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Politics : Stockman Scott's Political Debate Porch -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Raymond Duray who wrote (7042)	9/22/2002 2:05:05 AM
From: stockman_scott	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 89467

Remember the Gulf of Tonkin By Gar Alperovitz Editorial The Washington Post Sunday, September 22, 2002 I was a young Senate legislative aide in 1964, at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin crisis. Just as the Bush administration is now looking for a "reason" to go to war, in 1964 it was clear that the Johnson administration was desperately looking for some "reason" to expand the Vietnam War. It was also clear that the Johnson leadership team was not above creating or embroidering a reason -- or at least so it seemed to many of us working in the Senate at the time. When the reason occurred -- two alleged "unprovoked" mosquito-boat attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin -- a national crisis atmosphere was created and a resolution was introduced for congressional approval that gave the president the authority to respond to the provocation. It seemed obvious that there were many questions about the alleged events. The senator I worked for, Gaylord Nelson, put forward an amendment we drafted to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Its purpose was to restrict any response to only that which was "limited and fitting" to the actual provocation (if there actually was such a provocation). Among other things, the amendment stated that U.S. policy should be limited to the "provision of aid, training assistance and military advice." It concluded that it was "the sense of Congress that, except when provoked to a greater response, we should continue to attempt to avoid a direct military involvement." Like the Bush administration today, the Johnson administration in 1964 did not want any restricting amendments. It was interested in creating a crisis atmosphere and a rush to judgment. To buy off opponents, it permitted the then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. J. William Fulbright, to create a legislative record that could serve as a less-than-formal interpretation of the meaning of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution -- a tactic sometimes used to persuade senators to withdraw amendments. Fulbright, in turn, stated on the Senate floor that his understanding of the intent of the resolution was that it was to permit only a response appropriate to the alleged provocation. With such assurances, Nelson withdrew his amendment. The Johnson administration went on to use the Gulf of Tonkin resolution to justify its massive expansion of the war in Vietnam -- even though we now know that the incidents used to ram the resolution through Congress were highly dubious: The first appeared to have been provoked (the United States fired first), and the second may never have occurred. On many occasions later, Fulbright said that not including a formal limiting amendment to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was one of the greatest errors of his long and distinguished career in the U.S. Senate -- if not the greatest error he ever made. We are now faced with another administration urging another congressional resolution that will be used to authorize war. There will be many opportunities for "interpreting" alleged violations of agreements concerning disarmament inspections. And there will be many ways for the Bush administration to exaggerate, dramatize and publicize what may or may not be attempts to conceal weapons of mass destruction. If -- when -- the time comes, what will be needed are restraint and careful investigation, not hysteria. As in 1964, many senators and members of the House are frightened that taking a stance against the administration -- or even urging prudent limiting language -- might make them politically vulnerable. The lesson of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution is clear: There is every reason for tough and explicit limiting language that does not allow for the usual rhetorical gambits that thereafter can be used by an aggressive administration to claim support for whatever it wants to do, no matter what. ___________________________________________________________ The writer is the Lionel R. Bauman professor of political economy at the University of Maryland. He was a legislative director in both the House and Senate and a special assistant concerned with United Nations matters in the State Department. © 2002 The Washington Post Company washingtonpost.com