STATEMENT OF SCOTT RITTER, Former UNSCOM Inspector (Part Four)
REP. BATEMAN: The other thing I think we need to focus on today, as a committee, is until
your resignation, I as a citizen, I as a member of Congress and of this committee, had no
reason to believe the United States was doing anything other than insisting upon all of the
legitimate prerogatives of UNSCOM and its inspection regimen.
I frankly was shocked to learn, that this was indeed not the case, and that even the secretary
of state of the United States, was communicating "back off, go slow, don't do these things."
Now, I don't suggest she, or that person was wrong. But I suggest that there's some
obfuscation that I don't really understand the level of, that suggests to the American people,
that one thing is the operative policy of the United States, while we're doing, diplomatically,
back-channel another.
And I know you can't conduct your foreign affairs in the wide open all the time. But I do not
understand that complete dichotomy. If you put it in the context, if we have any national will
to do what our national security interests require, the American people at some point have to
be brought into this loop, and prepared to back up the judgments of their national security
policy leaders, when they take some action that's meaningful.
Again, I think what you have done at least made us aware of policy decisions and judgments
that the American people need to be prepared to make, and I hope have the will to make.
REP. SPENCE: Mr. Taylor.
REP. GENE TAYLOR (D-MS): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ritter, in your mind, having
been inspecting in Iraq firsthand, would nuclear, biological, and chemical threats coming out
of Iraq -- how would you rate them?
MR. RITTER: In all honesty, it's hard to rate them with the degree of certainty that I think that
you want, because we just don't know what the extent of all their programs are. They have
never given us a full accounting of these programs.
What I would say, is that if you take a look at the level of obstruction that Iraq has put up for
their programs, you might be able to get a sense of what they view as being more valuable,
and it's the biological program that they have lied about and obstructed more consistently
than any other program.
This means that they view it as having more value than perhaps the chemical and ballistic
missile, although ballistic missile is different, because they're allowed to have a ballistic missile
program. And it's one in which they have developed in a manner which gives them a rapid
breakout capability. So they believe they already have ballistic missile delivery capability in
place.
Now, what will they arm that with? And there's two things of concern. One is the biological
program,l but the other is the VX program. Even after we exposed the VX program in April,
and confronted Iraq with that reality in June, they have denied outright that they had a VX
program. They're using the same pattern of outright denials, absolute denials, that they
exhibited with the biological programs and applied it to VX. So, I think I have to say that both
VX and a retained biological capability, are highest on the list of what Iraq wants to hold on
to.
REP. TAYLOR: Mr. Ritter, what -- and again, I may have missed your point. What would you,
if given the opportunity to make things right, what would you do?
MR. RITTER: Again, I need to make sure everybody understands that there is no easy
solution, that you can't just reach into your pocket and pull out the magic card that tells you
this is the route to take.
We made a decision in 1995, that it would be in the best interests of everybody, if we broke
through Iraq's wall of concealment, and actually obtained a weapon, if we did more than just
expose their lies, and we actually obtained a weapons that we could show to the world, and
say, "This is the result of ineffective disarmament. This is the price that you will have to pay
if you don't disarm Iraq."
We thought we had a program of inspections, no matter how imperfect, and no matter how
difficult, that would eventually achieve that objective.
So, what would I do? I would say that if you want your resolution that you passed in April
1991 to be implemented, you have to get the inspection teams back in Iraq, doing the difficult
job of disarmament-oriented inspections.
REP. BATEMAN: And what are the hindrances to making that happen?
MR. RITTER: Disunity in the Security Council.
REP. BATEMAN: They're the problem? From which members?
MR. RITTER: Right now, we're in a situation where you have 15 members of the Security
Council, five permanent members. And we find three of the five are aligned against this kind
of activity: Russia, France, and China. We have the United States and the United Kingdom
that are very supportive of disarmament-type inspections. And then you have 10 rotating,
non-permanent members.
Whenever we brief the Security Council, and we present them with the facts, we tend to sway
the 10 members over to our side. But we're still confronted with three members with veto
power, veto authority, and their concerns have to be taken into consideration.
