Baghdad doesn’t know the score
By Fawaz Turki
arabnews.com
Pre-emption? Well, two can play at this game of diplomatic poker.
As the UN Security Council prepared to work on a resolution demanding that Iraq
readmit its weapons inspectors into the country or face dire consequences, the
Baghdad government indicated on Monday that it is ready, promptly and
unconditionally, to allow the inspectors in.
With President Bush having opted to take the UN route, which most of the
international community has urged him to do all along, the ball was now in the Iraqi
court, and Iraqi leaders would’ve had no one to blame but themselves if this time
around they brought a disaster on their people similar to the one that had hit them
12 years before.
The White House denounced the overture as a ruse and a "tactic that will fail." Dan
Bartlett, President Bush’s communications director, told reporters that "the tired
tactic of Saddam Hussein’s overture on inspectors is something he’s done in the
past and is met with a healthy dose of skepticism."
Baghdad should show good faith and prove him wrong. Will it, instead, prevaricate
by setting improbable conditions on the tasks of the inspectors, as had been its
wont till 1998 (no inspection of the president’s palaces, no inspection during
business hours, and the like), thereby missing an opportunity to avert a
devastating war waged against it? For keep in mind, neither the UN nor the US is
in a mood to negotiate conditions here.
If the country does not possess "weapons of mass destruction," then it has
nothing to fear from UN inspectors, whatever the tasks they are called upon to
perform. If it does have them, the price it will pay for their removal will be miniscule
compared to the one it will surely pay otherwise.
Sometimes those who do not learn from history are not only doomed to repeat it,
but are just doomed. So, are we going to see a repeat performance of what
happened after August 2, 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait and rejected mediation
efforts to have it withdraw its occupation forces from there?
In his memoir, Pilgrimage for Peace, Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN
secretary-general at the time, tells us that the six weeks prior to Jan. 15, 1992,
the deadline that had been given by Resolution 678 for the withdrawal of Iraqi
troops, was used for intensive efforts to find a diplomatic solution by UN, Arab,
Islamic and Third World delegations. All failed.
During September and late October, Yevgeny M. Primakov, the special
representative of Soviet President Gorbachev, traveled twice to Baghdad to find a
way that would preclude the use of force to drive Iraq from Kuwait. No go.
Then came that fateful meeting in Geneva on Jan. 9, less than a week before the
UN authorized deadline for allied forces to attack, between American Secretary of
State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz, where not only did Iraq
fail to seize the opportunity, there and then, to offer to withdraw its troops
unilaterally, but Aziz refused receipt of a letter from the White House addressed to
Saddam Hussein as too "insulting."
And finally, there was that one last-ditch effort by Secretary-General de Cuellar
himself who arrived in Baghdad on Jan. 12 for a meeting with the Iraqi president,
just three days before the time limit set in Resolution 678 would expire. Again, no
go. "Saddam walked me to the entrance of the building as we left and told me
almost jocularly that the package I had brought was not good enough," writes de
Cuellar. "Come back with something better next time."
What the Iraqi leader clearly did not understand was that there was not going to be
a next time. For any package would have had to start with Iraq’s withdrawal from
Kuwait.
And the rest, as they say, is history. Some nations repeat their history not only
because they do not learn from it, but because they do not take the trouble to
understand it in the first place.
In this regard, consider this: In one of his many encounters with Tareq Aziz during
the crisis, de Cuellar quotes the Iraqi foreign minister as telling him dismissively:
"The United States is foolish. Iraq recognizes American military superiority, but its
planes could not win the war. Iraq is fighting on its own territory. It has one million
men under arms and could double that number. Moreover, no political leader would
be weakened by fighting against the United States. Egyptian President Gamal
Nasser had lost a war but remained the most popular leader until his death."
Wrong, wrong, wrong. The Gulf War was not a popularity contest. The allied forces
who set out to fight it, giving Iraq a six-month leeway to soberly consider the
consequences of its actions, set out to fight it in earnest. They did. And the people
of Iraq paid and continue to this day to pay the price of that folly.
Those of us engaged in writing commentary in those hectic months between Aug.
2 and Jan. 15 — lackeys of imperialism and unpatriotic reactionaries, one and all
— who could see the impending disaster and urged Iraq to withdraw its troops from
Kuwait before all hell broke loose, find themselves at it again today. In the name of
reason, do what’s right for your people.
So, we say it one more time, with feeling: If you don’t have weapons of mass
destruction, you have nothing to fear from UN inspectors — loss of face, if that’s
what the problem is — is a little price to pay. And if you do have them, elimination
of the darn things is even a little price to pay in order to avoid the fire next time.
And make no mistake about it — the US is hellbent on seeing them destroyed, by
force of reason, through the UN, or by force of arms, through a lethal military
assault.
And the aggregate of support by the American people and by the international
community for that assault is mounting, not diminishing. Leading Democrats in
Congress have already signaled their readiness to stand behind a vote in coming
weeks authorizing military action, and the Republicans are solidly behind their
president. In the UN, many of the nearly 200 member states have climbed on the
US bandwagon heading rapidly toward confrontation with Iraq after listening to
President Bush’s speech at the General Assembly last Thursday.
Have Iraqi leaders over the last few months been trying to make a point as they
had done on the eve of the Gulf War, and between 1991 and 1998? And if so, what
would that point be?
At a time like this, making a point is a marginal pursuit, since, with war writ large,
good points become even more ephemeral than bad ones. At a time like this, one
acts to save one’s hide — that is, one’s citizens and one’s nation from
destruction. |
