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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Ilaine who wrote (43824)9/14/2002 12:16:24 AM
From: KLP  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Found this re Iraq, and Chemical Weapons (1998...and see what they had THEN - NOW must be really terrible, with no one to watch them.....)

Chemical Weapons Programs
From: Federation of American Scientists - Dated November 1998


fas.org

Iraq started research into the production of chemical weapons agents in the 1970s and started batch production of agents in the early 1980s. At that stage, production was heavily reliant on the import of precursor chemicals from foreign suppliers.

In 1982, early in the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqis used riot control agents to repel Iranian attacks. They progressed to the use of CW agents in mid-1983 with mustard, and in March 1984 with tabun (the first use ever of a nerve agent in war). The Iraqis continued to use chemical weapons until the end of hostilities in August 1988; in addition they introduced the nerve agents sarin and GF late in the war.

In March 1986 UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar formally accused Iraq of using chemical weapons against Iran. Citing the report of four chemical warfare experts whom the UN had sent to Iran in February and March 1986, the secretary general called on Baghdad to end its violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the use of chemical weapons. The UN report concluded that "Iraqi forces have used chemical warfare against Iranian forces"; the weapons used included both mustard gas and nerve gas. The report further stated that "the use of chemical weapons appear[ed] to be more extensive [in 1981] than in 1984." Iraq attempted to deny using chemicals, but the evidence, in the form of many badly burned casualties flown to European hospitals for treatment, was overwhelming. By July 1986 it was estimated that Iraqi chemical warfare was responsible for about 10,000 casualties.

Although the Iraqis initially used chemical weapons to prevent defeat and to reduce battlefield losses, they later integrated CW attacks into combined-armed operations designed to regain lost territory and to gain the offensive. Iraq's use of CW in the war with Iran can be divided into three distinct phases:

1983 to 1986--used in a defensive role; typically to deflect Iranian human-wave assaults. In 1984 Iraq became the first nation to use a nerve agent on the battlefield when it deployed Tabun-filled aerial bombs during the Iran-Iraq war. Some 5,500 Iranians were killed by the nerve agent between March 1984 and March 1985. Tabun kills within minutes. Some 16,000 Iranians were reported killed by the toxic blister agent mustard gas between August 1983 and February 1986.

1986 to early 1988--iraq adapts use against Iran to disrupt Iranian offensive preparations.

early 1988 to conclusion of the war-- Iraq integrated large nerve agent strikes into its overall offensive during the spring and summer of 1988 leading to the ceasefire.

Iran used chemical weapons late in the war, but never as extensively or successfully as Iraq. The success of Iraqi offensive operations in the southern sector in mid-1988 ultimately caused the Iranians to cease hostilities. The use of chemical weapons contributed to the success of these operations.

The first chemical attacks by Saddam Hussein against civilian populations included attacks launched by Iraqi aircraft against 20 small villages in 1987.

Saddam Hussein's forces reportedly killed hundreds of Iraqi Kurds with chemical agents in the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988. The poison gas attack on Halabja was the largest-scale chemical weapons (CW) attack against a civilian population in modern times. Halabja had a population of about 80,000 people who was predominantly Kurdish and had sympathised with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Troops from the Kurdish Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) entered Halabja on 15th March 1988, accompanied by Iranian revolutionary guards. The Iraqi CW attack began early in the evening of March 16th, when a group of eight aircraft began dropping chemical bombs; the chemical bombardment continued all night. The Halabja attack involved multiple chemical agents -- including mustard gas, and the nerve agents SARIN, TABUN and VX. Some sources report that cyanide was also used.

Mustard Blister Agent

In 1981, Iraq started producing the blister agent mustard (HD). Iraq's earlier declarations of 3,080 tons produced have been reduced in the 1995 disclosure to 2,850 tons. The quality of the mustard agent was good (not less than 80 per cent pure) and was such that the agent could be stored for long periods, either in bulk or in weaponized form. Even years after its production, the mustard agent analysed by the Commission was found to be in good and usable condition.

CS Tear Gas

Research into the production of CS was initiated at the Salman Pak site in the late 1970s and early 1980s for the purposes of riot control. It was conducted under the auspices of the Committee for National Security, not the Armed Forces. A few tons were produced at this site. In the early 1980s, military scale production of CS was started at the Muthanna site. The UN Special Commission has been unable to establish how much CS was produced in total. It is known that RPG-7 rocket- propelled grenades, 250- and 500-gauge bombs and 82mm and 120mm mortar shells were filled with CS, but again the quantity of munitions so filled cannot be established. Consequently, the Commission is unable to establish any kind of material balance for Iraq's CS-related activities.

