'Even if Iraq managed to hide these weapons, what they are now hiding is harmless goo'
Page 2
Thursday September 19, 2002
The Guardian
guardian.co.uk
Biological weapons
R: If you listen to Richard Butler, biological weapons are a
"black hole" about which we know nothing. But a review of the
record reveals we actually know quite a bit. We monitored more
biological facilities than any other category, inspecting more
than 1,000 sites and repeatedly monitoring several hundred. We
found the same problem with biological weapons programmes
that we found with VX: it took Iraq four years even to admit to
having such a programme. They denied it from 1991 to 1995,
finally admitting it that summer.
P: What did they try to make?
R: They didn't just try. They actually made it, primarily anthrax
in liquid bulk agent form. They also produced a significant
quantity of liquid botulinum toxin. They were able to weaponise
both of these, put them in warheads and bombs. They lied about
this capability for some time. When they finally admitted it in
1995, we got to work on destroying the factories and equipment
that produced it.
Contrary to popular mythology, there is no evidence that Iraq
worked on smallpox, Ebola, or any other horrific nightmare
weapons the media likes to talk about today.
The Al Hakumfactory provides a case study of the difficulties we
faced, and how we dealt with them. We had known of this plant
since 1991, and had inspectors there who were very suspicious.
Iraq declared it to be a single-cell protein manufacturing plant
used to produce animal feed. That was ridiculous. No one
produces animal feed that way. It would be the most expensive
animal feed in the world. The place had high-quality fermentation
and other processing units. We knew it was a weapons plant.
The Iraqis denied it. Finally they admitted it, and we blew up the
plant.
Iraq was able to produce liquid bulk anthrax. That is without
dispute. Liquid bulk anthrax, even under ideal storage
conditions, germinates in three years, becoming useless. So,
even if Iraq lied to us and held on to anthrax - and there's no
evidence to substantiate this - it is pure theoretical speculation
on the part of certain inspectors. Iraq has no biological weapons
today, because both the anthrax and botulinum toxin are
useless. For Iraq to have biological weapons today, they would
have to reconstitute a biological manufacturing base. And again,
biological research and development was one of the things most
heavily inspected. We blanketed Iraq - every research and
development facility, every university, every school, every
hospital, every beer factory: anything with a potential
fermentation capability was inspected - and we never found any
evidence of ongoing research and development or retention.
Delivery systems
R: Iraq is prohibited from having ballistic missiles with a range
greater than 150 kilometres, but permitted to have missile
systems with a lesser range. Iraq was working on two designs.
One was a solid rocket motor design, and the other, the Al
Samoud, uses liquid propulsion. We monitored this project very
closely, and found that the Iraqis have severe limitations on what
they can produce within the country. Prior to the Gulf war, Iraq
acquired a lot of technology, as well as parts, from Germany,
which has a record of precision machinery. After the war, the
Iraqis tried to replicate that, but with very little success. We
watched them assemble their rockets, and because many of the
members of our team were rocket scientists, we would notice
their mistakes. They had to show us their designs and, of
course, we didn't comment on them. But it quickly became
apparent that the programme was run by intelligent, energetic
amateurs who were just not getting it right. They would
manufacture rockets that would spin and cartwheel, that would
go north instead of south, that would blow up. Eventually they
would figure it out. But as of 1998 they were, according to
optimistic estimates, five years away, even if sanctions were
lifted and Iraq gained access to necessary technologies.
I often hear people talk about Iraq having multi-staging rockets.
But Iraq doesn't have multi-staging capability. They tried that
once in 1989, when the country had full access to this
technology, and the rocket blew up in midair. I hear people talk
aboutclustering, but Iraq tried that, too, and it didn't work. Iraq
doesn't have the capability to do long-range ballistic missiles.
There's a lot of testing that has to take place, and this testing is
all carried out outdoors. They can't avoid detection.
Of course, now the inspectors have left Iraq, we don't know what
happens inside factories. But that doesn't really matter, since
you have to bring rockets out and, fire them on test stands. This
is detectable. No one has detected any evidence of Iraq doing
this. Iraq continues to declare its missile tests, normally around
eight to 12 per year. Our radar detects the tests, we know what
the characteristics are, and we know there's nothing to be
worried about.
Ritter - the man
Scott Ritter was once the all-American hero. Now, at the age of
42, he is regarded by Washington as an apologist for Iraq,
branded in the New York Times as "the most famous renegade
marine officer since Oliver North".
A Republican-voting major in the Marine corps, he earned a
reputation as an expert intelligence officer and arms inspector in
the late 80s, performing arms control inspections in the former
Soviet Union. During the Gulf war he was assigned to an
intelligence unit of General Norman Schwartzkopf's staff
responsible for tracking Scud missiles.
Leaving in 1991, he was then recruited by Unscom, the UN
special commission authorised to find and destroy Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction. Seven years later, after frustrating
attempts to get behind Saddam's lies and concealments, he
resigned accusing the American government of trying to
engineer an unnecessary confrontation with Iraq and using
Unscom to spy on Iraq. But his conversion to full-time critic of
American policy was not instantaneous. Just after his
resignation he said: "I think the danger right now is that without
effective inspections, without effective monitoring, Iraq can, in a
very short period of time, reconstitute chemical biological
weapons, long-range ballistic missiles to deliver these weapons,
and even certain aspects of their nuclear weaponisation
programme." Only 100% disarmament would do, he insisted.
A year later, however, he was saying: "As of December 1998 we
had accounted for 90 to 95% of Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction capability. We destroyed all the factories, all of the
means of production. We couldn't account for some of the
weaponry, but chemical weapons have a shelf-life of five years.
Biological weapons have a shelf-life of three. To have weapons
today, they would have had to rebuild the factories and start
producing these weapons since December 1998."
In an interview this week, days after appealing to the Iraqi
national assembly to readmit the inspectors, he appears to have
hardened his position again. "The problem is the last time Iraq
chose to cheat and retreat, the UN did nothing about it. The US
was not a fair and honest broker in this game. We were pushing
a policy of regime removal that took precedent over
disarmament.
"So this time around, let us not play that game. Let us focus on
weapons of mass destruction, let us focus on doing what the
international community has said and, if Iraq chooses to play
cat and mouse and cheat, we don't play that game. We back off
and the security council takes decisive action."
David Pallister
guardian.co.uk |
