. The United States and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have criticized the referendum, citing "widespread irregularities," including ballot-box stuffing. Some local observers say that opposition leaders are intent on linking the cadet protest to the referendum rigging in an attempt to convince international opinion that Aliyev’s continued leadership could lead to turmoil in oil-and-gas rich Azerbaijan.

As for the military, some analysts say that, given current conditions, the army may be prone to future mutinies. "Azerbaijan seems to be acquiring an attribute of a "banana republic," and entering a new era in which the army can turn into an important political tool," a Turan news agency commentary said. Others contend that the military establishment remains loyal to Aliyev. Regardless of the army’s allegiance, however, morale, especially among younger officers, appears to be significantly damaged.

Observers also say the incident is unlikely to have much impact on the search for a Karabakh political settlement. Talks are currently stalemated. As a way of breaking the deadlock some Azerbaijani politicians have threatened renewed Azerbaijani armed action. [For additional information see the Eurasia Insight archives]. Few international observers have taken the threats at face value, and Armenian officials appeared unmoved by belligerent posturing. However, the cadet protest would seem to eliminate completely the possibility of Azerbaijan mounting an offensive in the near future.

Many observers now wonder whether the government will be able to address the underlying causes connected with the protest, and press ahead with effective reform. Some analysts question Aliyev’s commitment to improving the military’s capability. Since Azerbaijan gained independence in 1991, the country has experienced several uprisings, including the 1993 mutiny led by Suret Husseinov in 1993. Ongoing concerns about the military’s reliability may be a factor in the government’s reluctance to strengthen army capability.

"It is clear that order should be introduced by the president," the Turan commentary said. "As commander-in-chief, he [Aliyev] bears the main responsibility for the abnormal state of the army. But the president is demonstratively refusing to notice problems, which creates the perplexing questions: what kind of army does he need?"

Editor’s Note: Fariz Ismailzade is a free-lance writer on Caucasus geo-politics and economics based in Baku. He holds a master’s degree from Washington University in St. Louis and has previously published at Caucasus-Central Asia Analyst, East-West Institute, Institute for War and Peace Reporting and Baku Sun.



To: maceng2 who wrote (43643)9/17/2002 3:02:41 AM
From: maceng2  Respond to of 281500
 
How to Win War and Peace (Chechnya)

By Boris Kagarlitsky

themoscowtimes.com

The more helicopters go down in Chechnya, the more talk you hear about a peaceful solution to the conflict. Representatives of the Chechen opposition met with Russian officials in Liechtenstein; a second Chechen Anti-War Congress has been announced, and it appears that the Russian military won't interfere with preparations for the event even though its organizers openly state that Aslan Maskhadov is the republic's only lawful president. And public opinion polls clearly show that a majority of Russians now support an end to the war.

Achieving peace in Chechnya will not be easy, and the obstacles to peace are found on both sides. The message delivered by many Chechen Internet sites is a mirror-image of Russian nationalism. Russians are depicted as a nation of alcoholics and thugs with whom peaceful coexistence is out of the question. A dash of anti-Semitism is also thrown in -- rare common ground between the Chechens and their Russian enemies.


Now as never before, Maskhadov needs a vote of confidence from his fellow Chechens, but also from Russia. He has some very tough questions to answer. More Chechens live outside the republic today than within its borders. Even if Chechnya were to receive independence, international recognition and so on, these people would remain Russian citizens. And that means the Chechen problem would remain. Moreover, there are many Russian-speaking refugees from Chechnya -- not just Russians, but Ukrainians, Jews and Armenians. Will these people be allowed to return to Chechnya? And if so, will they enjoy equal rights and security?

A declaration of sovereignty is not the answer. Chechnya needs a comprehensive peace agreement that includes a joint policy, implemented by Moscow and Grozny, on reducing ethnic tension.

The Chechen Republic has already had independence, to all intents and purposes, on two occasions -- under President Dzhokhar Dudayev from 1991-94, and again under the Maskhadov administration in 1996-99. The Dudayev era brought little in the way of social and economic development to the region, but then again all of the former Soviet Union was in crisis during those years. The Maskhadov era was marked by rampant criminal activity, kidnapping and embezzlement of funds earmarked for the rebuilding of the region. No one can guarantee that all of this will not happen again if a new peace agreement is signed. That prospect worries many in Chechnya as well as in Russia.

All wars come to an end sooner or later. Russia's task in Chechnya is not merely to win the war, but also to win the peace. When the war is over, the time will come for practical work: rebuilding the economy and stopping the graft; bringing the refugees home and providing them with housing, jobs and a safe place to live. These issues are no less important than the republic's legal status within Russia, and if they are not addressed any status agreement will be a dead letter. What is needed is a sort of Marshall Plan for Chechnya -- a program of international investment carried out under strict public scrutiny.

This leads to the $64,000 question: How to restore the democratic process? Why did negotiations in 1996-97 fail to deliver the desired result? It was not the peace process as such that failed, but the political elite's penchant for closed-door deal-making. The Russian and Chechen people were excluded from the peace process. The upshot was that a few officials from the two sides wound up reaching an agreement not about peace, but about the Chechen incursion into Dagestan, which led Russia to launch the second war in Chechnya.

Yes, Chechnya held presidential elections that were widely considered more democratic than the Russian elections in 1996 and 2000. But this was "democracy for the rebels." It offered little to Chechens who supported Moscow. Advocates of independence claim that only a minority of Chechens are pro-Moscow and that they are totally discredited in the eyes of the Chechen people. Be that as it may, democracy guarantees the rights of minorities and the participation of a majority in the decision-making process. If Russia and Chechnya can somehow put in motion a peace process that also opens the way toward democracy, then the tragedy of the Chechen people will end in victory -- in the historical, not merely the political, sense.

It seems that Chechnya and Russia have the chance to achieve peace. But it would be a shame to work for an end to the second Chechen war only to see a third follow on its heels.

Boris Kagarlitsky is a Moscow-based sociologist.