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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: JohnM who wrote (46219)9/22/2002 5:08:35 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
Congress must carefully debate Iraq issue

Lead Editorial
The San Diego Union-Tribune
September 21, 2002

By granting Congress the sole power to declare war, the framers of the Constitution envisioned a deliberative decision-making process before the nation engages in hostilities. As the Bush administration's confrontation with Iraq grows, lawmakers face no more-critical responsibility than debating a resolution authorizing the use of force against the Baghdad regime.

The congressional resolution drafted by the White House amounts to a broad declaration of war in the event Saddam Hussein fails to abide by the disarmament directives adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1991. Although the congressional document does not explicitly endorse "regime change," it would give the president ample power to overthrow the Iraqi government by military force if he chose to do so.

The implications of the proposed resolution are far-reaching. They include not only a costly war in which American lives would be sacrificed, but also the potential requirement for a prolonged U.S. military occupation to rebuild Iraq and a host of destabilizing impacts throughout the region. Congress must debate these policy implications carefully and not engage in an election-year stampede to appear tough on Hussein, regardless of the consequences.

At this stage, a congressional resolution approving U.S. military intervention could bolster President Bush's drive to get the Security Council to deal squarely with Iraq's flagrant violations of U.N. directives. It is essential, however, that the resolution do nothing to undercut the Security Council's effort to return arms inspectors to Iraq or undermine the chances for U.N. approval of a multilateral military campaign if inspections fail. Inspections under U.N. auspices must be given one more chance before resorting to war.

Robust, unfettered weapons inspections or, failing that, U.N. authorization for military action against Iraq are both infinitely preferable to a go-it-alone war waged by the United States and Britain.

signonsandiego.com



To: JohnM who wrote (46219)9/22/2002 7:10:02 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Saudis Say the U.S., Not Iraq, Threatens Stability

Mideast: Many believe Saddam Hussein has been subdued by his military defeats but would be provoked by an invasion.


By MICHAEL SLACKMAN
LOS ANGELES TIMES STAFF WRITER
September 22, 2002

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia -- This longtime ally of America isn't convinced that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein poses a serious and imminent military threat to regional stability and security. That threat, Saudi Arabia believes, comes from another source: the United States, top officials say.

Many here believe that Hussein has been chastened by his military failures and is unlikely to wage war on his neighbors--unless the U.S. decides to invade.

"The U.S. may know something about the existence of chemical weapons in Iraq, but we are not sure," said the nation's longtime security chief, Interior Minister Prince Nayif ibn Abdulaziz, adding that a U.S. attack on Iraq would create problems in the region "faster than any Iraqi operation against its neighbors."

For more than 70 years, Saudi Arabia and the United States have had close ties, a marriage of convenience that has served their mutual political and strategic interests. But relations have been strained since the Sept. 11 attacks on the U.S., and the priorities of both countries have diverged.

The U.S. government wants Hussein ousted. The Saudi leadership wants the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolved first. Neither side has been willing to budge.

Against this backdrop, the White House faces the prospect of waging a major military campaign in the Persian Gulf region without the key strategic support of Saudi Arabia.

"The Saudis don't regard Saddam as a military threat," said a high-level Western diplomat based here in Riyadh, the capital. "For the Saudis, he is a political threat. The Saudis fear U.S. military action will not only divert attention and break up a coalition to fight terrorism but will also foster terrorism."

So far, the Saudi government has been very clear. If the U.S. goes it alone, without the endorsement of the United Nations, the Saudi government will refuse to allow the use of its territory.

When authorities said recently that they would allow U.S. forces to operate here if there is a U.N. resolution, observers say, the goal was to thwart a war by pressuring Hussein to let in weapons inspectors. It was not meant as a nod to the U.S. agenda, they say.

"Anything that will avoid military operations against Iraq, or military operations in the region, will be a positive act," Nayif said in an interview.

This reluctance to attack Iraq reflects the significant differences between what is happening today and what occurred in 1990, when Hussein invaded Kuwait and the entire area felt threatened by the region's largest armed force.

"Saddam's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 posed the gravest threat to Saudi Arabia's security that I had yet encountered in my military career," Prince Khaled bin Sultan wrote in "Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander." "Our vital oil-producing Eastern province--the principal source of our national wealth--lay open to his mechanized and armored divisions."