Nerve Gas

Production of the nerve gases tabun (GA) and sarin (GB) started in 1984 and the method of production changed over time in order to resolve stabilization problems. Iraq's latest declarations have reduced the stated amount of tabun produced from 250 tons to 210 tons and of sarin produced from 812 tons to 790 tons.

The tabun produced was poor, being of a maximum purity of 60 per cent. As a result, the agent did not store well and could only be stored for a limited period. Furthermore, Iraq experienced problems in the production of tabun owing to salt blockages forming in pipes during synthesis. Because of these problems, Iraq refocused its nerve agent research, development and production efforts on sarin (GB/GF).

The sarin produced was also of poor quality (maximum purity of 60 per cent when solvent is taken into account) and so too could only be stored for short periods. In order to overcome this problem, Iraq resorted to a binary approach to weaponization: the precursor chemicals for sarin (DF 2/ and the alcohols cyclohexanol and isopropanol) were stored separately for mixing in the munitions immediately prior to use to produce a mixture of two G-series nerve agents, GB and GF. Given that the locally manufactured DF had a purity of more than 95 per cent and the alcohols were imported and of 100 per cent purity, this process could be expected to yield relatively pure sarin.

Over the period from June 1992 to June 1994, the Commission's Chemical Destruction Group destroyed 30 tons of tabun, 70 tons of sarin and 600 tons of mustard agent, stored in bulk and in munitions.

VX Nerve Agent

Iraq also had a research and development programme for the production of a further nerve agent, VX. According to Iraq's 1995 account, VX was the focus of its research efforts in the period after September 1987. Iraq has stated that between late 1987 and early 1988, a total of 250 tons of phosphorous pentasulphide and 200 tons of di-isopropylamine were imported, these being two key precursors required for the production of VX. For the other precursors required, Iraq claims to have used only approximately 1 ton of methyl phosphonyl chloride (MPC) from a total of 660 tons produced indigenously. The remaining MPC is claimed to have been used to produce DF, then used in GB/GF production. The fourth precursor required for VX, ethylene oxide, was generally available, being a multi- purpose chemical.

Iraq stated in 1995 that it produced a total of only 10 tons of choline from the di-isopropylamine and ethylene oxide and approximately 3 tons of methyl thiophosphonyl dichloride from the phosphorous pentasulphide and methyl phosphonyl chloride. From this, Iraq states that it produced experimental quantities of VX (recently increased to 260 kg from 160 kg). Iraq has recently admitted that three 250-gauge aerial bombs had been filled with VX for experimental purposes.

Iraq claimed that further attempts to produce VX were unsuccessful and the programme was finally abandoned in September 1988. According to Iraq's account, the remaining choline from the 10 tons was burned in early 1988 and the remaining 247 tons of phosphorous pentasulphide was discarded in 1991 by scattering it over an area of land and putting it in pits. Iraq also claimed that 213 tons of di-isopropylamine was destroyed by bombing during the Gulf war. However, while the Commission has found traces of these chemicals at the sites at which Iraq states their destruction occurred, it has not been able to verify the quantities destroyed. Thus, precursors for the production of at least 200 to 250 tons of VX could not be definitively accounted for.

The Commission has supervised the destruction, or verified Iraq's unilateral destruction, of 125 250-gauge bombs and several thousands 120mm mortar shells. In its new declaration, Iraq declared an additional 350 500-gauge and 100 250-gauge aerial bombs filled with CS in 1987.

"Agent-15"

The British government has asserted that Iraq developed large stocks of an incapacitant gas dubbed "Agent- 15". It is apparently a glycollate similar in effect to the agent BZ, an incapacitant once produced by the United States. If this is correct, exposure to about 100 milligrams in aerosolized form would be sufficient to incapacitate. Symptoms, which begin within 30 minutes of exposure and may last several days, include dizziness, vomiting, confusion, stupor, hallucinations, and irrational behavior. The US Army considered BZ to be too unpredictable in its effectiveness to be useful on the battlefield, and all US stocks were destroyed.

Precursor chemical production

In the early stages of its chemical weapons programme, Iraq imported all its precursor chemicals. Over time, however, Iraq sought to obtain the capability to produce indigenously all the precursors required for the production of the agents noted above. Iraq acknowledges that it had or was on the brink of having the capability to produce in quantity the precursors for tabun (GA): D4 and phosphorous oxychloride (POCl3), the sarin/cyclosarin (GB/GF) precursors: methylphosphonyl difluoride (DF), methyl phosphonyl dichloride (MPC), dimethylmethyl phosphonate (DMMP), trimethylphosphite (TMP), hydrogen fluoride (HF), phosphorous trichloride (PCl3) and thionyl chloride (SOCl2). Phosphorous trichloride and thionylchoride are also the main precursors for the production of mustard (HD).

