Iran could be democratic soon, along with Iraq. Peace on Earth is just around the corner.
Middle East
COMMENTARY
Iran: A blueprint for change
By Suri Dalir
Almost everybody knows - as do the reformists themselves, maybe better than anyone else - that their reforms were dead even before they were born.
And President Mohammad Khatami's recent show didn't, and should not have, deceived anyone. In an unusual public outbust at a news conference in Tehran, Khatami boldly challenged the religious hardliners for blocking his efforts to make Iran more democratic, vowing to present a bill to parliament that would give him more power.
"My repeated warnings on violations of the constitution have been ignored. The president should be empowered to fulfill his constitutional responsibilities. Therefore, I will present a bill to the parliament soon that would allow me to fulfill my responsibilities with greater powers absolutely within the constitution," Khatami said.
That Khatami's wailing and moaning, laced with anemic threats, was only a show is evidenced by the fact that, while conservatives hailed him for his so-called speech - even though he implicitly attributed his failure to their machinations - many reformists were not one bit impressed by his threadbare gambit. It is clear by now that even if Khatami were what he claimed and still claims to be, that is, a reformist, he is and will remain as impotent as an emasculated deity.
He, as well as the religious hardliners, know that the majority of Iranians want a separation of politics and religion. But Khatami and his peers, instead of yielding to the demands of the people, are passing off an oxymoronic term, "Islamic democracy" for the real thing, democracy.
The truth is, while Khatami promises to bring civil freedoms to Iran, his efforts are sabotaged by the hardliners who control unelected institutions such as the judiciary and who are supported by supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the appointed religious figure who outranks the elected president.
And while any reforms that Khatami might propose will most likely be passed by the reformist-dominated parliament, the bills have to be approved by the hardline religious supervisory body, the unelected Guardian Council, which has in the past rejected reforms proposed by parliament.
Democracy, being secular by nature and definition, is as incompatible with religion as mating and reproduction between two different species. Believing that "religious democracy" is a contradiction in terms, as is freedom in shackles, and that the majority of Iranians are asking for real democracy, the question arises how secular democracy can be attained, especially when the religious hardliners have their claws dug as deeply as possible into each and every organ of power. Before attempting to answer this question, a brief review of the political context of the issue might prove helpful.
Iran is an isolated country in the real sense of the word. It is surrounded by Arabs and Turks, and it has a long history of on-and-off animosity with both. (A few Persian-speaking Afghans or Tajiks don't change this fact.) To make matters worse, Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and company, at the onset of the uprising drew a clear line between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims (Iran is almost 90 percent Shi'ite) to cement the latter's indisputable power and authority.
This led to a deepening conflict not only between the Sunnis and Shi'ites in Iran, but between Iran and the rest of the Muslim world, the overwhelming majority of which espouse the Sunni branch of Islam and resented Iranian attempts to spread their Islamic revolution. Khomeini, with his misguided political views, generated from his utmost naivete and lack of political insight, turned every one of these Muslim countries into Iran's potential or actual enemy.
Saudis, besides being designated as "worse than America", were spurned and despised for being Wahhabi, a strict Sunni sect. The Palestine Liberation Organization was sidelined for not following Khomeini's version of Islam and his policies in its conflict with Israel. Khomeini then supported the Shi'ite Ayatollah Hakim as the bona fide leader of Iraq, thus providing Saddam Hussein with an excuse to invade Iran in 1980, the start of the crippling eight-year war.
Libya was given a cold shoulder from the beginning. The regime's representatives were sent to Turkey, India, and later to the newly-founded Muslim republics of former Soviet Union, carrying vast amounts of chador (black veils that the regime enforces on women), which were doled out, ostensibly as gifts, among the unveiled schoolgirls of those countries. In short, Khomeini's words and deeds became the exact opposite and a mockery of the slogan inscribed on a newly-minted coin: "Oh, Muslims of the world unite."
Among non-Muslim countries, America, of course, was the arch-fiend (often translated as "Great Satan".) In one speech, Khomeini declared that "America is worse than England, England is worse than America and the USSR worse than both". This statement made the Americans very happy, for it gave them assurance that the leftists in Iran wouldn't be given a voice or a chance. That would have made the process of disintegration of the USSR a little easier and faster.
Slogans such as "Israel should be annihilated," and "The road to Jerusalem passes through Karbala," (where the shrine of the third Imam in Iraq is located) covered the walls in every city, town and even village. As a result, Iran didn't have a single friend in the region and beyond, except Syria, which was bribed with millions of barrels of free oil for its nominal support of Iran. And after almost two decades, when Khatami tried to break this enormous barrier of isolation, the hardliners constantly sabotaged his meager detente efforts in any way they could. It should be noted that the hardline conservatives are more than eager to have a relationship with the West, especially America, but they want to be the initiator and the beneficiaries of any such relationship with the outside world.
