Hi DJ, fancy meeting you here:0)
Concerning attached, my bet is that the Security Council ducks will be lined up soon, with USA doing the ultimatum, UK doing the asking, Russia doing the nod and then the speech, France doing the speech and then the nod, and China doing the speech and then abstaining altogether.
Is your portfolio allocated 'storm ready' and positioned for 'survival whatever may'?
Chugs, Jay
BTW, I find Stratfor simplistic and naive at times, but they do offer a view amongst many views;0)
stratfor.com
Possible Iraq-for-Georgia Deal Could Seal Baghdad's Fate
13 September 2002
Summary
Washington and Moscow appear to be discussing a possible deal in which Russia would not veto a U.S. attack on Iraq in the U.N. Security Council in exchange for Washington's tacit agreement on a Russian counterterrorist operation in Georgia. If the deal holds, Iraq's fate will be soon sealed, but the consequences could hurt Russia as well in the end.
Analysis
Russian President Vladimir Putin threatened Sept. 11 to send troops into Georgia's Pankisi Gorge unless Tbilisi deals with Islamic militants -- including alleged Chechen rebels -- within its borders, the BBC reports. On Sept. 12 Putin also warned the United Nations that Russia would take "necessary measures" to defend itself against cross-border Islamist attacks if Tbilisi cannot control the gorge.
The Bush administration, which until just a few days ago publicly supported Georgia against such Russian threats, recently said through statements by U.S. Ambassador Alexander Vershbow that al Qaeda agents are operating not only in the Pankisi but also in Chechnya. Vershbow also met with Russian officials Sept. 12 for talks on anti-terrorism cooperation and Iraq.
It appears that the United States and Russia may be close to some form of an "Iraq-for-Georgia" deal. This likely means that Moscow will not veto an American attack on Iraq in the U.N. Security Council in exchange for U.S. acquiescence to a planned Russian operation in Georgia. It also suggests that one of the last obstacles for a U.S. war on Iraq is being removed and that Baghdad's fate soon will be sealed.
No matter what happens, Washington will win. If an agreement is reached, Moscow will deal with al Qaeda in the Caucasus but likely will have to leave due to U.S. pressure. Even if there is no deal, Washington likely will find another lever to make junior ally Putin follow its lead on Iraq.
Putin's timing was perfect, as he made his ultimatum on the anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, and his letter to the U.N. Security Council Sept. 12 coincided with U.S. President George W. Bush's speech to the General Assembly, in which he laid out the case for an attack on Iraq.
This timing makes it difficult, especially for Washington, to accuse Russia of aggression in also seeking to protect itself, as Moscow claims, from terrorist threats. Moreover, Russia has more personal reasons for striking inside Georgia than the U.S. does against Iraq: Baghdad cannot hit American territory, while Islamic militants have been attacking Russia from Georgian territory regularly for several years.
The Deal in the Making
The possible U.S. turnaround comes a few weeks after White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer accused Moscow Aug. 25 of violating Georgia's territorial integrity after it allegedly bombed the Pankisi. But CBS news reported Sept. 5 -- based on information from sources in the National Security Agency (NSA) -- that a few minutes after the Sept. 11 attacks, a telephone call was intercepted from an al Qaeda member in Afghanistan to an unknown person in Georgia, where the attacks were praised and discussed.
The fact that the NSA has only now disclosed this information is an indication that the Bush administration, despite the State Department comments Sept. 13, is more supportive of Putin's case for Russian counterterrorism operations in the Pankisi, especially since an initially 1,000-man-strong Georgian military operation that began there Aug. 25 has resulted in few militant arrests.
Bush called Putin Sept. 9, and it is possible that Iraq and Georgia were key topics of discussion. Just two days later, Vershbow stated that he hoped the United States and Russia would be on the same side when it came to Iraq, adding that both "share common interests," Russian pro-government Web site Strana.ru reports. One of these common interests appears to be helping each other in dealing with their respective and, in some cases, common enemies.
In making the case that the United States and Russia face the same al Qaeda-associated fighters, Vershbow stated Sept. 11, "We both have been confronting terrorism that has an international dimension, and I think we know that al Qaeda has been involved in supporting the separatists in Chechnya," BBC reports. This acknowledgement comes a few months after Washington admitted that al Qaeda elements were present in the Pankisi, located across the border from Russia.