So, something has to be done to convince these three members that inspections are the right
thing to do, that the only way to get sanctions lifted, to get the horrible economic hurt that's
been inflicted on the Iraqi people by sanctions finished, and to bring Iraq back into the fold, is
through the inspection process. Right now, they believe that they can denigrate the
inspection process, minimize it, get sanctions lifted, and get Iraq back into the fold quicker.
And we need to somehow change their philosophy.
REP. BATEMAN: There's a school of thought, that with the disintegration of the Soviet
Union, that the people who made their living in their biological warfare research, went and
began to peddle their wares in other places, and that many of them ended up in Iraq. Is it
possible that that accounts for some of the Russian reluctance to be fully supportive in this
measure?
MR. RITTER: I think that the Russian foreign policy objectives are driven by a broader sense
of feeling very defensive, vis-a-vis the United States. You have the expansion of NATO, you
have the reduction of the status that Russia enjoyed when it was the former Soviet Union.
Russia is now an economic wasteland. they have difficulties asserting their authority around
the world.
The Middle East, because of the previous experience of Yevgeni Primakov, is an area that
Russia feels comfortable in operating in. And I think one of the reasons why you see
obstruction in Iraq, is it's a chance for Russia to stand juxtaposed to the foreign policy of the
United States, and that plays well with the nationalists and the ultra-nationalists in Russia
today.
I don't believe that their policy is driven by the fact that they're trying to siphon biological
weapons experts into Iraq. That could be happening, and hopefully people are alert to that.
REP. BATEMAN: Are you a personal witness to any scientist with the former Soviet Union
working in Iraq?
MR. RITTER: We have intelligence information of an undetermined quality that we haven't
been able to follow up and verify, that indicates that weapons scientists from the former
Soviet Union -- all the republics -- not all, but republics other than Russia -- have made their
way into Iraq to support Iraqi military programs, to include programs which are prescribed by
Security Council resolution. But I can't prove that.
REP. BATEMAN: You're not a personal witness to that.
MR. RITTER: I've only seen the reports, and tried to investigate the reports. But I haven't
personally seen a Russian in Iraq, doing prohibited activity. No, sir.
REP. BATEMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SPENCE: Thank you. Mr. Redmond.
REP. BILL REDMOND (R-NM): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ritter, I would like to concur
with my colleagues in thanking you for the courageous move of resignation so that this could
be made known, not only to this committee, but also to the American people.
I couldn't help but think, as I was listening to the testimony and the questioning, that we are
very much like the parent in the supermarket that is being held hostage by a young child
screaming in the checkout line. And in order to pacify the child, we buy it a sucker. Basically,
when we won in 1991, we put Saddam Hussein on a behavior modification program, but over
these seven years, he has not developed the internal will to do the right thing. And until he
does change internally, it will require external force to modify the behavior of the nation of
Iraq.
He has moved from active aggression in 1991, to a seven-year pattern of passive aggression,
which has placed not only the region but the entire world at risk.
I would like to thank my colleague, Mr. Taylor, for raising the question concerning (rating ?)
this particular risk, because it appears to me that, minimally, that there are three things that we
need to do. And if you could shed some light on any of these three, I would appreciate it.
First, I believe that this committee, and also, Mr. Chairman, that this committee needs to send
a letter to the administration strongly urging that the files not be closed, we do not need to
hand that sucker to that child that is making demands. I think that the administration needs to
know the desire of this committee that we continue on with the open files.
Secondly, I was somewhat disturbed, learning of the methodology that is used for the
verification process. It appears that the verification process and the methodology itself is
flawed, in that Iraq issues the statement of declaration whereby we verify, but when Iraq does
that, they are basically identifying the perimeters of discussion and what can or what cannot
be investigated.
And it seems to me that, in addition to the letter sent to the administration concerning the
keeping the files open, I think that we need to establish a new methodology where it is not
Iraq that takes the initiative for verification in setting the parameters, but the United Nations,
with the leadership of the United States, sets the perimeters for the investigation. And thirdly,
I think that the connection that our good colleague, Mr. Weldon, had mentioned between the
Soviet -- or the former Soviet Union, with Russia and Iraq, that that close relationship and the
fact that Russia is not now responsibly attending to its nuclear stockpile -- this is similar to
what Senator Domenici is working on in conjunction with Los Alamos National Lab. I think
that we need to be very current with what happens on the Senate side with Senator Domenici.
