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To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (6775)9/19/2002 7:15:34 PM
From: 4figureau  Respond to of 89467
 
J.P. Morgan, Citigroup Winning in Asset-Backeds

By Edward Leefeldt

>>ABS investors can add Congress to their list of worries. More people may rush to file for bankruptcy in coming months because lawmakers are considering enacting legislation that would make it tougher for people to seek protection from creditors, says Barclays Capital's Salmon. While similar proposals have bogged down in Congress in the past, President George W. Bush has said he'd sign the current bill if lawmakers pass it.<<

New York, Sept. 19 (Bloomberg) -- These are uneasy times in the $7 trillion market for asset-backed securities -- bonds typically backed by payments on credit card debt, auto loans or second mortgages or by corporate bonds.

Since January, a record 21 ABS issuers have defaulted, according to Standard & Poor's. This year, S&P has cut the credit ratings of 409 ABS issues, an all-time high.

Another 2002 record for this market was set in the area of sales. Even as the risks grow, banks are selling new asset backeds as never before. U.S. sales of those securities rose 15 percent to $265 billion during the first eight months of 2002, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. At that rate, sales for the entire year may reach $398 billion, topping the 2001 record of $372 billion, bankers say.

``It's a huge market,'' says Joseph Lorusso, who manages about $2 billion at Structured Finance Advisors in Hartford, Connecticut.

Investors in this mostly AAA-rated world may be headed for more shocks. Many of the raw materials that bankers have used for constructing the securities have grown weaker since the U.S. economy slid into recession in March 2001.

WorldCom

This past July, the bankruptcy of just one company --WorldCom Inc. -- touched off a chain reaction of trading losses in the market for collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. Those securities use money generated by pools of corporate bonds to pay holders interest and principal. Underwriters had packaged WorldCom bonds into about a hundred different CDOs, according to Merrill Lynch & Co. People who bought those investments could lose $400 million, Merrill says.

The U.S. Congress, meantime, is considering at least two measures that could pose new dangers for ABS investors.

``These are uncertain, painful times,'' says Jeff Salmon, director of ABS research at Barclays Capital Inc.

Uncertain, painful -- and profitable for underwriters. Over the past four years, firms such as J. P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Credit Suisse First Boston have shot to the top of this business at the expense of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Merrill Lynch, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Banks Win

Big banks have an edge in the ABS market because their large balance sheets enable them to offer credit lines to companies in exchange for underwriting business. At stake in this market are underwriting fees that are likely to reach $1 billion in 2002, according to Bloomberg data.

During the first half of 2002, J.P. Morgan underwrote 22.4 percent of the 50 largest car loan transactions -- measured by U.S. dollar value -- thereby giving the bank the lead in that field for a second consecutive year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

J.P. Morgan also underwrote 25.8 percent of the largest credit card deals, ousting Salomon Smith Barney, the securities and underwriting arm of Citigroup Inc., from its No. 1 perch; Salomon dropped to second place, with 19.8 percent. Credit Suisse First Boston sold 29.4 percent of the largest CDO issues, leading that business for a second year. Countrywide Securities Corp., the securities arm of mortgage company Countrywide Credit Industries Inc., underwrote 20 percent of the biggest home equity issues, displacing the 2001 leader, Bank of America Corp., which dropped to No. 3.

Consumer Ills

Underwriters create asset-backed securities by bundling together millions or even billions of dollars of individual loans or bonds and dividing the securities backed by the collateral into classes ranked according to the order in which holders get back cash if borrowers fail to make payments on the underlying loans. Credit card issues typically comprise three or more classes, with the highest -- usually 80-90 percent of an issue -- getting first dibs on payments from the underlying loans. The lower classes absorb any losses first, helping protect the senior securities.

U.S. consumers have missed or delayed so many credit card payments lately that some of these securities have run into trouble. In June, income from credit card loans backing $3.3 billion of securities issued by J.P. Morgan and FleetBoston Financial Corp. fell so low that Daniel Castro, head of asset- backed research at Merrill, warned that soon there might not be enough cash to pay ABS investors. In the end, collections rebounded in July. If they hadn't, Morgan and Fleet might've been forced to repay the $3.3 billion in principal immediately. Like many asset backeds, these securities have early-redemption clauses obliging the issuers to redeem the bonds if the loans no longer generate more than enough interest to cover bond payments.

`Sacrosanct AAA'

While Morgan and Fleet avoided the early payout, the experience suggests that even the highest classes of card securities may no longer be ensured of AAA ratings, Castro says. ``Sacrosanct AAA has become quite vulnerable,'' he says.