Iraq also had the capability to produce, at least at laboratory scale, sodium sulphide (Na2S) and thiodiglycol (both for sulphur mustard agent production), methyl benzilate (for BZ production), triethanol amine (for nitrogen-mustard agent production) and potassium bifluoride and ammonium bifluoride (for GB/GF production). In addition, Iraq had the capability to produce the VX precursors choline, methyl thiophosphonyl dichloride (MPS) at the least at pilot-plant scale.

Munitions

Iraq has declared that it weaponized for chemical weapons purposes the following munitions: RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenades and 82mm and 120mm mortar shells exclusively for CS; 130mm and 155mm artillery shells for mustard agent; 250- and 500-gauge aerial bombs for mustard, tabun, sarin and CS; 122mm rockets, R-400 and DB-2 aerial bombs for sarin and mixtures of GB/GF; and Al Hussein missile warheads for sarin. Of these, Iraq acquired the capability to produce all of the aerial bomb types listed and the Al Hussein missile warheads and chemical containers for 122mm rockets. It was reliant on imports of the other empty munitions but had the capability to empty conventional artillery shells and aerial bombs for subsequent refill with chemical-weapons agent.

Current Capabilities

Iraq has rebuilt key chemical weapons facilities since 1991. While they are subject to United Nations scrutiny, some could be converted from industrial and commercial use fairly quickly, allowing Iraq to restart limited production of chemical weapons agents. Iraq currently has 41 sites with equipment that could be converted to produce chemical weapons agents and their precursors and four facilities that produced chemical munitions until 1991 and could do so again. At least 30 facilities have infrastructure that could be reconfigured for weapons production. Iraq also has the experience and know-how in large-scale production of chemical weapons agents and sufficient qualified personnel with practical experience in research and development on, and the industrial production of, CW agents. It is also thought that Iraq retains a broad array of chemical-weapons-related items such as precursor chemicals, production equipment, filled munitions, and program documentation, as well as requisite technical expertise. UNSCOM estimated that, under current circumstances, Iraq would be able to organize the production of chemical agents through reconfiguration or relocation of available dual-use material within several days or weeks.


Sources and Resources
Chemical and Biological Weapons Threats to America: Are We Prepared? Christine M. Gosden, April 22, 1998
S/1995/284n - UNSCOM Seventh report under resolution 715 10/04/95

fas.org
Created by John Pike
Maintained by Webmaster
Updated Sunday, November 08, 1998 5:34:37 AM



To: Ilaine who wrote (43824)9/14/2002 1:30:52 AM
From: Bilow  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Hi CobaltBlue; Re: "Hi Carl - the difficulty in taking cities lies in taking cities the populations of which do not wish to be taken."

It is certainly possible that the locals will cheer us in the street. But that's not the way that the US military is going to bet, and the reasons are these: Unlike the Iraqis, the Afghans did not have 10 years experience of a US economic blockade. Instead of a recent military history of the US brutally (their view) killing their sons and brothers with fancy weapons, the Afghan military experience with the US was that the US provided them with weapons and advisers to help them get rid of the hated Russians. And now the Afghans, once again, needed foreign help to help them, once again, get rid of a foreign enemy, the Arab mercenaries / Taliban. This is why I was able to predict (starting only a few days after the WTC) that the Afghans would cheer us in the streets. Remember that I did this in the face of many who predicted that the Afghans would take up arms against us, and that the Afghans would fight off all foreign enemies just like they did Alexander the Great (or whoever).

-- Carl

P.S. Next I'll post an attempt to allow you to understand the likely Iraqi point of view. Most of predicting politics is tied up in the ability to avoid selective perception and the ability to see things from other people's points of view.



To: Ilaine who wrote (43824)9/14/2002 1:32:33 AM
From: Bilow  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Hi CobaltBlue; On the strength of Saddam's regime, in terms of local support for a US invasion.

The revolutionaries in Iraq already had their chance, in 1991. While the North had its rebellion, and the South had theirs, the middle did not. Saddam did not fall.

Has it changed since then? It may or may not have, there's no way to be certain. Humans are amazingly fickle creatures, and even if you ran a poll today and found out whether the population was for or against a US invasion, the opinion would be different tomorrow. One can never predict in advance what, for example, Saddam might say to his population and how that might resonate with them. Humans who are in populations under attack by foreign powers don't usually give a hell of a lot of credence to what those foreign powers say, but instead listen to their own leaders (Churchill and all that). Since there's no way to be sure, the military will have to plan for a full scale invasion.