Saudi Arabia is a large land mass, with a relatively small population living on top of a valuable resource: one-fourth of the world's known oil reserves. It is surrounded by unpredictable neighbors, such as Iraq and Iran, and its leadership strives to preserve credibility in a nation that has blended political and religious authority. An alliance with the United States has helped the Saud dynasty maintain the status quo.

For these reasons, Saudi Arabia continues to allow the U.S. to fly military patrols over a "no-fly" zone set up in southern Iraq after the 1991 Persian Gulf War and allowed America to use a high-tech command center to run the war in Afghanistan.

Although the United States has moved thousands of its troops out of the kingdom, about 5,000 U.S. military personnel remain in Saudi Arabia, as well as the command center, which could be quietly used in an Iraqi operation.

At the moment, officials, diplomats and political observers say there is no fear that Baghdad will attack any neighbor. But there is a fear that if the U.S. strikes, Hussein could lash out, perhaps targeting the oil fields.

U.S. officials in the region are paying close attention to what the Saudi government is saying, although they say there is no sign that it is wavering in its opposition to a war. Saudi Arabia's leadership has a reputation of choosing its words carefully and rarely being duplicitous.

"They conceivably could have a powerful role if they offered facilities to support some sort of response to Iraq's flouting of U.N. resolutions," said a high-level U.S. diplomat from the region. "It would be practically very important--plus, it would be a huge signal throughout the Arab world."

Even during the Gulf War there were elements of concern, ideas that today have come to define the national policy. Some Saudi leaders didn't like the idea of Arabs fighting Arabs, and they worried that an invasion of Iraq could have negative consequences for the rest of the region.

"Our fear is that a defeat will be inflicted on them, dividing and scattering their ranks and fragmenting their unity into ethnic groups," Crown Prince Abdullah was quoted as saying in Joseph Kechichian's book "Succession in Saudi Arabia."

In the end, almost everyone, including Abdullah and the nation's top religious leaders, accepted the idea of allowing foreign forces to join a military coalition based on the Arabian peninsula.

The war was successful, Hussein's military was defeated, and, for a short time, Saudis thanked America for its help.

But the anti-American sentiment started with a growing sense of embarrassment among Saudis who questioned why they could not defend themselves--especially after their leaders had spent hundreds of millions of dollars on weapons.

The hostility was stoked by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the early days of the current Bush administration, in particular, the government here grew incensed at the White House's hands-off policy.

But as important as the Palestinian issue is to the Saudis, nothing has set back relations as drastically as the Sept. 11 attacks. Americans may feel that they have been double-dealt by the Saudis' conservative religious system, but the Saudis feel that their faith and culture have been demonized by the secular West.

"It's like a bad marriage. Neither one of us are listening to each other. And no one is taking the other seriously," said the Western diplomat based here. "We see each other as the problem."

This presents more than a public relations challenge. The leadership in each country finds itself under increasing pressure to redefine relations with the other.

Since the Sept. 11 attacks, the Saudi government has tried to tone down the outward expression of anti-American sentiment in the kingdom, and to some extent it has succeeded.

But it has done little to extinguish those feelings--and has been careful not to offend religious conservatives.

"You are an American, you are a terrorist," said Ahmed, a farmer in the central province of Qassim, a poor religious and independent agricultural area that has presented the regime with some of its most vociferous religious critics. "We call you to be Muslims, to be brothers. Instead, you fight the whole world."

Over and over, in interviews in cafes and university offices, in the poorest neighborhoods and the highest levels of government, Saudis expressed a belief that they are victims of America's misdirected anger.

"Concerning the relationship, there are no changes accorded from our side," said Saleh ibn Humaid, who chairs the Shura Council, an appointed consultative body. "The U.S. is fully responsible [for a worsening of relations] for one reason: If, after the 11th of September, some Saudi names appeared in this case, it should have been treated like individuals, but not by accusing the government."

Many people here believe that America has targeted their religion.

Because Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state, with the Koran as its constitution and religious law, called Sharia, as its guide, criticism of any aspect of the way people here live is seen as a criticism of their faith.

The issue of charity is an example. U.S. investigators have said that Saudis--individually and through the government--gave millions of dollars to charitable organizations that, in some cases, then funneled the money to terrorist groups.

Many Saudis see the U.S. finger-pointing as a criticism of one of the five pillars of Islam: charity.

"Yes, many Saudis used to give to charity--never, never ever for [Osama] bin Laden or Al Qaeda or any terrorist organization," said Mohammad bin Saad al Salam, president of Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University in Riyadh.

"You give your contributions [and] you are limited about what you know about this. To perform Islam you have to give--it's your responsibility. You are not a Muslim if you don't do that."

