To: Stephen O who wrote (89691 ) 9/17/2002 9:00:16 PM From: Richnorth Respond to of 116790 Arms inspections only serve to delay war which is inevitable for all the justifiable reasons the U.S. can come up with. =============================== Arms inspections doomed to fail By GARY MILHOLLIN and KELLY MOTZ MANY voices are now calling for renewed United Nations inspections in Iraq. Some belong to critics of the Bush administration who are opposed to war. Others belong to those who favour war but see inspections, which they fully expect to fail, as the needed triggering event for war. Whatever one's stance on how best to handle Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, it is crucial to understand one thing: UN inspections, as they are currently constituted, will never work. There are several reasons for this. Consider the record of the UN Special Commission (Unscom), an agency that was charged with inspecting Iraq's weapons programmes from 1991 to 1998. While it did manage to destroy tonnes of missiles, and chemical and biological weapons, it could not complete the job. Iraqi obfuscation prevented it from getting a full picture of the entire weapons-production effort. The commission's replacement, the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (Unmovic), which has not yet been allowed to enter Iraq, will have even less success given its structure and policies. Unscom was staffed mainly by officials on loan from national governments who did not owe their jobs to the UN. Unmovic personnel, on the other hand, are UN employees who are likely to be hobbled by its notoriously inefficient bureaucracy. These inspectors are not set up to make effective use of intelligence information. In the 1990s, American intelligence officials supplied secret information to selected Unscom inspectors, knowing that the information would be protected and be used to uncover hidden Iraqi weapons facilities. At Unmovic, however, no inspector will be allowed to receive intelligence information on a privileged basis. Unmovic has also declared that it will not allow any information gathered from its inspections to flow back to national intelligence agencies. Even if it is allowed into Iraq, Unmovic will run up against obstacles at least as formidable as those that stymied Unscom. After years of practice, Unscom became adept at launching surprise visits to weapons sites, yet Iraq's intelligence operatives defeated it more often than not. It was a rare inspection when the Iraqis did not know what the inspectors were looking for before they arrived. Most Unmovic inspectors have little experience in Iraq and even less in handling intelligence information. Compounding this handicap is the fact that Iraq has taken considerable pains to make its weapons programmes mobile. Laboratories, components and materials are ready to hit the road at a moment's notice. Unmovic is also stuck with a deal the UN made in 1998 on 'presidential sites'. Iraq is allowed to designate vast swathes of land that the inspectors can visit only after announcing its arrival in advance, disclosing the composition of the inspection team (nuclear or biological experts, for example) and taking along a special group of diplomats. New inspections will occur under the threat of imminent American military action. Any announcement that Iraq is not cooperating could be a casus belli. Such a risk might encourage Unmovic to monitor what is already known rather than try to find what is hidden. This could mean that the goal of inspections - the disarmament of Iraq - might never be achieved. Which brings us to the heart of the matter. Inspections can do only one thing well: verify that a country's declarations about a weapons programme are honest and complete. It is feasible for inspectors to look at sites and equipment to see whether the official story about their use is accurate. It is a different proposition altogether to wander about a country looking for what has been deliberately concealed. For inspectors to do their job, they have to have the truth, which can come only from the Iraqis. As President George W. Bush told the UN last week, the world needs an Iraqi government that will stop lying and surrender the weapons programmes. That is not likely as long as Mr Saddam remains in power. Gary Milhollin is director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Kelly Motz is the editor of IraqWatch.org. They contributed this comment to The New York Times.