And that nuclear material that is present there, because of the strong link between Russian
and Iraq, it appears that we need to be aggressively pressuring the Russian government into a
stockpile stewardship program where the material is not readily available.
If you could answer those three and then I have just another comment.
MR. RITTER: Yes, sir.
I think, again, one of the actions that would be very helpful is if a signal was sent to the
United States administration that files should be not be closed prematurely, that if a
comprehensive review of Iraqi compliance with its disarmament obligations is going to take
place, as indicated in Resolution 1194, that it is carefully monitored to ensure that
compromises are not made, that Iraq is held fully accountable to the original intent of Security
Council Resolution 687, and that if a file is to be closed it's because every single point that
must be addressed by Iraq of a disarmament nature is indeed addressed to the satisfaction of
the Special Commission -- not anybody else. We're the body that has to make -- determine
that satisfaction.
Secondly, through this process of a comprehensive review, any signal that was sent that it is
indeed the Special Commission that's in the driver's seat, it's the Special Commission that
establishes the preconditions for determining disarmament in accordance with the resolutions
passed by the Security Council, that's a good signal. But what I'm concerned is going to
happen is that there will be new standards set for determining disarmament of Iraq which are
not in accordance with Security Council resolution and which will be conducted under the
auspices of the secretary general, and pressure will be placed upon the executive chairman
and the Special Commission to fall in line with this and Iraq will be given an artificial clean bill
of health.
On the issue of Russia and its stockpiling, again, I have to respectfully decline to answer
because that does fall outside of my remit as a weapons inspector in Iraq.
REP. REDMOND: Okay.
Mr. Chairman, just a closing comment. There are two phrases in the testimony by Mr. Ritter
that just leap out at me, and they're on page 30 of the testimony. You see that he states that
Iraq believes that time is on its side, and immediately following, the truth of the matter is that
Iraq is not disarmed, we have not accomplished what we set out to accomplish.
And I'd like to make reference real quickly to the declaration of Independence where the
Founding Fathers stated that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are sufferable.
And here we have a seven-year abuse of passive aggression with no remorse at all. And it
appears that history would tell us that the sooner we act on this the better it will be not only
for the region but for the world.
So I would encourage us to take action and to take action sooner than later.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SPENCE: Thank you.
Mr. Pappas.
REP. MIKE PAPPAS (R-NJ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ritter, thank you very much for being here and for answering questions.
I want to focus a bit upon you as a professional and those that you worked with and what
your sense of things were.
First of all, how many other people served on that inspections team with you?
MR. RITTER: On my unit or the inspection as a whole?
REP. PAPPAS: The inspection team as a whole.
MR. RITTER: It fluctuates, depending on which task we're going to have. But generally
there's around 30 to 40 full-time experts in New York, a staff of a dozen or so support
personnel in Bahrain who support the inspection teams when they form up in Bahrain, and
then about 120 inspectors and support staff in place in Baghdad on a full- time basis to
oversee the monitoring inside Iraq.
REP. PAPPAS: Your unit was the approximately 120?
MR. RITTER: The Special Commission. It was actually closer to maybe 150, 160 people.
REP. PAPPAS: And the countries that just focus on that unit, folks that you worked with on a
daily basis, was it from --
MR. RITTER: Around the world.
REP. PAPPAS: -- countries around the world.
MR. RITTER: We had -- on the inspection teams that I've led in -- for instance, in January, we
had 41 inspectors from 16 different nations. On other inspections I've had 21 nations
represented on my teams, sometimes as few as 12 nations. But we are indeed a United
Nations body and we draw our expertise from the member nations.
REP. PAPPAS: Did you, while you were there -- and how long were you there personally?
MR. RITTER: Seven years.
REP. PAPPAS: Did you ever sense a concern for your safety, or did any members of the team
ever sense any concern for your safety?
MR. RITTER: The vast majority of the time we actually felt secure and we felt that Iraq was
carrying out its obligations to ensure the security and the safety and welfare of inspection
teams. There were some occasions in which an inspection of a particularly sensitive area,
because these are no-notice inspections and we arrived without notice, soldiers who were
trained to protect these facilities felt threatened by our arrival. And there were periods of time
where it was very close as to whether or not they would open fire on the inspection teams.