The second point to be taken into consideration in the quest for democracy is the place of religion in Iran. It can hardly be denied that the majority of Iranians are essentially religious. However, there has always been a profound difference in religious outlook between Iranians and the majority of other Muslims.
While in Saudi Arabia, for instance, the canonical laws and their observance according to the Koran are of central importance, the nature of Iranians' adherence to religion is more of a mystical attachment rather than rigid piety. The appearance of mystic or mystically-oriented poets and thinkers shortly after the Iranians' conversion into Islam after the 7th century Arab Muslim conquest of Iran and the Iranians' endless fascination with mysticism and mystical poetry attests to the fact that it was the spiritual, rather than the practical aspect of Islam that led to their near voluntary conversion into Islam.
This is not the place to discuss too deeply the roots of these tendencies in the religious outlook of Iranians. Suffice to say that Iranians believe that the patriarch, whether in heaven or on the earth, is and has always been loved, feared and worshipped with a lover's fervent - and a lover's informality. Thirteenth century Persian poet Jalaluddin Rumi's famous parable of a shepherd and Moses is an excellent example of this religious outlook. As the story goes, at first, Moses is horrified at the informal manner in which the shepherd addresses God, but after a revelation he learns that "there are no rules for worship. Say whatever and however your loving [of God] tells you to. Your sweet blasphemy is the truest devotion. Through you a whole world is freed. Loosen your tongue and don't worry what comes out. It's all the light of the spirit."
Hence, the place of intrinsic and spontaneous religious attachment in Iranian mystic-religious beliefs rather than rigidly-imposed religion and strict adherence to what Rumi calls the superficial aspects of religion, or "the skin of the Koran which we throw to dogs".
The strict attitude towards religion is manifested nowhere better than in the fundamentalists' constant efforts to implement such laws as Islamic dress code or the ban on alcohol, and the people's obstinate defiance of those laws, while pilgrimage to holy cities or visiting this or that saint's tomb goes on as enthusiastically as ever. No doubt, the atrocities committed by fundamentalists have, to a great extent, dampened religious zeal and fervor, and disaffected large masses of people. Yet it will be naive to believe that Iranians have abandoned their Islamic beliefs. To be sure, political views, social class or rank, and where a person lives, have almost no bearing on those feelings.
The emigre Iranians of monarchist tendencies (who lost most of their wealth and all of their power to Islamic rule) hold, every Thursday, parties consecrated to the third Imam's stepbrother. Interesting enough, 90 percent of these people don't fast, don't perform daily prayers, don't wear veils - unlike Arab, Pakistani and Afghan women abroad - and freely associate with members of the opposite sex. Yet they love, fear and venerate this semi-saintly figure fanatically as the epitome of religious ideals. This may illustrate the love and adulation of the patriarch as the basis of Iranians' religious devotion.
Viewed from this angle, it wouldn't be too far from the truth if one said that Iran was trapped into being the first Islamic state, as Russia was forced to be the first communist country, contrary to Karl Marx's prediction. And now they want the separation of state and religion, and are striving to force out those who come between them and their god.
No doubt, there are and have always been fanatics and fundamentalist Islamists who long for a strictly Islamic state. But with the testimony of history, they have always been in the minority. Otherwise, the poetry of Omar Khayyam, Hafez Shirazi, Shaykh Sa'di, and yes, Rumi, wouldn't have existed. One can hardly find similar poetry in other Muslim countries.
Therefore, while the majority of Iranians, despite their adherence to Islam, want an end to theocratic rule, there is the fundamentalist minority who want to hold on to the ideal of an all-powerful Islamic state with tooth and nail.
The terrorists who attacked the Twin Towers and the Pentagon by destroying themselves epitomize the mentality of Islamic fundamentalists everywhere, including Iran. Moreover, they will definitely be encouraged and assisted by mysterious figures, inside and outside Iran, should there be a change towards democracy. Considering the circumstances, one wonders whether the establishment of a secular government is possible. And there is even a bigger question, who should take the lead towards such a government?
Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed shah, might seem a likely candidate, and, indeed, he has started a campaign for secular democracy recently. But those familiar with Iran's internal conditions and international position hardly take him seriously. His opponents have discussed, in detail, the reasons that disqualify him for the leadership, the most damning being that he is the son of a tyrant and his association with those who served his father.