These days, many consumers aren't paying their bills, and people in the U.S. are going bankrupt at a record pace. Nearly 391,000 people filed for bankruptcy in the second quarter alone, according to the American Bankruptcy Institute. The percentage of U.S. credit card debt that banks label uncollectible ran at a record 7 percent from March to June, according to S&P.

Companies that make consumer and home loans to customers with weak credit histories and that package that debt into securities have been hit especially hard. From 1999 to 2002, NextCard Inc. sold $1.2 billion of asset backeds while growing into the largest marketer of credit cards on the Internet. Last February, the U.S. comptroller of the currency ordered the closure of the company's NextBank unit, saying NextCard had failed to spot credit problems.

Sub Prime Scrutiny

``NextCard cost us $300 million-$400 million,'' says David Barr, a spokesman for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., which guarantees U.S. bank deposits. The FDIC stepped in to keep NextCard's asset-backed securities from paying out early by injecting money into NextCard. Most of the company's loans had been packaged into bonds, Barr says.

The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, an umbrella group for U.S. financial regulators, has been scrutinizing other sub prime lenders that tap the ABS market. In July, Capital One Financial Corp. stock plunged 40 percent in one day after regulators ordered the consumer finance company to set aside more money to cover loan losses.

Lisa Brown-Premo, who helps manage $32 billion in bonds at Evergreen Asset Management, a unit of Wachovia Corp., says she's reluctant to buy more asset backeds, given such troubles in the market.

``We're not adding assets,'' Brown-Premo says. ``I see more negatives now than in the past.''

Congress Threatens

ABS investors can add Congress to their list of worries. More people may rush to file for bankruptcy in coming months because lawmakers are considering enacting legislation that would make it tougher for people to seek protection from creditors, says Barclays Capital's Salmon. While similar proposals have bogged down in Congress in the past, President George W. Bush has said he'd sign the current bill if lawmakers pass it.

Another bill before Congress, the Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002, would give employees and retirees an edge over ABS investors when some companies fail. Right now, ABS buyers get first dibs on the assets backing their securities. As a result, S&P and Moody's Investors Service usually rate a company's asset backeds higher than its corporate debt. The bill would put other creditors first in line when a company collapses because of fraud.

Alexander Dill, an analyst at Moody's, says lawmakers will probably rewrite the legislation so it doesn't hurt ABS investors. If the current bill passes, however, it would radically change the market. ``You could never assign a rating to an ABS that was higher than the company's bonds,'' Dill says.

Accounting Changes

The Financial Accounting Standards Board, meantime, is considering a proposal to tighten the rules governing off-balance- sheet financing -- a switch that could make it tougher to sell new asset backeds. Enron Corp. had used special purpose entities with names like Chewco and Jedi to hide debt and losses. Companies that sell asset-backeds typically set up SPEs to hold the assets backing their securities. The setup lets issuers shift those assets off their balance sheets.

A big change in the rules governing SPEs could hamper the growth of both CDOs and the $700 billion market in asset-backed commercial paper, some investors say.

``A cloud of uncertainty hovers over the market,'' says Joseph Sheridan, a managing director at S&P. FASB officials say they plan to put new rules into effect in 2003.

For now, the deals keep coming: After Moody's cut Ford Motor Co.'s credit rating to Baa1 from A3 in January, Ford went on to sell $17.2 billion of securities backed by car loans during the first half of 2002, up from $9.3 billion in the first six months of 2001. Ford says it's cheaper to sell ABSs than ordinary debt.

`Two Markets'

MBNA America Bank NA, a unit of MBNA Corp., sold $450 million of credit card securities in August after saying it might set aside $300 million to cover losses on its card accounts.

Providian Financial Corp. wants to sell as much as $2 billion of credit card securities by year-end, says spokesman Alan Elias. Since September 2001, Providian stock has plunged 84 percent -- closing at $5.09 on Sept. 17 -- because many of its credit card customers have failed to pay their bills.

And as some investors fret about a potential bubble in the U.S. housing market, Gyan Sinha, head of asset-backed research at Bear Stearns & Co., says sales of securities backed by second mortgages may rise to $90 billion during the second half of 2002 from $63.4 billion in the first half, as more and more people tap equity in their homes.

``This is a tale of two markets,'' says Brian Clarkson, a senior managing director at Moody's. ``The headlines are terrible, but the bankers and issuers say it's great.'' So far, anyway.