A possible Iraq-for-Georgia deal is likely to have been discussed in detail at a meeting Sept. 12 between Vershbow and Vyasheslav Trubnikov, a Russian deputy foreign minister responsible for coordinating anti-terrorism activities with foreign countries. Trubnikov is also a former head of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service.
Putin had to consult with Washington before making the ultimatum to Georgia. On a strategic level, having committed himself and Russia to a pro-Western course since Sept. 11, Putin understood the repercussions that could result should he unilaterally threaten Georgia.
On an operational level, Putin could not leave the U.S. government in the dark about his move because of the presence in Georgia of American military advisers, who were deployed to the country earlier this year to train Georgian troops in counterterrorism tactics. The last thing Putin wants is to get them caught in the middle of any fighting.
Why Bush Needs the Deal
But much more important, Putin knows how much Washington needs Russian support for its war against Iraq. Though the Bush administration keeps saying it will act alone if need be, an Iraq campaign would be much easier politically and strategically if backed by the United Nations.
Russia's role in this regard cannot be overestimated. Of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, only the United States and Britain are united in their plans for Baghdad. France is saying it will back the war if there is a U.N. resolution in support of military action. China, not wanting to confront the United States, is becoming more positive about agreeing to Washington's plans, Reuters reported Sept. 13, but there is a chance it may decide to avoid taking a position by abstaining from a vote.
So it falls to Russia to broker a U.N. resolution that will pave the road to Baghdad for American troops. The United States has been strongly pressuring Moscow on this issue for a long time. But Putin has taken his time and figured out what to ask from his senior U.S. ally in exchange for Iraq.
Why Putin Needs the Deal
Putin chose to pursue an "Iraq-for-Georgia" deal because it may help him finally finish the second Chechen war, which started in 1999 when Wahhabi militants from a de facto independent Chechnya invaded Russia's Dagestan region. The Russian army launched a counteroffensive, took Chechnya's capital Grozny after a bloody siege and regained control over the province. However, Chechen and international militants, including al Qaeda elements, have been systematically inflicting serious losses on the Russian army in the course of their guerrilla campaign.
Georgia's Pankisi and other regions adjacent to Chechnya have been heavily used by these rebels as a base for logistics, regrouping and recruiting, as well as a major financial route used for funneling Middle Eastern money to the fighters. The militants, whose estimated numbers have varied from several hundred to two thousand in the Pankisi, often launched cross-border raids and attacks on the Russian army and border guards.
The situation has become very similar to the one U.S. forces experienced in Afghanistan. The U.S. troops also have had to sweep for militants along Pakistan's side of the border, as the Pakistani government is either unwilling or unable to stop cross-border attacks on American troops.
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze has been even less willing or able to deal with Islamic militants in Georgia than Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, leading Putin to press for a Russian deployment in Georgia. Shevardnadze has refused for internal reasons -- since he is extremely unpopular in Georgia and widely accused by European media of corruption, he may be playing up a Russian threat to distract the masses.
Rare Mistake by Georgian President
Shevardnadze bet on the U.S. support partly because Washington does not want Moscow to gain a strong presence in the oil-rich Caucasus region. But faced with a dilemma between gaining Russian support on Iraq and sacrificing it, the Bush administration may find that these two things are not compatible and might still opt to give Russia a temporary free hand in Georgia if there is no other timely way to get Russia's vote on Iraq.
Though the U.S. State Department said Sept. 13 it opposed Putin's intentions to launch an operation against Islamic militants in Georgia, Bush administration officials have remained silent on the matter. Meanwhile, Kommersant, Vremya Novosti and many other Russian and other former Soviet Union papers are speculating about an Iraq-for-Georgia deal. Moscow has not made an official statement, but several Russian government officials allege in the media that a deal is being negotiated.
The fate of the deal depends on whether Washington thinks it can get Russia on board for an Iraq attack without giving in on Georgia. Given the pro-U.S. course Putin seems to be willingly pursuing, Bush may decide that Moscow will not dare to veto a U.S. Security Council war resolution in any instance.