The gap in understanding is so great that Interior Minister Nayif, while emphasizing how strongly his nation condemned the Sept. 11 attacks, insisted that there is no credible evidence that Bin Laden or the 19 suspected hijackers either planned or carried out the attacks. And he said that if they did do it, some other organization was behind them.

"Personally, I think Al Qaeda is not qualified and doesn't have the ability to do such a big and criminal action such as happened in the Sept. 11 attack," he said.

"In any case, we cannot say for sure. They claim that they did it. At the same time, maybe they were an agent for those people who asked them to do it, or those people who are really behind it."

Although Nayif's conspiracy ideas are popular, they are not universal. There are others who believe that Bin Laden was responsible and that he has achieved one of his main goals: driving a wedge between Saudi Arabia and the United States.

"He succeeded, really," said Salam, the university president. "We never dreamed we would be treated like an enemy of the United States."

This sense of distrust, and the widespread feeling of victimization, plays a role in what course of action the Saudi government will play if the United States asks for help with Iraq.

"People here don't trust America," said a prominent religious leader, Sheik Salman al Odah. "They think America is a real danger."

latimes.com



To: JohnM who wrote (46219)9/22/2002 8:04:41 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Analysts: New Strategy Courts Unseen Dangers

First Strike Could Be Precedent for Other Nations

By Peter Slevin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, September 22, 2002; Page A01

The Bush administration's declared willingness to attack potential enemies before they strike represents a new chapter in strategic doctrine that heightens the danger of unintended consequences and raises the pressure on the U.S. national security system to get things right the first time, military and diplomatic analysts say.

Made official on Friday, the dramatic change in the decades-old strategy of deterrence and containment puts an option into play that could be effective against rogue states, according to experts. But they warned that the shift to preemption also risks establishing a precedent for countries whose motives or timing the U.S. government may not support.

Just as Russia, India and Israel cited last year's U.S.-led assault on Afghanistan to justify aggressive measures against opponents they labeled terrorists, a preemptive attack by the United States on another country could prompt other governments to bypass the United Nations and launch a unilateral strike against a foe.

"What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander," said Oxford University professor Adam Roberts. "I have to say it puzzles America's allies that that danger doesn't seem to be fully grasped."

Preemptive military action would require the administration to draw early conclusions about a rival nation's capabilities and intent, placing a premium on accurate intelligence and judgment. It would necessitate a clear public case to avoid sharpening the perception that the United States plays by its own rules in foreign affairs.

And the military would have to strike with precision, as the danger of retaliation would be great, defense analyst Harlan Ullman said.

"You don't get a second chance," said Ullman, author of "Unfinished Business -- Afghanistan, the Middle East and Beyond," an assessment of international threats. "Preemption assumes a quick, decisive, relatively inexpensive victory. If that does not happen, you may not have the necessary logic and rationale for a long-term campaign."

President Bush laid out his argument for beating an enemy to the punch in his National Security Strategy, released Friday. He declared the shift, part of a policy designed to maintain a "balance of power that favors human freedom," at the same time the administration has announced its intention to disarm Iraq -- unilaterally and by force, if necessary.

For the president's national security team, the strategy document makes explicit a tactic that every administration has contemplated in contingency planning but few have applied. Senior officials contend that aggressive "anticipatory action" is a weapon more suited to threats posed by terrorists and terror-sponsoring states than the more passive Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment.

No longer is the military power of the United States sufficient to dissuade opponents from attacking American interests, the thinking goes. And no longer, by implication, is the Bush team confident that U.S. interests can be defended properly by collective action, whether sponsored by the 19-nation NATO alliance or the cumbersome machinery of the United Nations Security Council.

"The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends," the National Security Strategy asserts. "The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just."

Yet, to some observers, the very act of one country preemptively attacking another carries troubling echoes of vigilante justice when much of the world is working toward common understandings about the use of force.

"It's a violation of the U.N. Charter. It's a violation of the NATO charter," said Sam Gardiner, a retired Air Force colonel who has taught strategy at the National War College. If preemption as a policy takes hold, Gardiner asked, "where does it stop?"

On Sept. 11, just as Bush was preparing to tell world leaders that the United States would act alone against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein if no one else would, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a determination of his own. He said Russia would be justified in launching attacks on Chechen rebels who seek refuge in neighboring Georgia. The Bush administration objected.