Rank Volume Market 2002 2001 Autos (billions) Share% 1 1 J.P. Morgan Chase $11.9 22.4 2 11 Banc One Capital Markets 8.2 15.5 3 4 Bank of America 6.8 12.8 4 5 Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown 6.4 12.0 5 7 Morgan Stanley 4.5 8.5

CDOs 1 1 Credit Suisse First Boston $6.0 29.4 2 5 Deutsche Banc Alex. Brown 3.6 17.8 3 7 Wachovia Securities* 1.9 9.2 4 2 J. P. Morgan Chase 1.7 8.4 5 NA WestLB Panmure 1.0 4.9

Credit cards 1 2 J. P. Morgan Chase $9.5 25.8 2 1 Salomon Smith Barney 7.3 19.8 3 4 Banc One Capital Markets 4.1 11.0 4 3 Deutsche Bank Alex. Brown 4.0 10.7 5 5 Morgan Stanley 3.3 9.0

Home equity 1 9 Countrywide Securities $9.9 20.0 3 5 Credit Suisse First Boston 8.4 17.0 3 1 Banc of America 7.7 15.5 4 2 Bear Stearns 4.2 8.4 5 8 Morgan Stanley 3.9 7.8

*Formerly First Union Securities. Includes the 50 largest Dollar- denominated issues with settlement dates in the first Halves of 2001 and 2002. Lead managers get full credit; co-lead managers share credit equally. Source: Bloomberg

quote.bloomberg.com



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (6775)9/19/2002 8:12:51 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 89467
 
J.P Morgan's Warning Is So 1998

By Aaron L. Task
Senior Writer
09/19/2002 04:57 PM EDT

The echoes of Long Term Capital Management's implosion still reverberate on Wall Street -- and not just because the Dow Jones Industrial Average dipped below 8000, meaning it is essentially unchanged since September 1998.

The core lesson of Long Term Capital's shocking fall that autumn was that at extreme junctures, financial markets operate in ways that make models based on historic norms worthless, if not cancerous -- even those created by Nobel laureates. Yet recent announcements by J.P. Morgan (JPM:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis) and Fannie Mae (FNM:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis) suggest how the illusion of control that helped doom Long Term Capital remains very much a part of the firmament on Wall Street.

The most commonly used risk-management tools "rely on continuous, normally distributed markets, which isn't reality," observed Diane Garnick, global equity strategist at State Street in Boston. "Market practioners need to rely on expecting the unexpected, which academics can't model."

But the cases of J.P. Morgan and Fannie Mae suggest some firms are still prepared only for the expected, with disturbing echoes of Long Term Capital's fall.

Because of its early successes and high-profile partners, Long Term was able to leverage its roughly $2 billion capital base by a factor of more than 20 to 1 (some press reports in 1998 said as much as 80 to 1). After the Asian financial crises in 1997 and Russian debt default in 1998, Long Term Capital faced huge trading losses, prompting the Federal Reserve to arrange a bailout by its Wall Street lenders, whose own financial health was perceived to be at risk.

State Street's Garnick, who observed similarities to 1998 back in June, said yesterday, "I don't see a specific organization behaving like Long Term Capital."

But J.P. Morgan is the second-largest U.S. bank while Fannie Mae has the largest fixed-income portfolio. Furthermore, they are the world's largest dealer and customer of derivatives, respectively. Problems with either firm would have widespread implications for the financial markets, and the Fed is less able to help today than it was in 1998, what with the fed funds rate already at a 40-year low.

Seeing Ghosts, Part 1

Late Tuesday, J.P. Morgan warned about its third-quarter results, citing "high commercial credit costs concentrated in the telecom and cable sectors" as well as weak trading results. The former garnered loads of media attention, as it's easy to explain how lending to now-bankrupt telecoms caused J.P. Morgan's level of nonperforming assets to jump by nearly $1 billion in the first two months of the third quarter (even if the company was very circumspect about what, exactly, occurred to cause the jump).

As for the latter, Marc Shapiro, head of risk management at J.P. Morgan, said in a conference call Tuesday evening that the firm's trading revenue fell to $100 million in July and August from $1.1 billion in the second quarter, because "the normal diversification benefit we get from trading different instruments was not as prevalent in these periods as in the past." Shapiro stressed the losses were "not particularly concentrated" in any one area and that all trading units were within pre-established risk levels.