But Washington also would like to see the al Qaeda presence in the Caucasus destroyed. The U.S. advisers in Georgia likely have reported that they cannot quickly train a sufficient number of Georgian units to defeat al Qaeda-associated militants in the country. The Georgian army currently lacks the motivation, weapons and training to fulfill this difficult task. So in the end, Bush might agree to a Russian operation, while cautioning that Russian troops must immediately withdraw once they accomplish their goal.
It is not likely that this deal is a sure thing quite yet; Washington and Moscow probably are still negotiating the details. Putin wants to know how far he can proceed in Georgia: Cracking down on Islamists is one thing, but going so far as replacing the anti-Russian Shevardnadze is quite another. Putin also will try to launch an operation in Georgia before Russia is required to vote on a U.N. resolution, as he is afraid that after Moscow gives the green light, Washington will withdraw its tacit support for Russia's actions.
Short-Term Benefits and Longer-Term Problems
Nevertheless, if the deal holds it likely will reap significant benefits for both Washington and Moscow in the immediate future. For the Bush administration it would mean that the last remaining political obstacle to an Iraq war would be removed. In a war sanctioned by the United Nations, Iraq's chances of getting political and diplomatic support abroad would be diminished severely.
This in turn will further tilt the military and strategic balance in the U.S. favor. Iraq will be dealt a huge blow when its traditional top supporter Russia walks away, while Washington's efforts against al Qaeda will be strengthened if the Russians can destroy an al Qaeda-associated base in the Pankisi.
Putin likely would send Russian forces into Georgia this or next month, before winter weather in the mountains makes air support ineffective. Russia is more likely than Georgia to be able to clean many of the Islamists out of the Pankisi faster and stay there to block their attempts to return.
This could have a short-term positive effect on Russian operations in Chechnya proper, since the militants will feel keenly the loss of the logistic base in the Pankisi. And with a much stronger presence in the country, Russia may be able to put enough pressure on Shevardnadze's government to cause its downfall, which would help Moscow to regain its former position in the Transcaucasus.
But looking farther ahead, the negative consequences of an Iraq-for-Georgia deal may prove even greater, especially for Russia. Washington will be able to overcome any minor temporary problems due to sheer weight of its power and might, but Washington also will see Russia's return to the Caucasus as a threat to its interests in the oil-rich region.
The U.S. government will use its senior status in its relations with Putin to limit Russia's advances to only the Pankisi Gorge. Washington probably is already advising Shevardnadze to make a last-minute attempt to avoid a Russian operation in Georgia by undertaking real and meaningful measures against Islamic militants.
While seemingly concerned, Shevardnadze first responded to Putin's ultimatum by simply saying he could not believe the Russian leader would launch an operation into Georgia. The Georgian Security Council was then quick to say that it has decided to "activate to the maximum" its so-far-ineffective "anti-criminal" operations in the Pankisi, Russian Web site lenta.ru reported Sept. 13.
But Georgian forces are not in a position to deal with highly skilled Islamic militants. Moreover, many rebels reportedly have already left the Pankisi and are located in other mountainous regions of Georgia. So Georgian troops again will produce no results in the gorge, strengthening Putin's argument and likely making an incursion unavoidable.
But the benefits for Moscow will not last long. First, if the U.N. Security Council adopts a war resolution on Iraq, Washington will have little further incentive for supporting Russia's case in Georgia. By that time Russian forces probably will have delivered a blow to al Qaeda elements in Georgia, thus fulfilling the second U.S. goal.
Washington then would apply pressure on Moscow to retreat beyond the Caucasian Mountains again. Russia might resist, but it would have little leverage due to the sharp imbalance in U.S. and Russian capabilities.
Even once they deployed to the Pankisi, Russian troops likely would find few militants there, as most would have fled by then. This would force troops to sweep farther out in the countryside, causing more resentment among Georgians already angry at Moscow for supporting the secessionist campaign in the Abkhazia region.
Events might get out of control even if Washington told Moscow to take its troops out. A civil war may begin between Shevardnadze and pro-Russian groups, and new fighting could erupt between Georgians and Abkhaz, provoked either by Shevardandze or by Abkhaz emboldened by the Russian presence. The United States and Europe likely would intervene politically in such a case and make Putin withdraw Russian forces from Georgia. Russia would be blamed for creating chaos and its relations with the West would suffer. |