Ullman worries that countries fearing a preemptive strike would develop stronger deterrent weapons. He gave Iran as an example, saying that a Tehran government might hurry its nuclear weapons program after seeing the United States lead an assault on Iraq, along with Iran a part of Bush's "axis of evil." Others have asked whether Pakistan, feeling pushed into desperation by India and its significant superiority in conventional forces, would feel freer to use nuclear weapons as a first strike.

When deterrence ruled the strategic calculations during the Cold War, understandings among rival governments were generally clear. Superpowers knew that certain behavior could trigger a response.

During the Cuban missile crisis, President John F. Kennedy, armed with reconnaissance photographs of missile sites in Cuba, ordered a blockade of the island and told Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev to remove them or face destruction of the sites. The Soviets backed down.

These days, the threats posed by chemical, biological and nuclear weapons are more diffuse and the rules less clear. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said earlier this year that the United States could not always afford to wait for "absolute proof" before challenging terrorist groups or countries that are thought to possess weapons of mass destruction.

If preemption became widely acceptable, according to some military experts, one country fearing an assault might attack its rival first, preempting the preemptor and escalating a conflict that might have been resolved without force. Or a nation under a sudden attack might choose to deploy chemical, biological or nuclear weapons it otherwise might not use.

Brussels-based analyst Robert Kagan believes the dangers of the new doctrine can be overstated.

"I don't think we're moving into the age of preemption," Kagan said. "I don't think other nations are being restrained from taking action by the fact that no one has set the precedent of preemption. That's not why China is not attacking Taiwan. That's not why India is not attacking Pakistan."

"They're making calculations based on their own national interest and the relationships of international power," he said.

Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, a retired Army general, briefly pushed aside the finer points of doctrine and the potential for trouble last week when he explained preemption's logic. "When we see something coming at us," he said, "we should take action to stop it."

Ullman emphasized the radical change embodied in the elevation of preemption to a formal place in U.S. strategic doctrine after years when national security was defined by thickets of nuclear-tipped rockets and their cousins based on land and sea, none of which were ever likely to be launched.

"You're now resting American security on different sets of assumptions," Ullman said. "Given the reality of September 11, this is no longer an academic debate."

© 2002 The Washington Post Company

washingtonpost.com



To: JohnM who wrote (46219)9/22/2002 8:51:25 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
DOING IT WRONG WOULD BE A CRIME...

The Director of the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University's School of Law writes a great editorial that is in today's Chicago Tribune...

Doing it wrong would be a crime
By Doug Cassel
Editorial
The Chicago Tribune
Published September 22, 2002

If the United States attacks Iraq without authorization by the United Nations Security Council, will we violate international law? Will our commander in chief commit an international crime? Does it matter?

Yes, it would be unlawful. Quite possibly a crime as well. And, yes, it matters.

One can understand the presidential demand to put Saddam Hussein out of business. We have already been the victim of one devastating surprise attack. President Bush is determined not to let it happen again.

As the president argued persuasively to the UN this month, Hussein represents a unique threat. His track record includes massacres of civilians by poison gas, military aggression against his neighbors, systematic deceit, a dictatorial regime led by an unstable personality with no internal checks, and a covert program to perfect chemical and biological weapons and develop deliverable nuclear bombs.

But how immediate or certain is the threat? Does he amass an arsenal in order to attack the United States, only to face certain annihilation by nuclear retaliation? Or does Hussein covet nukes for the same reason as most countries--to gain power and respect in geopolitics? To enter the exclusive club of nations too potent to be pushed around? To lead the Arab world?

Some fear he would share his deadly arsenal with international terrorists, leaving no fingerprints. But that reasoning, too, is flawed. Aside from the odds of being caught, no proof links Iraq to the Sept. 11 attacks, and mutual distrust separates secular Hussein from Al Qaeda's religious zealots.

It is one thing for Hussein to harbor Al Qaeda fugitives, as Washington now claims, but quite another to supply them with arms that might be turned on their host. Just ask Abu Nidal, the infamous terrorist recently given sanctuary in Baghdad, only to turn up dead in the company of Iraqi security agents.

Not that anyone should rest easy in a world where Hussein wields power. Whatever doubts there are about the certainty, magnitude or imminence, in the words of the UN Charter he represents a threat to "international peace and security." Because this relatively low standard is met, the UN Security Council has authority to act, by force if necessary.

But the Charter grants this power exclusively to the council. Its premise is that there is likely to be more wisdom and less aggression in the collective than in a unilateral decision to use force. If the case against Hussein is strong enough, it should convince a majority of the 15 Security Council members and escape a veto by any of the permanent five.