Basically what Shapiro and Chairman and CEO William Harrison said was that "everybody lost a little, and collectively, J.P. Morgan lost a lot" (or made a relatively paltry sum) observed Jim Bianco, president of Bianco Research in Barrington, Ill. "They should know that's exactly what happens when markets get under stress. In a crisis, markets become emotional and trade off the focal point, which is typically the stock market. In times of stress [their 'diversified' portfolio] becomes a giant bet on the S&P 500."

Such damaging correlations will happen to J.P. Morgan "again and again," he predicted, suggesting "the only thing that's going to bail them out is a bull market. Unless we have one, they've got real problems."

Because of J.P. Morgan's dominance of the derivatives market -- it's involved in $25.9 trillion, or 51%, of the $50.8 trillion notional value of contracts involving U.S. commercial banks and trust companies, according to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's second-quarter bank derivatives report -- some believe its potential problems have immense implications, on a far greater scale than even Long Term Capital Management.

"This isn't a bank but a hedge fund -- a hedge fund that makes LTCM and Enron look like T-bill money market funds," said Jim Pulplava, president of Puplava Financial Services, a Poway, Calif.-based firm with about $200 million under management.

The majority of J.P. Morgan's derivative contracts are not exchange traded, Pulplava noted, meaning "you don't know what the value is until you are forced to sell them in the marketplace."

Recalling past debacles, the fund manager and radio personality observed: "Most blowups occur when a financial entity has to unwind its positions and finds no buyers. The same thing that happened to Long Term Capital and Enron could happen to J.P. Morgan."

In the recent past, J.P. Morgan has countered such criticisms by noting that the vast majority of its derivatives exposure is with investment-grade counterparties and that its direct exposure is a very small percentage (less than 5%) of the derivatives' notional value, which refers to the total value of the contract. Yesterday, Bloomberg quoted a company spokesman as saying the firm's capital ratios and cash reserves exceed adequate levels and that the firm's liquidity is strong.

In the wake of the company's profit warning, Standard & Poor's lowered J.P. Morgan's credit rating to A-plus. The downgrade will have "some impact [but] a small impact" on J.P. Morgan's derivatives business, said Dina Dublon, J.P. Morgan's head of finance, on the firm's conference call. But she noted that J.P. Morgan maintains a double-A rating on its senior bank debt and "doesn't expect any meaningful impact" on its derivatives book.

Such comments did not alleviate the concerns of Pulplava, among others. J.P. Morgan "really is a house of cards standing on itself," he said in an interview Thursday.

Pulplava was particularly concerned about comments from S&P analyst Tanya Azarchs. In a conference call yesterday Azarchs said "we don't think the worst is over" for J.P. Morgan and that the firm needs to show "no other fundamental issues or surprises" in 2003 to avoid another ratings cut.

That's significant, because while an A-plus rating "may not hurt them all that much," another downgrade to single-A or below "is a breakpoint that has some significance," Azarchs said. "It could cause a downward spiral, [and] we can't not downgrade just because it might cause that downward spiral."

Isolated?

Nevertheless, many on Wall Street believe the firm's problems are its own and not a "systemic threat."

J.P. Morgan's problems were that "they were heavily lending to companies who were never going to produce positive cash flow," according to Sean Reidy, a portfolio manager at Robert Olstein & Associates, which has $1.4 billion under management. But whereas Long Term Capital was writing contracts with almost every firm on Wall Street and able to dramatically leverage its bets, "these guys have reserves," he said. "I don't think the risk of [nonperforming] loans is going to effect them materially in the long run."

Olstein & Associates has no position in J.P. Morgan. The fund manager suggested late Wednesday that the declines in names it does own, including Morgan Stanley (MWD:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis) and Merrill Lynch (MER:NYSE - news - commentary - research - analysis), were based on "sympathy with J.P. Morgan, not fundamentals."

Such attitudes suggest why each of the aforementioned closed well off session lows Wednesday, as did the Amex Broker/Dealer Index, which ended off 0.7% to 390.54 after having traded as low as 382.95. Thursday afternoon, the index closed down 5.6% to 368.73, thanks largely to Morgan Stanley's disappointing earnings repot Thursday morning, which is a fundamental issue.

Meanwhile, Bianco agreed that J.P. Morgan is not likely to be named "Miss Long Term Capital Management 2002." But he does worry that Fannie Mae could be a potential heir to Long Term Capital's tainted tiara, an argument we will examine in Part 2.



To: Jim Willie CB who wrote (6775)9/19/2002 8:32:43 PM
From: SOROS  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 89467
 
U.S. Slams German Minister for Bush-Hitler Comment

reuters.com