There were other situations where the Iraqis themselves have acknowledged they have
stopped drive-by shootings or other acts of violence that were being threatened against the
inspection teams. Whether or not these real and the Iraqi authorities were merely trying to
intimidate us is one thing.
But I can say that, especially recently, there has been more concern about the physical safety
of the inspectors operating in Iraq, especially inspectors that were carrying out
confrontational inspections designed to expose the concealment mechanism.
REP. PAPPAS: The times that you've felt that your safety was not an issue and maybe
especially the times that you were, could you briefly describe how the UN provided for your
safety.
MR. RITTER: Our safety lies in the strength of our mandate. The fact that the Security
Council passed a resolution under Chapter 7, meaning that they would back us up, meant that
we could go forward into Iraq and carry out our tasks. And Iraq had obligated itself to allow
us to do this. And Iraq had agreed to ensure our physical safety. So we -- the United Nations
did not provide for our physical security. It's Iraq who has that responsibility. And again, we
believed that as long as we stayed within the framework of the mandate given to us by the
Security Council, we should not be put at risk.
REP. PAPPAS: Those members of the team that were not from the United States or Great
Britain, did you ever discuss with them what their sense of the situation was?
You did mention, in responding to a question earlier, that -- that as the US representative to
the Security Council was dealing with this and we've seen a diminished influence, what
appears to be a diminished influence in our ability to ensure for adequate inspections, what
was the sense or the discussion or the banter with folks from other countries? Did you they
share that? And why do you think that they may have if they did?
MR. RITTER: The vast majority of the inspectors who were in Iraq with me or I was associated
with clearly understood the reality of the situation, the role that the United States played in
making inspections a viable regime. They were there when the technical expertise from the
United States was brought to bear. They were there when they saw the financial resources of
the United States brought to bear. Every inspector knows the important role that the United
States plays in getting inspections done in Iraq. And they're all very supportive of that role.
They also know that our mandate -- our security is dependent upon the will of the Security
Council to back us up if we get into a bind with Iraq. And there was concern on several
inspections that I was involved in that Iraq, faced with less than solid resolve by the Security
Council, may undertake a precipitous act that could put our safety at risk. And a lot of people
were concerned that that was because of a lessening of resolve by the Security Council,
which is reflective of maybe a lessening of leadership by the United States.
REP. PAPPAS: I guess what I was getting to, maybe I wasn't clear -- Mr. Chairman, just one
other question, or clarification.
Of those people that you served with that still understood that they were under the Security
Council's resolution and had the authority to act as you were, did you sense any trepidation
that if these -- did they feel that the Security Council wasn't serious -- (laughs) -- is the easiest
way to put it and most direct way to put it? Did you feel or did they feel that the Security
Council wasn't serious and was it just words on a piece of paper?
MR. RITTER: Most inspectors that we have are very experienced inspectors who have done
this over the course of years, and they've seen resolution after resolution after resolution after
resolution being passed on Iraq for Iraq's obstruction. They've seen no meaningful actions
undertaken by the Security Council to hold Iraq into compliance.
And so they did. And everybody feels that the Security Council no longer has the teeth to
back up its words.
REP. PAPPAS: Thank you, Mr. Ritter.
And, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to emphasize for Mr. Ritter's benefit that last month I had
introduced a resolution 519 which deals with the threat of Iraq and I'd like to pull out a copy of
it to you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. SPENCE: Thank you, Mr. Pappas.
Mr. Taylor.
REP. TAYLOR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ritter, I want to go into -- follow up a little bit on some questions that were asked to you
before. And you indicated that you did not believe it was our -- America's responsibility to
unilaterally support UNSCOM.
It seems to me that the case you're making is really more the contrary of that, that officials of
our government have been unilaterally interfering with the work of that agency.
Now, I've read your statement and a lot of the newspaper reports. I wonder if you could tell us
with as much detail as possible the specific incidents in which you believe that somebody
from our government interfered with the operation of the agency or with you. And where you
have firsthand knowledge of that, that would be useful. If some of it may be secondhand, I
don't know, but some level of detail would be helpful to me. |