But what if the council does not act? Then individual UN members--such as the U.S. and Britain--are governed by other Charter rules mandating that all UN members "shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means" and "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." Plainly these rules bar invasions for purposes of regime change.

One exception may apply. Nothing in the Charter "shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs."

The president asserts pre-emptive self-defense. At West Point in June, he warned: "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long." Our security will require "pre-emptive action when necessary."

Before the UN, he specified that the "first day we may be completely certain [Hussein] has nuclear weapons is when, God forbid, he uses one." We must "prevent that day from coming."

However, the Charter speaks of self-defense when an armed attack "occurs," not when one is merely anticipated in some indefinite future. Only the Security Council can authorize such pre-emptive strikes.

Granted, the Charter reference to the "inherent right" to self-defense must allow individual nations at least some anticipation; surely if the bomb is being assembled, we need not wait until it is wheeled to the launch pad. But how certain or imminent a threat is required?

Precedent can be found in the prosecutions of German leaders for "crimes against peace"--wars of aggression--at Nuremberg. The Germans claimed that their invasions of several countries were justified as self-defense to pre-empt occupations by Britain and France. Most of these bogus claims were summarily rejected.

But one case--Norway--was troubling. Although the evidence was mixed, at least one internal memo warned Adolf Hitler of the "disadvantages to Germany which an occupation by the British would have." His chief of naval operations "harbored the firm conviction that England intended to occupy Norway in the near future." Hitler's secret order for the invasion gave, among other reasons, that it "should prevent British encroachment."

And in fact, he barely beat the British to the punch; only a last-minute postponement of English mining of Norwegian waters allowed German troops to get there first.

Yet the tribunal rejected the defense. "[P]reventive action in foreign territory," it ruled, quoting an oft-cited 19th Century letter by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, "is justified only in case of `an instant and overwhelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.'"

The Germans failed this test because their attack was not "for the purpose of forestalling an imminent Allied landing, but, at the most, that they might prevent an Allied occupation at some future date."

The same could be said of a pre-emptive U.S. invasion of Iraq. Barring any new revelations, our invasion would not forestall an imminent Iraqi attack, but at most, might prevent one at some future date. For such a crime seven top Nazis were found guilty at Nuremberg.

Should George Bush follow in their footsteps?

Not that he is in imminent jeopardy. The crime of "aggression" will not be put on the docket of the new International Criminal Court for at least seven years, and then only if its members reach overwhelming agreement on a legal definition, which likely will require prior certification by the Security Council, where the U.S. has a veto. Still, is this any kind of company to keep?

Some may object that the Nazis were evil aggressors, while our president means well. But in convicting German diplomat Ernst von Weizsacker, another Nuremberg tribunal rejected "the claim that good intentions render innocent that which is otherwise criminal." Aggressive war "is a crime which stands at the pinnacle of criminality. For it there is no justification or excuse."

Which brings us to whether all this matters. The president asked the UN whether it will act against Iraq, "or will it be irrelevant?" In effect he also asked, will international law be irrelevant?

Battered and torn as it may be, international law is not irrelevant, either to our own success or to what we can expect from others in an ever more interdependent world.

The evidence for our own success is right before our eyes. Hawks urged the president to bypass the UN and dispatch our troops to invade Iraq. This lawless, lone wolf approach--not yet ruled out--would succeed militarily, but only at a higher cost in American casualties and deficits. And it would lead to minimum support and maximum hostility from many governments whose cooperation we need globally against terrorism.

Instead--so far--the president went to the UN, and now it appears support might come from unexpected quarters.

And how might the behavior of others be shaped by what Henry Kissinger calls "our first pre-emptive war"? Kissinger rightly cautions that "it is not in the American national interest to establish pre-emption as a universal principle available to every nation."

In other words, the international law rule against pre-emptive strikes is in our national interest. If it is repealed by Bush, powers like India, China and Russia may be tempted to force a few regime changes as well. We can hardly ask them to play by more peaceful rules than we do.

Do we really want a world ruled even less by law and more by raw power, with fewer restraints on war? In evaluating the uncertainty of an unspecified threat in some indefinite future, we cannot but weigh carefully the cost of throwing out the rule book written by American diplomats and judges after World War II.
_____________________________________________________

Doug Cassel is director of the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University's School of Law

Copyright © 2002, Chicago Tribune

chicagotribune.com