And now, from a "Senior Fellow at CFR."
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An Attack Strategy to Win
The more troops we array against Iraq, the less resistance we will face.
By Bernard E. Trainor
Wednesday, September 18, 2002; Page A29
President Bush has stated clearly to the American public and the rest of the world that Saddam Hussein is a threat that must be removed in the near future. It's not likely that Hussein's overture this week will stay Bush's hand.
Now the president must also make it clear that he is prepared to commit whatever troops are necessary to bring a war with Iraq to a speedy and victorious conclusion. The war will not need anything like the numbers used in Desert Storm, but it cannot be done on the cheap, as was done in Afghanistan. It is presumptuous for those outside the Pentagon to calculate the exact number of troops needed, but it will certainly be more than 100,000.
There is a powerful strategic argument for dispatching a sizable American force and not trying to use the Iraqi opposition as a proxy. Psychologically, the Iraqi army and even the Republican Guards must be convinced that the United States is absolutely committed to Hussein's overthrow and that they are doomed to destruction if they oppose it. The larger the army deployed against them the more it will become clear that resistance is futile and the less resistance we will face. The more powerful the force arrayed against them, the more likely Iraqi commanders will realize that resorting to chemical or biological weapons will not stave off defeat but simply put them before a tribunal once the war is over.
Just the buildup of forces on their border will have a depressing psychological effect on those in Hussein's army. The Iraqis know from the Gulf War that they are no match for the Americans. The president should capitalize on this fear and drive home the point. The Iraqi armed forces are a shadow of their pre-Gulf War selves, but they are still formidable -- too formidable for the United States to use the Afghan model of relying on local proxies supported by American air power and Special Operations forces.
According to unclassified sources, the Iraqi army is about half the size of that pitted against a half-million-man coalition force in 1991. Except for favored Republican Guards, it suffers severely from a shortage of spare parts, poor maintenance and a resulting lack of mobility. Of its 2,200 tanks, at least half are estimated to be nonoperational. The army is made up mostly of infantry divisions. Unclassified sources indicate that it is spread over the length and breadth of Iraq -- unlike during the Gulf War, when it massed facing Saudi Arabia. Two corps are in the north in Iraqi Kurdistan, one in the south facing rebellious Shias and two facing Iran. Iraqi morale is considered questionable and fighting ability marginal. These five corps are backed up and kept under surveillance by two Republican Guard corps, one in the north and one near Baghdad to the south. The Republican Guards are the cream of the Iraqi armed forces, but they are widely separated and have only two armored divisions and three mechanized divisions between them. Saddam Hussein also has a Special Republican Guard for his protection, made up of four loyal and well-armed brigades. These forces protect Baghdad.
Given that the Iraqi army and the Republican Guards are spread out, an American ground attack out of Turkey in the north and from Kuwait in the south would force the Iraqis to fight on multiple fronts, allowing it to be defeated piecemeal. Iraqi commanders recognize this and know their vulnerability. They also know that their air defenses will be destroyed in the opening days of combat, leaving them helpless in the face of American air attacks.
Though Hussein opponents are not powerful enough to serve as the main anti-Hussein force, they can be useful in targeting these strikes, as was done in Afghanistan. Supported by American Special Operations forces, their greatest value is as a magnet to draw opposing Iraqi forces out of their barracks and into the open, allowing American air power to attack them. The dissidents could also be useful in encouraging civilian and tribal uprisings.
By concentrating U.S. air power on the Iraqi military in the field, and not on Iraq's infrastructure, as was the case in the Gulf War, civilian casualties would be minimized. But it would probably force retreating military units loyal to Saddam Hussein to fall back on the cities, where American power would be less effective. Fighting in cities is a nasty business, accompanied by terrible casualties all around, to say nothing of the destruction wrought. This may be Hussein's plan, as there are reports that the Iraqis are digging trenches and erecting fortifications around urban centers. But historically, when a regime's army is defeated in the field and loses control of the countryside, troops trapped in cities don't hold out long. The Iraqis are credited with having a substantial tactical and strategic chemical and biological capability. That is their key strength, and it makes sense that in his bid to survive, Saddam Hussein would try to use that capability. It should be made clear that any officer who authorizes chemical or biological weapons, even if ordered to do so by Baghdad, will be treated as a war criminal.
The United States knows where some of the sites of weapons of mass destruction are, but not all of them. A vigorous intelligence campaign would be needed to locate and destroy those weapons. Even then there is no guarantee of getting them all. But chemical and biological weapons, once they are released on the battlefield, can be a greater danger to the user than to his intended target. American forces have far better protective clothing and equipment than do the Iraqis. Defense against mobile Scud missiles armed with poison warheads depends on early detection by satellites and manned and unmanned aerial vehicles, and their speedy destruction by precision-guided munitions and Patriot missiles. Special Operations teams would have to play a major role in tracking down hidden and mobile launchers.
When attacked by American bombs and missiles the Iraqi armed forces will be challenged to look to the better interests of Iraq -- and to their own survival. It should be made clear to the Iraqis that those who stay neutral or join in Hussein's demise will be treated well. Those who resist will continue to be attacked. Saddam Hussein and his regime must go, and the sooner the better. But the strategy of the U.S. military campaign is important. The campaign must be decisive, swift and psychologically devastating for Iraqi forces. Undermining the military support for the Baghdad regime is key to rapid success and to keeping American casualties to a minimum.
The writer, a retired Marine general, is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and co-author of "The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf."
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