Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Ilaine who wrote (45284)	9/19/2002 5:37:13 AM
From: LindyBill	Respond to of 281500

Can we simultaneously wage a war against terrorism and bring the boys home? With the speed of jet travel, and the number of Air transport available, we could keep equipment at strategic locations and the troops on US soil. How much longer does it take to fly them from Frankfort to Kuwait than from South Carolina to Kuwait? A lot cheaper, with better morale.

To: Ilaine who wrote (45284)	9/19/2002 6:14:24 AM
From: LindyBill	Respond to of 281500

Fred Barnes agrees with my take on Bush's moves last week. From "The Weekly Standard" Power Play In the span of ten days, President Bush flexed his executive muscles and changed the the conventional wisdom on Iraq. by Fred Barnes 09/19/2002 12:00:00 AM WE HAVE JUST WITNESSED one of the swiftest and most effective exercises of presidential power ever. And while practically no one has recognized it as extraordinary and historic, it was both. President Bush and his subordinates, by laying out the case for regime change in Iraq, changed the political dynamic at home, the world's stance toward the United States and Iraq, and the course of events. All this happened in 10 days, from September 3 to September 12. Consider where things stood a month ago. The Bush administration was divided over how to confront Saddam Hussein. The press was bristling with announcements of former allies who wanted no part in invading Iraq. Both Bush's job performance and support for deposing Saddam were slipping in public opinion polls. Former GOP officials such as Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser under the first President Bush, were voicing strong criticism of plans for military action against Iraq. And Democrats, plus some Republicans, were noisily insisting that Bush "make the case" against Saddam Hussein in regards to his development of weapons of mass destruction. In short, August saw Bush's Iraq policy under far more widespread attack than the White House had anticipated. September has been different. The Bush administration's campaign to build support for removing Saddam began with a speech by Vice President Cheney right after Labor Day. He took on critics and emphasized Saddam's efforts to produce nuclear weapons. Others administration figures followed, with the Big Three--Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Colin Powell--appearing on the Sunday shows talking about one thing: Iraq. Then came Bush's two speeches on September 11, which set the stage for his address to the United Nations the next day, pointing out Saddam's continued defiance of U.N. resolutions requiring disarmament, and an end to political repression and trafficking with terrorists. Bush embarrassed the United Nations by emphasizing its failure to enforce those resolutions. Consider where things stand now, as compared to mid-August. The Bush administration, including Powell, is singing the same tune with no dissenting voices. Allies against Iraq--including Norway, Denmark, Spain, and Italy--are cropping up all over the world. Poll numbers have soared, with two-thirds of Americans now favoring military action against Iraq. Amazingly enough, Scowcroft and some other critics have flipped and endorsed Bush's anti-Iraq crusade. And Democrats have changed their tune, eagerly seeking to vote on a resolution approving the use of military force against Saddam. Whew! A total turnaround, caused solely by the exercise of presidential power. As Bush demonstrated, presidents have the world's largest megaphone and can seize the attention of the media in a way that lesser political figures such as Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle cannot. Of course, a president has to use his inherent ability to command center stage deftly, and Bush did. Everything the administration did from September 3 pointed to Bush's U.N. speech. It was narrowly focused to make one point: The United Nations must act forcefully against Saddam or the United States will. In 10 days in September, Bush blew away most of his critics and lined up much of the world in the fight against Saddam. Iraq's disingenuous offer of a return to unconditional arms inspections didn't change that. Even the press was skeptical of Saddam's sudden eagerness to allow inspectors. Saddam, too, was reacting to the Bush campaign against him. Only he was too late. The exercise of presidential power had already assured that, one way or another, he is doomed. Fred Barnes is executive editor of The Weekly Standard. weeklystandard.com

To: Ilaine who wrote (45284)	9/20/2002 3:57:47 AM
From: frankw1900	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Am I being a pain in the ass when I keep bringing up the fact that one of Dubya's campaign promises was that the US would no longer be the policeman of the world? Hey, there's a fee for being the only super power and it's this: you can't stay home and everyone, sooner or later, is going to try it on with you one way or another. US doesn't have to be the whole world's policeman but it does have to get its ducks in a row. Everyone expects it and gets all antsy when it doesn't. Something like 9/11 needs a big, thorough response. If that doesn't happen then the small sharks start to nibble - just a taste to see if the whale is moribund. Here in Washington we talk about "mission creep." That's when the thing you were tasked to do keeps morphing and engulfing everything else. Yup. I worked for a company that evaluated government programs. Usually problematical programs were non, or ill, defined, and started as a response to a symptomatic problem rather than a systemic one. Very often the government stuck with symptomatic treatment rather than face the difficulty (political and practical, but mostly political) of dealing with systemic malaise. You got bears in town - you can kill them one by one or clean up the dump that attracts them. Practically, you'll have to do both for a while. Terrorists attack your major city, killing lots of people. You can kill the terrorists one by one or deal with the governments, organizations, and conditions producing them. In the real world you have to do both. If a program is well defined you don't get "mission creep." Often there is a definition of the program or mission but it derives from poor analysis - which itself usually come from too narrow a focus. I don't know exactly where you live but here is an example of what I'm talking about and I bet dollars to doughnuts, that in your professional capacity you've seen this: Juvenile delinquents are extremely difficult for legal system to deal with. There are special laws applying to them, special programs for trying them, for incarcerating them, for reforming them. These special things keep proliferating, don't they [mission creep]? So what is the most important thing in dealing with a young malefactor when you actually look at him or her? Its their subjective experience of time and their feeling of immortality. Six weeks, three months, six months, a year, is too long to wait for trial - that's the subjective equivalent of years for adults. The seriousness of the process is dissipated, etc, etc. All of the above is arguable, but lets suppose I'm right. What we see then is that the most important thing (necessary celerity of justice due to nature of young subjectivity) is subordinated to the special laws and programs. And that's the source of mission creep. In the case of 9/11 aftermath what needs dealing with for certain: the criminals that did it; the organizations that supported it; the governments that actively and passively supported them, then and now; the ideological movement that gives permission to commit such evil; and the wider political environment which impedes and supports action. You have to decide which of these things is most important, in the past, right now, in the future, and all the time Then you need a program to deal with each of these and a program to be sure these programs support each other. Each program has a natural life and has to wind up and wind down. Circumstances change and so they must be modifiable. The trouble with political-military campaigns is that, especially at the start, you have to try a lot of things because you're not sure what's going to work, or even know yet what's really important. You can be informed by analysis and theory, so it's not completely trial and error, but you still have to try things out and on a large scale and at scale, things tend to take on a life of their own. Is there mission creep? Ask, are the most important goals defined and are they being served by the various programs or are they being subordinated to them.