Maybe not, maybe the locals will cheer us. Let's make you a test case. Imagine you live in Baghdad. Your eldest son was drafted into the military in 1990. He was sent to invade Kuwait and came back a cripple. He tells stories of how the Americans butchered the retreating soldiers on the road to Basra. Your younger son reached draft age and is now in the Army. You worry every day that the US is going to drop a bomb on him. You watch Iraqi TV (rather than CNN), and it's clear that the Americans have been bombing residential neighborhoods for 10 years.

The men you know say that the Americans are cowards who kill with machines, and that if only Iraq had better technology the Americans would leave them alone. The TV says the same thing, and it seems to be logical. You remember what life was like in Iraq before the Gulf war, and while it wasn't the best thing on the planet, the fact is that if you kept your nose clean (like 99% of the Baghdad population), you were safe, and the only thing you have available to compare it to is what life is like now, when the Americans have been trying to "help" you for most of a decade.

So for 10 years Iraq has had tough times. Your husband has had great difficulty finding work and you know that this is due to the sanctions that the Americans placed against your country, sanctions that the neighboring countries try to smuggle past all the time. You worry about the health of your little grand daughter, since her mother isn't getting enough to eat.

You remember the Gulf war very well. American planes snuck in under cover of darkness and you personally know a people (or know people who know people) who lost property or were wounded in the attacks. Certainly you probably know of far more people who were killed by Americans in the Gulf War than, for example, the average American knows who was killed at the WTC.

So you have a lot of very personal reasons to dislike the American military and government, if not the American people. Now, the question is this. Will you be able to transform your personal negative experiences with the Americans, your relatives who were maimed or killed, everyone's financial difficulties, and the very personal fear you felt of American military action into an intellectual appreciation of the Americans plan to run your country for you? And what is that plan? The Americans say that they want to have free elections, but you know that the Americans support an Israeli government that suppresses democracy in Palestine, and you have the usual human tendency to discount government propaganda.

I doubt you could intellectualize the conflict, or that the inhabitants of Baghdad could intellectualize what the US has done to them to that extent. Instead, when your neighbors quake in fear, the natural human response is to look to your leaders for comfort. That's why Bush's ratings, in the face of an obvious economic downturn, nevertheless went up after the WTC. War does not divide people, it unites them. And since Saddam is still in power after 10 years, I would guess that this natural human tendency has been present in Iraq.

The American problem in Iraq would be the control of civilians. There are essentially zero examples of civilian populations that were brought under control (in the military sense of allowing an invasion without resistance) by blockade tactics. You can sometimes get the government to toe the line, but blockades and starvation, in and of themselves, always pisses off the locals more than it makes them love you. To get the civilians under control you have to put them in actual fear for their lives and our actions against Iraq are nowhere near deadly enough for that effect to kick in.

Example: When the Allies starved Germany for most of a year after the Armistice in 1918, the result was not that the population of Germany became true lovers of Democracy and the West. Instead, the population provided the tinder for Adolf Hitler to take over. Within a few years they got their revenge.

Example: When the North blockaded the South in the war between the states the effect was to cause economic devastation in the South. Did that win the Civil War? Of course not, to win the war the North had to actually march through the South and make it clear that the Southerners who didn't toe the line would be killed. And this was in the face of the fact that the Southerners had to be aware that the North had no particular malice towards them.

Example: When Germany blockaded Britain in WW1 and WW2, and caused the population to suffer such that, for example, people were only allowed to buy new shoes every 3rd year (or something like that), did the British react to it by developing a warmth and compassion for the Germans? No, the British fought on.

Example: When Britain blockaded the US in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812, causing economic devastation, did the US quit fighting? No, the US fought on, and the wars only ended when the British got tired of fighting.

So much for examples where "sanctions" (i.e. blockades) failed to pacify civilian populations.

Unlike Kuwait, Iraq has not been invaded by a foreign power. Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq is not run by an external force (i.e. Osama bin Laden and the mercenary Arabs). So the Afghan liberation example does not translate directly into Iraq. And for that matter, the Northern Alliance lost many thousands killed in their assaults on the Taliban, and that was with the Taliban having no prior experience against US military activity. The Iraqis, by comparison, have received constant, on the job training in how to deal with the US and its air force for 10 years.

Unlike Afghanistan, we can't simply arm the local rebels and provide air support. The Kurds in the North are too much of a problem for Turkey, our ally (i.e. the weapons would inevitably infiltrate back across the border and be used against the Turks), and arming the Sunnis in the South would essentially be giving weapons to the Islamic Fundamentalists that are our target in the terror war.

-- Carl