However, what is more important than his capability to lead a movement is the question of his ability, if he succeeds to the "throne", to deliver what he is promising Iranians. First of all, his addressees, besides some aged monarchist, are very young people who imagine that as soon as Pahlavi sets foot in Iran he will lift all the restrictions that stand between them and fulfilling their youthful desires (which have been sharpened by watching Western television through satellite.)
However, his audiences are mostly from northern Tehran, the affluent part of the capital, and a few big cities. Besides, the fanatic Islamists, at least for a while, might very well turn their dreams into a nightmare. I even doubt if Pahlavi will dare to propose the lifting of hijab, the strict code of dress for Muslim women. Second, his opponents rightly predict that he won't be able to solve the gigantic economic problems that the country faces or reduce or eliminate unemployment.
It should be added here that no one possesses a magic wand to make the near arid field of Iranian economy flourish overnight. But those who have been patient to the limit won't hear the request or command for more patience from someone who has promised them the horn of plenty. Certainly, there will be other difficulties and failures, too. So, either he will have to give up or, most probably, start ruling the country with an iron fist.
Nothing, though, could be more difficult than containing a people who have had the experience of overthrowing a monarchy, as happened in January 1979, when the shah left for exile from Iran. Although America, Europe and the rest of the world didn't offer asylum to his father during the last days of his life, the West might want to assist Pahlavi now on his way home, or when he ascends the desecrated seat of power. But the harmful consequences might well outweigh the doubtful benefits of supporting a ruler who is not trusted or accepted by the majority of his own people. The result is not difficult to predict: the widespread growth of fundamentalism and intensification of hatred of the West, especially America, in Iran and the region.
Other opposition groups wishing the overthrow of the current regime in Iran are almost as ineffectual as to be non-existent. There are tiny communist groups which, enjoying the freedom of democratic societies in the West, oppose democracy as fiercely as Josef Stalin himself. There are the nationalistic groups, which, lacking any coherent strategy or plan, are still bogged down in the debate on whether or not prime minister Mohammad Mosaddeq was a constitutional monarchist, and who betrayed him when he was overthrown in 1953.
No doubt, the relentless crushing of opposition groups by the Islamic republic has left no room for any meaningful activists in Iran. Nevertheless, these political parties have neither been able to establish themselves as a well-organized and effective force abroad, nor project their voices to Iranians inside - something that Ayatollah Khomeini did so effectively.
The Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) is the only organized group outside Iran. Yet, being sheltered and supported by the enemy Saddam Hussein, the group has lost the trust of the vast majority of Iranians, and is despised at least as much as the ruling clergy, for "treason". Moreover, all of these groups suffer from a common ailment: worshipping past heroic or not-so-heroic figures has left no room for independent thinking or planning a viable strategy.
Some of these groups, such as the MKO, monarchists and communists, dream of forcing Iranians into another bloody revolution. However, this is hardly more than wishful thinking. Iranians have witnessed, to their dismay and horror, that "revolution does kill its own children", and that today's revolutionaries can easily turn out to be tomorrows's tyrants. Besides, they have lost thousands on thousands of their sons, brothers, husbands and fathers to the eight-year war with Iraq that ended in 1988, which fattened the mullahs and helped them to tighten their grip on power and wealth. Iran won't again lose even one of her children to anyone, if she can.
In the face of such formidable obstacles, then, and in the absence of a qualified person or group to organize and lead a movement, what can be done? Should Iranians give up the hope for a secular democracy? Certainly not. Actually, some reformists, intellectuals (both inside and abroad), many disillusioned revolutionaries, some former fundamentalists and a few clergy have already denounced theocracy in favor of a secular democracy.
But, paradoxically, it is the last group that seems to be the one capable of untying this Gordian knot. Some members of this group are loved and venerated by the majority of Iranians, to the point of being accepted as leaders. And they have the power of fatwa (religious ruling), which could sanction secular democracy (fiercely resisted by fanatics as un-Islamic) as well as ending Iran's self-imposed and destructive isolation.
Further, some younger clergy, such as Kadivar, Eshkavari (now in jail), Abdollah Nouri (also in jail), and senior religious figures, such Ayatollah Sane'i, advocate separation of politics and religion. And of course there is Ayatollah Montazeri, who is loved and venerated to such an extent that even monarchists and anti-democratic communists couldn't dare to oppose him or question his legitimacy. (Ayatollah Montazeri is a senior cleric of Iran who was first chosen by Ayatollah Khomeini to be his successor. But his liberal views angered Khomeini and he was ousted. In recent years Ayatollah Khamenei, Khomeini's successor, has placed Ayatollah Montazeri under house arrest.)
