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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Rascal who wrote (45971)	9/21/2002 7:51:34 PM
From: Nadine Carroll	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

I didn't know the sanctions were off? De jure no, but de facto they're completely gone. Saddam's revenues have shot up, he now has plenty of money.

To: Rascal who wrote (45971)	9/22/2002 2:01:27 AM
From: stockman_scott	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 281500

Invade and Unleash? Saddam Hussein might see his biological weapons as an asset to be used only if he is on the brink of destruction. By William C. Potter Editorial The Washington Post Sunday, September 22, 2002 As the United States moves closer to war with Iraq, the Bush administration has sharpened its rationale for an attack: All remnants of Saddam Hussein's weapons-of-mass-destruction program must be destroyed. The return of U.N. inspectors, it is argued plausibly, might serve a number of useful purposes but cannot guarantee that disarmament outcome. The question no one in the administration wants to ask -- or answer -- is whether an invasion would guarantee the elimination of Iraq's biological weapons arsenal. An even more delicate question that has not been addressed publicly is whether an invasion might actually increase the likelihood of terrorist access to and acquisition of Iraq's deadly biological weapons assets. The answers to these questions are at best tentative and turn on many factors for which information is sketchy. It is reasonable, however, to assume that the stronger the argument about the limitations of U.N. inspections -- even if unconditional and unfettered -- the greater the difficulties a U.S.-led military force also would have in detecting and destroying concealed, mobile biological weapons stocks. To be sure, an occupying force would have several important advantages over an international inspection team. In particular, U.S. military forces could count on far more secure communications, rapid freedom of action and improved intelligence based upon new, on-the-ground sources. It would be imprudent, nevertheless, to presume that these significant assets would translate into the capability to identify and eliminate all of Iraq's biological weapons in a timely fashion. Hussein has repeatedly war-gamed a U.S. invasion. Surely he has taken steps to position his most lethal weapons at sites least susceptible to U.S interdiction. One cannot rule out the possibility that some of these weapons have been positioned outside Iraq, perhaps even on the territory of the United States and its allies, where their predesignated use awaits a specific turn of events. Little credible evidence has been provided regarding Iraqi ties to terrorists, at least in the recent past. There also is no reason to assume that Hussein has any incentive to share his weapons of mass destruction with anyone as long as he remains in power in Baghdad. It is less apparent, however, whether this proliferation disincentive would still apply under conditions in which his regime was collapsing and his power eroding. Indeed, much as Israel's nuclear force often is characterized as a "weapon of last resort," so might Iraq's biological weapons be viewed in Saddam Hussein's mind as an asset to be employed only if his regime were on the brink of destruction (as in, "If we are going to go, we'll take someone with us."). Even if biological weapons were not used militarily because of limited Iraqi delivery capabilities and possible U.S. preemptive action against missile and aircraft systems, we must assume that some biological weapons stocks might remain in the hands of Hussein's forces. In these circumstances, one also could imagine the remnants of Iraqi biological weapons finding their way into the hands of terrorists. Iraq's latest offer to accept the unconditional return of U.N. inspectors is unlikely to satisfy Washington's demands or to derail its plans for military action. I hope such plans are based on a more careful assessment of the implications for the use and proliferation of biological weapons than is obvious in public discussion to date. ______________________________________________________ The writer is director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. © 2002 The Washington Post Company washingtonpost.com

To: Rascal who wrote (45971)	9/22/2002 2:58:54 AM
From: stockman_scott	Respond to of 281500

A former weapons inspector rejects Bush's evidence by Jon Wiener LA Weekly Cover Story SEPTEMBER 20 - 26, 2002 SCOTT RITTER WAS SENIOR U.N. WEAPONS INSPECTOR IN Iraq from 1991 to 1998. For the last couple of years, the former U.S. Marines major has been a high-profile critic of U.S. policy against Iraq, arguing that Saddam Hussein represents no military threat. Last week, after President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair claimed to have evidence of new activity at a suspected Iraqi nuclear-weapons facility, Ritter traveled to Iraq and visited the site with a group of journalists and TV cameramen to demonstrate that Bush and Blair were wrong. He also spoke to the Iraqi parliament in Baghdad, urging it to head off U.S. military action by re-admitting U.N. inspectors and letting them do their job. A few days later, Iraq told the U.N. it was willing to submit once again to inspections. Jon Wiener spoke with Ritter before and after his visit last week to Baghad. Here's the link to the entire interview... laweekly.com <<...What if we are shown evidence that Iraq now possesses weapons of mass destruction? I believe that not only would the Security Council approve military action against Iraq under those circumstances, but we would have a large and viable coalition supporting us. But if Iraq has these weapons, the Bush administration needs to back up its rhetoric with evidence to support it. The fact that they haven't suggests they don't have the evidence, and that this is strictly about domestic American politics. You spoke to the Iraqi parliament, urging them to re-admit U.N. weapons inspectors. What kind of response did you receive from them? First let me explain why I spoke there. It was not in order to address Iraqi democracy. There is no democracy in Iraq. Their parliament is a Baath Party organization. I picked the parliament to use it as a platform to address the Iraqi government and also, frankly, to reach an American domestic audience. Decisions in Iraq are made not by the parliament but by the government -- and they were listening closely. Not only at the parliament but in my meeting with [Foreign Minister] Tariq Aziz and other ministers who advise the president. I told them all the same thing: If they didn't let inspectors in, and give them unfettered access, there would be war, and it would destroy their country. That message was received openly and understood clearly. How do you interpret Bush's speech to the U.N. on 9/12? If I believed the Bush administration was committed to disarming Iraq, that their final objective was eliminating weapons of mass destruction, I would be supportive of that speech. But it was a hypocritical speech -- because the final objective of the Bush administration is regime removal, pure and simple. Bush was saying the U.N. has to agree to remove Saddam's regime. But that runs counter to the U.N. Charter. The U.N. has never authorized regime removal in Iraq. That is purely a unilateral U.S. policy. It's been promoted since 1991 by James Baker under George Herbert Walker Bush. Baker made it clear at that time that even if Iraq complied with U.N. resolutions, sanctions would continue until Saddam was removed from power. This statement undermined the ability of the inspectors to work in Iraq. What motives do the Iraqis have to cooperate when the U.S. says their cooperation is irrelevant? Clinton and Madeleine Albright said the same thing. But no U.N. Security Council resolution talks about removing Saddam Hussein from power. What's the next move? The ball is now clearly in Iraq's court. The most important force that can head off this war is the government of Iraq itself. They must allow the unconditional return of U.N. inspectors with unfettered access. They've made it clear that they won't agree unless they can guarantee that inspectors won't be used to spy on them. There are some promising developments on that front. The Canadian prime minister appears to be ready to offer to serve as an honest broker between the inspectors and Iraq. Canada would monitor their interaction to ensure the inspectors don't go off task. Canada could be joined by South Africa, the leader of the nonaligned movement. And the government of Belgium, another member of NATO, is likewise contemplating serving as a guarantor of proper behavior by the inspectors. The question is whether these countries have the will to step forward. No nation has exhibited that yet. How much time do we have before war begins? The U.S. Central Command is deploying battle staff to Qatar. Six hundred officers will be positioned there in November. This means we're going to war soon. We're already bombing the Iraqis frequently. We already have troops deployed in the region. Deploying the battle staff in November, I think, means war is going to start maybe as soon as December or January...>>