True, some non-clergy intellectuals, such as Abdol Sorush, advocate a secular democracy. But no matter how many interpretations of the Koranic lines they present to justify a non-religious government, and no matter how fitting a religious context they provide for their political views, they can't even come close to Ayatollah Montazeri, with his immaculate past and his brave defiance of Khomeini when others either carried out Khomeini's murderous orders or just stood by.
These intellectuals can't claim the love and trust of Iranians as Ayatollah Montazeri does. Ayatollah Montazeri's objection to Khomeini on the brutal massacre of thousands of people (some as young as 13 years old, some even pregnant) cost him the leadership and subjected him to house arrest up to this date.
However, he hasn't been silent, even under pressure to do so. He has criticized the ruling clergy for their un-Islamic policies. He has condemned the brutal treatment of the youth. He has declared terrorism as haram (canonically unlawful.) Besides, his charismatic personality places him far above the ordinary politicians and the so-called sophisticated intellectuals.
Anyone who has read his memoirs (which are banned in Iran) knows that he expresses his views with such a fascinating lucidity that instantly inspires trust and respect. He has the capability to reach the public with the same simplicity, and without needing intellectual acrobatics. He could, for instance, ask the guards and leg-breaker volunteers not to take orders from those whose words and deeds are un-Islamic, and not to shed the blood of their brothers (believe me, the majority of them will listen to him.)
Or he could point out that chanting "death" to an entire nation, even if some of their politicians are hostile to Iran, is cursing God's creation. And more importantly, he could, by a fatwa, sanction civil disobedience - the most effective tool to break the back of the Islamic Republic without jeopardizing lives, as well as shielding the democratic movement and democratic enterprises against the aggression of hardliners, their mercenaries or fanciful followers.
This sounds like a long haul, considering the internal and external obstacles to the realization of the wishes of Iranians. And no doubt the brunt of carrying out this extremely difficult task will fall on the Iranian people. Yet this seems to be the only way out. However, there is not much time left. Ayatollah Montazeri is old, he is 79, and ailing. And no one else could replace him, the Grand Ayatollah.
Thus, the time is ripe for the so-called opposition groups, such as the National Front, the National-Religious and the Nation of Iran parties to redeem themselves by declaring their support of Ayatollah Montazeri and his views, and help Iranians in any way that they can. The students in the Office for Reinforcement of Solidarity, instead of writing ineffectual letters and futile criticism of Khamenei and his organs of power, should announce that they support and follow Ayatollah Montazeri as the spiritual leader, and invite all students and others to join them.
And of course, the reformists could come out of the closet and make good the promises that they have made whenever they have needed votes, but then forgot them once they were in office. However, it would be absolute naivete to believe that the Iranian people could achieve their goals in isolation.
They need all the help that they can get from around the world. President George W Bush, just recently, declared that the US would help the people of Iran. And he could. To begin with, America should stop humiliating Iranians by finger-printing them or denying them visas. Washington could also stop implicit and explicit threats of Iran, such as labeling the country a part of an axis of evil along with Iraq and North Korea, and let Iranians find a way to end their miseries.
Harassing or humiliating Iranians won't force them into a bloody confrontation with the theocrats. On the contrary, it will provide the ruling clergy with an excuse to tighten their grip over the country. Unlike what some Iranians argue, it would not be expedient at this stage for America to release Iranian assets, for they would be "mullah-devoured", as Iranians put it. However, America could and should lift sanctions against the country. Presently, Iranians are paralyzed with poverty. Many put all of their time and energy into just feeding themselves and their families. And everyone knows very well that poverty is not a suitable soil for democracy to grow.
Similarly, the European Union could refrain from setting preconditions for trade with Iran, if not for supporting the Iranians' quest for democracy - as they sometimes claim - at least for the sake of very profitable deals with Iran. Those conditions could be met when Iran is freed from theocracy.
But the Europeans are following and will follow America's footsteps. Whatever British poet William Wordsworth meant by "The child is father of man", in a poetic expression of his romantic outlook, it has become a reality in a very peculiar way: the child America has become the father of man Europe, and among the most obedient of yesterday's fathers and today's children is Great Britain.
This particular child, because of its long-standing experience with imperialistic rule, is still "closer to the source of knowledge", and has willingly put that knowledge at the service of the child-com-father, as in the 1953 coup in Iran. Even today, BP building the Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi oil route rather than a more cost-effective and safer route through Iran, is an indication that Britain is more than willing to ignore Iran's infrastructure, according to the wishes of father.
But it is not that important. What Iran needs more than anything else is the lifting of sanctions by America and a meaningful relationship between the two countries. If and when that happens, the children will follow the father. And it will be for everybody's benefit.
Suri Dalir has a PhD from UCLA in Middle Eastern Literatures and Cultures
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